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Abstract 
Intra-organizational factors are an important line of inquiry to improve the explanation of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) behavior in current theory and management concepts.  
 
Contributions from organizational behavior literature were used in this thesis to orient the 
analysis to the company’s structure in order to provide alternative explanations as to ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ companies addressed social responsibility issues and activities. Qualitative 
methods were employed to investigate the structure/decision relationship among a sample of 
decision processes of multinational business organizations. Conclusions suggest that social 
responsibility issues and activities can be treated contextually by the company, and its 
complexity can influence and shape the development of alternatives to address the issues and 
activities. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
“The benefits of corporate responsibility are hard-won in organizations and often 
non-existent in the short-term.”1  The quote, taken from Simon Zadek’s article, Path to 
Corporate Responsibility, highlights an often overlooked, but important reality regarding a 
business organization’s engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Institutionalizing if a CSR issue or activity is not a given. There can be an internal struggle 
for the ‘soul of the practice’2 between those that believe it is the right thing to do and those 
that seek private gains from its implementation. Thus, achieving internal engagement and 
alignment around CSR – grounded in consensus and collaboration – is not easy. And, indeed, 
are ‘hard-won’ for businesses that have publicly expressed a commitment to do so.  
The complexity of trying to explain how and why a firm implements CSR should not 
be underestimated. The investigation can take the researcher from the physical (e.g. the 
business organization itself) to the metaphysical (e.g. what is its purpose and role in the 
world). It can also take the researcher into the two states of the firm – rational and irrational – 
where the firm’s stated CSR goals and strategies is contradicted by high profile public 
controversies and pitfalls. Enron, Arthur Anderson, WorldCom, and several Wall Street firms 
portrayed themselves as model CSR firms, most notably for their internal controls and 
contributions to society. As we witnessed, the internal controls did not work, and the impact 
on employees, families, shareholders, and consumers were significant. Other instances are far 
less eventful. While Toyota was actively marketing its hybrid automobiles – and linking this 
to its considerations of environment and sustainability issues – it was also actively lobbying 
against increasing fuel standards in the United States in order to offset potential investment 
and sales losses to its sport utility vehicles and pickup trucks.
3
 This is not say that Toyota is 
an irresponsible company, but perhaps its CSR is part of a broader set of issues and concerns 
that may affect decision processes.   
When inconsistencies or contradictions arise, we may not consider CSR as part of a 
multifaceted decision process where there may be other competing issues, agendas, and 
priorities. One reason may be that CSR is rationalized based on an inventory of a company’s 
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CSR statements and activities. However, public goals may not be truly representative of the 
company because, “organizations tend to hold public goals for front purposes.”4 Another 
reason may be that CSR is depicted as an outcome of a logical schema that integrates CSR 
principles and/or issues into the firm’s management system or strategies. These 
rationalizations are associated with a number of prevailing CSR theories and conceptual 
frameworks.
1
 While each of these inquiries is by and large correct in terms of why companies 
pursue CSR, they provide only partial explanations as to the underlying reasons behind a 
company’s decision to pursue a specific course of action. For example, unexamined in these 
inquiries are why certain stakeholder demands were chosen above others; how specific 
performance goals were framed and decided upon; and what and who was driving the firm’s 
motivation to address a particular issue. These rationalizations may oversimplify the structure 
and complexity of the business organization and overlook the decision process. There can be 
many internal stakeholders with diverse interests, different exposures, or varying levels of 
comfort with a particular CSR issue or activity.  
Intra-organizational aspects are emerging as a basis of inquiry to address the gaps in 
these current explanations of why and how firms pursue CSR.
5
  According to Kunal Basu, 
“Disregarding institutional determinants can lead to failure in understanding how managers 
make critical decisions.” There has been a shift in the analysis and theory of CSR, which is 
contributing to the body of knowledge to help us investigate the decision process for CSR.
6
 
First, analysis is shifting the investigation from a focus on outcomes to a focus on means. 
Currently CSR is an outcome related to (i) macro-social level effects, such as external 
pressures and societal issues on the firm; (ii) organizational-level effects, such as the 
integration of CSR into firm processes; or (iii) individual-level effects that are largely based 
on individual efforts to promote CSR.
7
 Corresponding to this analytical shift, theory is 
progressing in the direction of performance-oriented management analysis where normative 
arguments are implicit.
8
  
                                                     
1
 Ethical, relational, instrumental, political, and managerial theories will be discussed in Section 2.  
 3 
 
1.1. Research Goals and Objectives  
The crux of this investigation is the facilitation of CSR in decision processes in large, 
highly complex business organizations. These business organizations are typically 
transnational in nature operating in multiple markets. There are numerous, differentiated 
corporate departments and business units contributing to the management of the company’s 
resources, products and services, and other ongoing issues. The company functions in a 
decentralized way, though there can be a mix between command-and-control from the 
corporate center and degrees of autonomy by the business units. They generally implement a 
multi-prong business strategy that involves multi-domestic and global strategies.  
This type of structure requires a rethinking and reorientation of the way CSR is 
treated in analysis. If we treat CSR as a company activity or course of action facilitated by a 
decision process, then we must analyze its co-existence with other company concerns and 
issues that the company must attend to simultaneously. Then, if CSR issues vie with other 
priorities for various business reasons, then we must account for the business organization’s 
complexity where different internal groups are in a state of conflict and struggle for sources 
of power and influence.
9
  This reorientation of analysis can provide an alternative 
explanation of why and how a firm selects certain CSR strategies, policies or other activities. 
This is a significant aspect of the investigation of CSR behavior because it may help deepen 
the analysis on internal aspects and the impact and implications on outcomes.  
The overall goal of my research is to contribute to the body of interest and knowledge 
of CSR in managerial studies, particularly organizational-level analysis and the impact on 
firm process and performance. It will hopefully support the opening of new avenues for 
future research, particularly how comprehensively decisions are integrated into strategy and 
the effect of choice(s) on the outcome for the company.     
The main objective of my research is to understand the effect of high complexity and 
related macro-organizational behavior on decision processes in connection to CSR issues or 
activities. Because there is no widely-accepted and common definition of CSR, we should 
not be too prescriptive with the usage of ‘CSR issues and activities’. For this purpose of this 
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research it is broadly used. Issues would have some materiality or significance to the 
company and would fall under the rubric of CSR; for example, human rights, transparency, 
economic development, and environmental protection. Activities can be either internal (e.g. 
company strategies, policies, guidelines, research and development, management processes 
and tools); or external (e.g. philanthropic contributions, socially-responsible products, multi-
stakeholder dialogues, or community investment programs). Again, these are difficult to 
define precisely, as CSR-related issues and activities can vary across different companies, 
industries, cultures, and geographies.  
Macro-organizational behavior is defined as “conflict or power of major sub-systems 
or organizations and the contextual, as opposed to individual, factors that help explain and 
manage these features of organizational life”.10 Here the analysis centers on internal 
departments or units, as well as the inner context they operate in. An undercurrent of macro-
organizational behavior is organizational politics, which is defined as, “… intentional acts of 
influence undertaken by individuals or groups to enhance or protect their self-interest when 
conflicting courses of action are possible”.11 While political behavior is widely accepted as a 
common feature in organizational life, it may be overlooked as a potential influence on the 
decision process related to CSR issues and activities. However, it is worth reminding that it is 
not the objective of this research to determine whether the outcomes of the decision process 
impacted the company’s overall business or CSR performance. Nor is it the objective to 
examine a company’s CSR as it pertains to its overall corporate values or beliefs. This type 
of correlation is again an opportunity for future investigations.  
With this as a basis of inquiry, my main research question is what is the effect of 
structural complexity on the decision processes related to CSR issues and activities in large, 
highly complex business organizations? My inquiry was guided by three assumptions:  
1. Complex business organizations have structures that engender and foster macro-
organizational behavior. As a result, strategic decision processes may not occur in 
complete isolation from macro-organizational behavior. 
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2. ‘CSR’ as an operating term and practice can be internally abstract and ambiguous. 
As a result, CSR crosscuts different organizational issues, functional roles and 
responsibilities, and departments/units particularly in large, complex business 
organizations.  
3. In complex business organizations CSR issues and activities may be an outcome 
of a strategic decision process where alternatives are generated and a preferred 
alternative is selected by top leadership.  
Some of these assumptions are based on my experience and observations having worked in, 
and with, several large and complex business organizations. They served as reference points 
for my investigation.  
1.2. Overview of the Thesis  
The thesis is divided into five sections. Section one provides a review and analysis of 
current literature with regard to the reasons why and how companies pursue CSR. The aim of 
this section is to assess potential variance in explaining how large, complex business 
organizations make decisions related to CSR issues or activities. In line with the emerging 
focus on organizational-level analysis, the investigation will examine institutional aspects, 
but take an alternative look at the company’s structure and inner complexity.  
Section two and three will discuss the data collection and analysis process. The aim 
of this section is to (i) reconstruct the organizational-level context where decisions on CSR 
issues and activities were facilitated; and (ii) examine the affect on a course of action or 
preferred alternative.  
Section three and four will discuss the results and meaning of the findings with 
respect to the current variance identified in the literature review. In other words, are there 
potentially alternative explanations, in relation to prevailing conceptual frameworks and CSR 
theories, as to why and how complex business organizations select certain CSR activities?  
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Section five will discuss the conclusions and recommendations that contribute to 
future research management studies on CSR.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
The justifications for CSR are often framed with an explicit or implicit normative and 
stakeholder core. Business is responding to societal expectations, which are ostensibly 
shaping how business is conducted and how performance is measured.
12
 For example, 
producing products and services in a sustainable manner to protect people and the 
environment, or securing trust and support from stakeholders to conduct and maintain 
business. Over the past decade the behaviors of business have increasingly become 
scrutinized by varied stakeholders, including media, activist groups and NGOs, international 
institutions, and shareholder groups. Even governments are crafting more explicit CSR 
policies and standards, such as the European Commission policy on CSR. Then again, the 
expectation and role of business has also expanded to address a myriad of social issues 
traditionally under the purview of the state.
2
 Some firms may actually need to engage in 
particular societal issues to conduct business safely and securely. These issues are by and 
large material to their business. Yet, some companies may be employing a strategy to appear 
to be aligned with or in compliance with societal expectations. While the objective may be to 
reinforce or restore the firm’s legitimacy externally, in actuality it may be designed to 
preserve the current leadership, processes, and majority beliefs internally.
13
 It may never be 
clear whether this is a one-time occurrence or a fundamental change in corporate behavior.  
An output of a management systems process also may not provide a complete and 
accurate explanation of CSR behavior. For example, companies are constantly reconciling 
competing issues and demands placed on the organizational system by internal departments 
and units, as well as external stakeholders and issues. CSR-related issues or activities would 
also be subsumed into a negotiated process that can involve several alternatives; so who is 
involved, and their motivations and sources of power and influence can affect how far and 
deep CSR is integrated and institutionalized.  
                                                     
2
 To respond to various global issues and societal expectations, companies developed, co-developed, and/or participate in 
voluntary codes of conduct or multi-stakeholder initiatives.   
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There may be limits in using outcomes-oriented explanations to justify CSR behavior. 
It may not account for internal issues and its drivers. This is important for several reasons. A 
normative core may not always help to explain the apparent inconsistencies that may exist 
between a company’s public CSR position and their misaligned actions. Similarly, a 
relational core may not always explain why some companies would prioritize one set of 
issues and stakeholders over another set with respect to their CSR. For instance, in Asia, “… 
asking where their primary responsibilities lie they [corporation] must recognize that it 
depends on which stakeholders are prioritized: shareholders in transatlantic capitalism; 
employees in traditional Japanese capitalism; owners of family capitalism; customers if the 
purpose of the corporation is customer satisfaction; or community, in the view of many 
NGOs.”14 A management core would not necessarily account for the organizational setting in 
which CSR issues and activities are treated. There can be inherent complexities and tensions 
associated with structure of the organization and the goals of different groups within the 
organization.    
In contemporary literature the concepts for explaining CSR still lack a strong 
empirical base; “This field of study [CSR] is not only theoretically and conceptually poor, 
but it also empirically unexplored.”15 From the existing literature, theory tends to explain or 
infer decisions regarding CSR issues and activities as an ‘ends’; in other words, various 
circumstances that would rationalize CSR behavior, e.g. maintaining relationships with 
stakeholders or responding to regulatory constraints. Because these explanations may be 
empirically weak, there has been more thinking and focus on the ‘means’. This change has 
included studies on the integration of CSR issues into the firm’s business process. This 
analytical focus, however, requires more empirical investigation. At its current state, it may 
be an oversimplification to create constructs or schemata to explain how CSR is internalized, 
and then make the linkages to a firm’s CSR activities or policies, strategies or positions on 
CSR issues. Multinational companies, for example, may be too complex to formulate such 
generalizations.    
A further review of the literature is needed to develop a more grounded understanding 
and explanation of the ‘means’ or ‘how’, particularly the decision process at the firm’s level. 
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Specifically, what facilitated internal decision making to pursue a CSR issue or activity? 
How were alternatives generated in the decision process and why was a preferred alternative 
selected? This research orientation toward the decision process would consider the 
complexity of the business organization and its internal context in which decisions are 
framed and processed. A focus on the decision process may help to explain how 
comprehensively decisions are integrated into the company’s CSR strategy, policy or 
activities.  
The literature review is organized in three parts and builds on the work of several 
researchers in the fields of CSR, organizational structure, and macro-organizational behavior.    
Part one examines current theoretical and conceptual developments of CSR that 
explain why and how a firm implements CSR activities. The determinants of influence on 
firm decision-making will be examined as part of this discussion. Part two and three looks at 
alternative explanations that may account for variance in prevailing theory, and focuses on 
the organizational decision process that can facilitate action on a CSR issue or activity. Part 
two will examine the decision-making process in complex business organizations, 
particularly how structure and macro-organizational behavior can influence a firm’s decision 
on CSR. Part three will analyze the premises of decision-making. In this section the 
discussion will look at the co-existence of CSR with other firm issues and priorities and the 
overall affect on decision processes.  
2.1. Theoretical Developments  
CSR is a widely used term that means different things to different people.
16
 Its 
ambiguity and malleability is both its strength and weakness depending who is defining it 
and how it is being used. Thus, there is significant heterogeneity of concepts and theories 
associated with CSR. Nevertheless they serve as important points of inquiry to investigate the 
potential influence on strategic CSR decision making. A number of these developments 
provide clues, perspectives, and insights into what can broadly guide a firm’s decisions on 
CSR issues and activities.  
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The analysis and explanation of CSR has evolved since the 1950s. In one of the 
influential works by William Frederick, “The Growing Concern over Business 
Responsibility”, he observed some of the underlying tensions between business decision-
making and CSR. Frederick recognized that profit-making is a constant and will be a source 
of ongoing divergence with the ideals of social responsibility.
17
 He also suggested that 
business managers may not be able to influence the organizational context in which they 
operate in. His early observations offer two important insights. First, while there are 
pressures to adapt or conform to societal issues, there are also pressures to stay true to the 
mission of the business. Second, companies are not mechanized entities where conformance 
to external issues or expectations is somehow automated. Integration of CSR can disrupt the 
natural order of the firm. The give and take between decisions to pursue profits and going 
beyond the core business is still by and large implicit in contemporary definitions of CSR, 
“the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, 
and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social [and environmental] benefits along 
with traditional economic gains which the firm seeks.”18 These observations allude to the 
inherent and ongoing tensions, even in contemporary CSR, that continue to exist between a 
company’s societal responsibilities and its strategic decision-making process.  
The normative origins of CSR are not abandoned in contemporary literature. 
Decision-making around ‘doing the right thing’ or ‘doing no harm’ in the exercise of 
business is still an ethical imperative for most companies. However, there has been 
increasing research and analysis of the institutionalization of CSR in the management 
systems and processes of business organizations. And this pivot is helping to integrate CSR 
into management oriented studies, which will advance knowledge and understanding of the 
intra-organizational aspects of CSR, including strategic decision processes – the focus of this 
paper.  
By drawing on the collation of theories and concepts and the analyses of Davide 
Secchi,
19
 Elisabet Garriga and Domènec Melé,
20
 and John Campbell,
21
 five theories of CSR 
are pulled together to identify the potential determinants of CSR decision-making: (1) 
ethical; (2) instrumental; (3) political; (4) relational; and (5) managerial (see Table 1).   
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Theory  Potential Relationship with CSR Decision-Making Some References 
Ethical Company decision-making is guided by an 
overarching normative consideration regarding its 
relationship with society. The company should 
accept social responsibilities as an ethical obligation 
above any other.  
• Respecting human rights in the conduct of 
business 
• Balancing social, environmental and economic 
considerations in decision-making 
• Contributing to the common good 
 
William Frederick (Business ethics) 
William Bowen (Business ethics) 
T. Donaldson (Business ethics) 
Edward Freeman (Stakeholder 
theory) 
Report of the Special Representative 
of the United Nations Secretary-
General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises 
(2008) 
Brundtland Report of the United 
Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development 
(1987) 
 
Instrumental 
 
Company decision-making is influenced by 
economic benefits to the firm. The corporation is an 
instrument for wealth creation and this is the primary 
social responsibility. The economic aspect of its 
interactions with society is the main consideration, 
including positive impacts that can accrue to society. 
CSR is a means to an end. 
• Maximizing of shareholder value  
• Gaining competitive advantage in markets  
• Enhancing firm reputation and/or product brand 
recognition 
Milton Friedman (Instrumental 
theory, Shareholder value) 
Michael Porter, Mark Kramer 
(Strategic Philanthropy, CSR 
Competitiveness) 
C.K. Prahalad (‘Base of the 
Pyramid’) 
Political  
 
Company decision-making is influenced by the 
social power of corporations, specifically in its 
relationship with society and its political 
responsibility with this power. It is also influenced 
by the broader political economy, specifically the 
constraints placed on the company.      
• Maintaining social contract with society 
• Demonstrating corporate citizenship  
• Acting in response to regulation, industry self-
regulation, multi-stakeholder governance and 
other ‘soft laws’  
John Campbell (Political Theory) 
David Detomasi (Political Theory) 
 
Relational   Company decision-making is influenced by the 
demands and expectations of stakeholders identified 
by the company. Companies depend on society for 
its continuity and growth; even for the existence of 
Edward Freeman (Stakeholder 
theory) 
S.P. Sethi (Social issues 
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the company itself.  
• Managing stakeholder relationships 
• Managing stakeholder issues  
management) 
 
Managerial  Company decision-making is influenced by the 
performance of the company’s social responsibility.  
• Managing social issues  
• Measuring social performance 
• Reporting social performance  
 
S.P. Sethi (Social issues 
management, code of conduct) 
Steven Wartick and Philip Cochran, 
D.J Wood,  A.B. Carroll (Corporate 
Social Performance) 
 Kunal Basu and Guido Palazzo 
(Organizational sensemaking) 
François Maon, Adam Lindgreen 
and Valérie Swaen (CSR 
integration) 
Table 1: Summary of the Potential Relationship with CSR Decision-Making 
2.2. Frame and Gap  
The goal of the literature review is to understand why and how a company makes a 
decision on a CSR issue or activity. The review focused on a number of existing theories that 
offer a logical conceptual framework to explain why and how a company would behave in a 
socially-responsible way. Yet, these theories provide limited explanations of the company’s 
decision process. They tend to be either outcomes-oriented or process-oriented with a 
pervasive normative core. Outcome-oriented theories rationalize decisions as a conclusion, a 
result, or a preferred alternative such as those often described in a company’s CSR or 
Sustainability Reports. The company’s CSR issues and activities can be fitted and explained 
in the conceptual frameworks. Process-oriented theories rationalize decisions as a logical and 
sequential schema to arrive at a decision. However, they often neglect to fully examine 
macro-organizational behavior and the potential impact and implications on decision 
processes. Both theoretical constructs therefore offer limited insight into the decision process 
and this aspect deserves greater attention if we are to evolve and advance the research on 
CSR behavior.  
Without more investigation of the decision process, CSR would be treated as a 
separate and distinct issue inside the company, which may not reflect business reality. Given 
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the number high level policy statements of most companies, we can infer that CSR as an idea 
or value may not be a choice, but rather a given. But it would be naive to believe that CSR 
related to specific positions on global issues, internal or external activities, or corporate 
strategies is not part of some sort of decision process where other company priorities and 
interests are attended to simultaneously. If we move from an outcomes-oriented analysis to 
explain CSR decisions to a means-oriented analysis, we may begin to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of how CSR can be affected by the structure and process of the 
company, particularly what is driving CSR decisions, how alternatives are selected and 
chosen, and why preferred alternatives or choice are made.    
2.3. CSR Theory 
In this section we review the five theoretical constructs widely used to explain a 
company’s CSR behavior. For the purpose of this research they serve as a baseline of 
knowledge to examine why and how a company would choose a specific CSR issue to 
engage on or activity to implement (see Figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1: Potential Determinants of Influence on CSR Decision-Making:  
Current Concepts and Theories  
 
Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Process 
Ethical 
Social obligation to 
society 
Instrumental 
Economic benefits to 
the firm 
 
Relational 
Stakeholder and 
issue considerations 
Political 
Constraints from 
political economy 
Managerial 
Process integration 
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2.3.1. Instrumental  
Instrumental theory takes a utilitarian view in which the role of the company is to 
create and protect its wealth. CSR in this sense is a means to an end, e.g. profit and survival 
of the company and anything otherwise would be unsustainable both for the company and the 
economic system. Instrumental theory has been largely influenced by Milton Friedman who 
believed all company investments, including social investments, should increase shareholder 
value; otherwise it would not be an optimal use of the company’s resources.  
Instrumental theory essentially explains the meaning of business, which is why it is 
considered a “supreme reference for corporate decision making.”22 Yet, there has been an 
evolution of thinking on the treatment and application of this construct, especially in 
contemporary CSR where business investments and social investments can overlap and 
address both business and broader societal issues. We see this debate playing out within the 
broader political economy where there are competing views as to whether or not socially-
oriented investments create shareholder value for the company.  
Under this concept the company’s decision process would be guided by four 
considerations, although this list may not be exhaustive. First, if we were to imagine a 
spectrum issues, the most extreme would likely be pure profit maximization as the key 
decision criteria. We consider this as extreme because there would be very little to no 
consideration of any other issues, including the potential harm on society. Addressing 
societal issues would divert the company’s financial resources, reduce profit, and erode 
shareholder value. Second, there can be decision criteria on developing a brand and/or 
elevating the company’s reputation. In this instance, the company can leverage CSR by 
marketing and selling products and services connected to a specific societal cause that matter 
to consumers. The Body Shop actively markets their skincare products as being certified by 
the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection. Third, the seminal works of economist 
C.K. Prahalad highlighted the emerging opportunities for specialized products adapted for 
the millions of consumers living under the poverty line, which otherwise would not be 
suitable for mainstream markets.
23
 Proctor and Gamble’s growth strategy is focused on 
emerging markets, particularly markets where individuals are living on two dollars a day. 
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Thus, the decision criteria would still be market access and profit generation, but the goods 
or services would address a targeted societal issue, which in this case is providing low-
income households with appropriate goods and services for their daily needs. Fourth, 
company decisions, while serving to create and protect wealth, may consider CSR as a way 
to optimize the conditions for the company to conduct business and generate profit. Porter 
and Kramer evolved the idea of a company utilizing its social investments more strategically 
to enhance its operating context to create competitive advantage.
24
 Managers can align and 
deploy organizational capabilities and resources, including those associated with CSR, such 
as impact assessment process, social investment strategies, or appropriate technology 
development to remove particular constraints in the company’s value chain and improve its 
overall competitiveness.
 25
    
2.3.2. Ethical  
There is a salient normative core in explaining CSR behavior. Under the ethical 
construct, companies have a moral obligation to ‘do no harm’ and/or generate positive 
impacts for society. The company’s mission, policies, strategies, and activities should be 
shaped by the value systems or societal norms at the macro level and the stakeholder interests 
at the community level. There is a proliferation of voluntary codes of conduct and other 
forms of corporate citizenship activities that are used to demonstrate a company’s ethical 
considerations to external stakeholders.  
Because companies have social and political power, their decision criteria should be 
guided by a moral compulsion to fully consider their impact on society.
26
 Beyond 
shareholders the company should consider the interests and demands of other stakeholders or 
constituents that may be impacted by the company’s operations e.g. host communities, public 
interest groups, and vulnerable populations. Companies, for example, should respect human 
rights wherever they operate. While the spectrum of human rights issues that a company 
should attend to continues to be debated, it is generally accepted that a company should have 
an internal process to identify and manage potential human rights issues and a mechanism 
where community concerns can be expressed to the company.
27
 There has been a growth in 
environment, social, and governance (ESG) reporting or indexes to evaluate a company’s 
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business performance against how well it manages non-financial issues. Goldman Sachs’ 
established GS Sustain, an ESG analysis that complements conventional metrics to assess a 
company’s long-term performance28. Thus, companies should integrate ESG issues into their 
decision processes in order to make balanced judgments about business pursuits and its 
potential impact on society in order to reduce potential financial risk. Finally, as a member of 
society, companies should contribute to the public good. Their wealth, knowledge and 
resources should serve to advance or protect society, such as using research, technologies, 
and know-how to eradicate HIV/AIDS or malaria. This is not without strong debate however 
in the broader business and public interest communities. For example, there has been a 
longstanding question about whether pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to 
provide life-saving medicines for free, or at a very low cost, to the poor or to those most in 
need. Research in business ethics suggest that ‘moral’ decision-making is sometimes a test 
for companies, especially where functions and preferences are highly differentiated. 
Decisions are continually assessed by managers against other competing issues and concerns. 
And, decisions can be an outcome of an organizational system where different persons and 
groups are making individual choices.
29
   
2.3.3. Relational  
Companies are open systems.
30
 They are not only dependent on the external 
environment they transact with; but they can also be shaped by it.  To confront and cope with 
a continuum of change and uncertainty that can influence the organization’s structure and 
operations, they should engage on a range of issues and with multiple stakeholders and 
institutions in order to operate efficiently and without major disruptions. Thus, organizations 
can spend significant resources to managing external issues and stakeholders.   
Relational constructs overlap with both normative and instrumental theories. Because 
the company’s survival depends on society, it should take into account societal issues and 
demands and integrate them into its decision process, which has principles- and process-
based aspects. On the one hand, the company’s decision criteria would be influenced by the 
interests and demands of individuals and groups impacted by the company’s operations. On 
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the other hand, it would be affected by the company’s own self-interest to manage emerging 
issues and risks that can impact the company’s profitability.  
There have been many useful applications of stakeholder management thanks in part 
to the seminal work of Edward Freeman.
31
 The concept has been used to explain or guide the 
structure and function of the business organization in relation to its external environment.
32
 
Central to this concept is the consideration of individuals and groups in the decision process 
who are either impacted by the company’s policies and practices or who themselves can have 
an impact on them. Next, the public process, which is more of a principles-based approach, 
steers the company toward achieving greater alignment with emerging social trends, such as 
voluntary business standards or public policies. In this instance the company’s public 
responsibility would supersede its self-interest or profit responsibility.  
Closely related with stakeholder management and the public process is social issues 
management. Because the intent is to have a systematic and orderly way to manage external 
issues, the focus is on the process.
33
 This is a longstanding practice of companies to identify 
and assess uncertainties emanating from the operating environment in order to inform 
decisions that minimize surprises or respond to new opportunities. External trends, such as 
growing societal distrust of a particular business sector, can be a latent or emerging issue that 
has the potential to develop into reputational, operational, legal, or financial risk for the 
company. As a process, it is a means not only to inform the decision process, but also to 
distribute and internalize social issues and objectives across the enterprise and help build 
CSR capacity within the company.   
A potential weakness in prior research, however, is how management treats social 
issues and stakeholders that vary in importance to their business.
34
 In other words, under 
different circumstances and at different points in time, some social issues and stakeholders 
can matter more than others, and therefore the company may develop deliberate strategies 
and tactics to engage them. Furthermore, the company is likely to pay more attention to 
social issues and stakeholders that impact strategic resources considered vital to the 
company’s business interests.35 It is unclear how ethical aspects are accounted for in the 
decision process under the relational construct. The decision process would take into account 
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short- and long-term financial and non-financial considerations, and weigh the costs and 
benefits of responses that may include operating business as usual, challenging the 
expectations of social issues and stakeholders, conforming, or attempting to reshape the 
environment through policy engagements.  
2.3.4. Political  
Similar to ethical and relational constructs, early thinkers developed concepts of CSR 
that were perceptive and/or responsive to the societal constraints or pressures related to its 
operating environment. The changing expectations of society can be endemic to the firm’s 
global and local contexts and therefore affect its decision-making and behaviors.
36
 In other 
words, the “business of doing business” may not have changed , rather, the “rules of the 
game” have changed consisting of worker rights, environmental safeguards, and national 
regulations, thereby compelling firms to rethink policies and strategies, resource allocations, 
and organizational functions.
37
 Moreover, this poses a number of organizational issues for the 
company that cannot be ignored.
38
    
Similar to normative-based theories, an implicit social agreement between the 
company and society exists at the macro-level (e.g. global human rights norms) and at the 
micro-level (e.g. host communities expectations where the company operates) in political 
theory.   
Under this construct companies are presumed to have significant power, and as such, 
should be checked by institutions in the broader political economy that have sufficient 
capacity to enforce appropriate behavior and align them with societal expectations. Over the 
course of the last few decades, there has been a notable shift by leading companies from a 
strategy of stalling or outright opposition to international CSR standards to a strategy of 
engagement. One explanation for this shift is the perception gap between roles and 
responsibilities between government, civil society, and business.
39
 This so-called 
‘governance gap’ where state enforcement of rules and regulations are sometimes weak and 
fragmented, such as the protection of human rights, has led to a growth of global CSR 
initiatives that are largely voluntary and governed by a tripartite who have an interest in the 
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issue. Global CSR initiatives, such as United Nations Mandate on Business and Human 
Rights,
3
 the Equator Principles,
4
 or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
5
 
for example, were developed to fill a perceived governance gap in the management of 
transnational social issues.  
The decision criteria to pursue CSR would be influenced and shaped by the broader 
political economy, especially the institutions and constraints (and opportunities) they may 
impose on the company. Because profit and responsible behavior have increasingly become 
more interconnected and visible
40
, the risk exposure for a company may be higher: operating 
without costly disruptions; having access to capital; maintaining a positive reputation; and 
coping with emerging regulatory and legal pressures. 
There are a constellation of institutions with specific roles and capacities to regulate 
or check company behavior, including (i) state regulation and enforcement; (ii) industry self-
regulation and multi-stakeholder initiatives; (iii) private non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that monitor and mobilize change; (iv) normative calls for change through business 
school courses and literature; (v) trade and employer associations; and (vi) deliberate 
dialogues with civil society groups, e.g. communities, unions.
41
 Where the company 
operates, whether in their home market or overseas, domestic political institutions can 
condition a firm’s CSR to promote values broadly consistent with society, and also manage 
how they are expressed.
42
  
Similar to the process dimensions under the relational construct, managers would take 
into account signals emanating from the market, which would influence how they think about 
CSR and the decisions they make on CSR activities. The various institutions mentioned 
earlier have the intentional effect to influence and shape corporate behavior. These 
institutions use mandatory and/or voluntary models to incorporate specific CSR issues into 
company practices. The enduring issue is whether the decision to pursue CSR is to be 
                                                     
3
 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie: A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. 
4
 See http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles.pdf  
5
 See http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary_principles_english.pdf  
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socially responsible from a normative sense, or to protect the company’s operational 
flexibility and profits (or both).  
Existing literature does recognize the strategic use of CSR into decision-making for 
competitive advantage.
43
 Because of the constraints a company may face, they may choose to 
implement corporate citizenship activities many of which are in the domain of the 
government.
44
 The activities tend to focus on addressing local community issues or 
protecting the environment.
45
 These activities can be used to gain reputational or operational 
advantage over their competitors. CSR can also be a strategy to prevent the introduction of 
new industry regulations or public policies.
46
 Under the guise of CSR, the company can build 
an alliance of NGOs around a point of view of the company, support competing research and 
articles against normative calls, or engage in purposeful leadership of an industry self-
regulation body. These are by and large strategic political decisions undertaken by the 
company.  
2.3.5. Managerial  
Nike faced mounting criticism for poor factory conditions overseas and associated 
human rights issues in the 1990s. Magnified by NGO campaigns and the media, Nike became 
synonymous with corporate irresponsibility. The turnaround for Nike was not an easy one. 
They had to orchestrate a change management scheme to integrate new CSR considerations 
into the prevailing business model (e.g. securing the lowest cost sourcing) and overcome 
internal resistance; “individuals and groups had to negotiate a favorable outcome through a 
socio-political process”.47  
The company’s response to environmental change is a strategic management issue,48 
and we have seen a confluence of external issues elevating CSR as a decision-making issue. 
This includes growing trust of NGOs versus companies
49
, institutions and processes (e.g. 
‘soft laws’) to manage transnational issues, and the overall visibility of corporate issues 
through increased access to information technologies
50
.  Moreover, transnational companies 
not only operate in multiple jurisdictions, but also in business environments where regulation 
and enforcement of global issues are inconsistent.  
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Internally, the shift in the company’s culture by integrating CSR principles into 
business processes and performance is also managerial issue. The focus is less on the ‘what’ 
and ‘why’ of CSR and more on the ‘how’. The corporate social performance (CSP) model51 
(see Table 2) was an early attempt to show that the normative concepts of stakeholder 
management or ethical considerations are not separate and distinct from the company’s 
management system and performance.  
1. Principles 2. Processes 3. Policies 
Corporate Social 
Responsibilities 
 
Corporate Social 
Responsiveness 
Social Issues Management 
• Economic 
• Legal 
• Ethical 
• Discretionary 
 
• Reactive 
• Defensive 
• Accommodative 
• Proactive 
• Issues Management 
• Issues Analysis 
• Response 
Development 
Directed at: 
 
• Social Contract of 
Business 
• Business as a Moral 
Agent 
Directed at:  
 
• Capacity to respond to 
changing societal 
conditions 
• Managerial approaches 
to developing 
responses 
 
Directed at: 
 
• Minimizing 
‘surprises’ 
• Determining effective 
corporate social 
policies 
Philosophical Orientation 
 
Institutional Orientation Organizational Orientation 
Table 2: Corporate Social Performance Model (Wartick and Cochran)  
Under the managerial concept, decision criteria for CSR would be largely guided by 
how CSR is measured (e.g. impact and outcomes) and the business case for pursuing CSR 
(e.g. return on investment). The performance dimension is complex from the standpoint of 
CSR analysis. Adam Lindgreen and Valérie Swaen outlined five CSR topics analyzed from 
the managerial and organizational levels: communication, implementation, stakeholder 
engagement, measurement, and business case. Inside the business organization CSR issues 
are more integrated, but a process that is still unfolding, and to some extent, its durability and 
consistency is not altogether clear.
52
 First, company communication is intended to 
demonstrate transparency on decisions and actions and the process of accountability for those 
decisions and actions. However, for some companies, communicating externally is not 
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always a good strategy because of the unintended consequences of being used against you. 
There are internal decisions on what to say, when to say it, and how to say it based on 
security, legal, operational or other considerations. Pending litigation, for instance, can 
prohibit the firm from not only disclosing certain information and facts, but also how the 
information is presented. Moreover, the choice of information can influence the degree of 
transparency to external stakeholders. A firm can choose to reveal challenges, areas of 
improvements, and missteps to build credibility among external critics and stakeholders. 
Conversely, a firm can elect to remain silent on critical issues or share information in an 
overly positive tone.  
Second, implementation is supposed to trigger organizational change management or 
reorient managerial rethinking on strategy. It may not be easy for complex business 
organizations to decide on the type of organizational CSR change that would be appropriate 
for the company. This can be attributed to territorial and other inherent tensions between 
different personalities, company departments and units. Third, stakeholder engagement 
demonstrates the company’s broad alignment and consideration of societal interests and 
demands. Yet, the outcome of company activities can seek to change their perceptions about 
the firm, or seek to moderate their interests and demands. Moreover, the company process 
can be inconsistent. The process can pre-select which stakeholders matter and when, or the 
mode of engagement can be tailored to meet desired outcomes. Fourth, the company would 
identify metrics and indicators to measure a range of CSR activities. There are several 
complicating factors associated with measuring CSR activities, including issues of attribution 
(e.g. did the activity actually lead to the specific outcome), manipulation of criteria and 
indicators, and the simple fact that a company can be competitive and profitable without a 
robust CSR program. Fifth, the business case for CSR should demonstrate a return to 
shareholders and on the financial health of the company. However, the business case itself 
can be different not only for the company, but for various departments and units who may 
define the business case as a specific priority relevant to their function, but not necessarily 
benefiting the company as a whole.  
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 The process dimension is equally complex. The process should inform the company’s 
decisions regarding what CSR considerations would be included in its overall strategy. 
François Maon, Adam Lindgreen and Valérie Swaen offered a useful change management 
scheme to illustrate how CSR issues could be integrated into a company’s CSR strategy and 
how it would be implemented. It centers on four stages of internal change: (i) unfreezing the 
status quo where internal resistance is constraining change and innovation; (ii) moving new 
ideas and assumptions around what is possible and how it benefits the company in the form 
of strategies and plans; (iii) refreezing the change by erecting new structures and processes; 
and (iv) sensitizing senior management and enabling a critical mass of internal persons to 
overcome resistance and maintain the change. From a process view, the decision process on 
CSR may not be so sequential and straightforward. It also may not be an accurate predictor 
of behavior related to decision-making on CSR. The step change is depicted as an 
organizational change, but much of organizational change is also political and the two are not 
entirely separate. To examine this further, we use as a reference point Michael Porter’s 
mapping of CSR issues to the company’s value chain showing how they can touch different 
functions of the company.
53
 What is important here is that it illustrates how the integration of 
CSR issues and activities can overlap with existing roles and responsibilities of individuals 
and departments/units. The company may be required to address new CSR issues and 
associated management policies and practices that can reshape its structure. Sources of power 
and influence can transition from one vested group to another; and function, responsibility, 
and territory become disrupted. CSR issues can present a change to the company’s status quo 
and resistance by some departments/units is natural and perhaps inevitable.
54
 The creation of 
new roles or modifications to existing ones can cause confusion, feelings of uncertainty, and 
foster intra-company tension. Theorists view schemata or framing “as a representation of 
contested terrain and various groups struggling for power”.55 Groups may “redraw territorial 
boundaries and reinterpret the meanings attached to a variety of organizational spaces, 
relationships, roles, and possessions”.56 Where the initiation of structural change is intended 
to advance the company’s CSR goals, it can also result in groups working against each other. 
 Transformations
57
  companies will undergo to integrate CSR issues into the business 
strategy can cause impacted departments/units to negotiate the costs and benefits to their 
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internal constituents, as well as their own vested interests. Episodes of organizational change 
or uncertainty, such as those triggered by external CSR issues, provide the enabling 
conditions for departments/units to be opportunistic, which may include taking advantage of 
the company’s ‘sensemaking’ process, the “primary site where meanings materialize that can 
inform and constrain identity and action”.58 Impacted departments/units can use a number of 
historical, perceptive, and communicative processes to attach their meaning and purpose to 
the CSR issue, allowing the CSR issues to become real and somewhat organized for the 
company.
59
 The inherent uncertainty or prospective opportunities can be a motivating factor 
behind the exercise of political behavior by these groups, and the tactics and resources they 
deploy will depend on the situation and what is needed to achieve group goals.
60
 
Simon Zadek’s “Five Stages of Organizational Learning” illustrates the different 
stages a firm undergoes to develop their competency of CSR.
61
 In summary, companies 
would (1) deny responsibility or poor practices to defend the company against reputational 
attacks; (2) adopt policies to demonstrate compliance and mitigate value loss of the company 
in the short-medium term; (3) begin to insert the social issue into management processes to 
build capacity and mitigate value erosion in the long-term; (4) integrate the social issue into 
core business strategies and align strategy and process with the societal expectations; and (5) 
promote industry engagement to collectively manage the social issue to enhance long-term 
economic value.  
Implicit here is that the integration of CSR issues or activities is part of a learning 
process for the company. Actions and reactions are tried and tested and learnings are fed 
back through the system. However, different departments/units, with self-interested 
behaviors, can influence how the company treats and manages CSR issues.
62
 Some of these 
behaviors can be explicit routines or ongoing practices “… to maintain new ideas as part of 
organization’s life without repeated interventions by self-interested actors”, or discreet acts 
initiated by self-interested actors “… to transform ideas into interpretations that are shared in 
order to influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of other stakeholders”.63   
Using the Social Psychological and Political Processes of Organizational Learning by 
Thomas Lawrence, Michael Mauws, and Bruno Dyck,
64
 we can examine this aspect further. 
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First, interpretation is “… a social process in which members negotiate meaning through 
conversations, adopting particular language and constructing new cognitive maps.”65 CSR 
issues and insights, as we noted, may have different meanings to different groups within the 
organization. By highlighting specific advantages and disadvantages to any one 
interpretation, the range of options to various departments/units would be intentionally 
limited. Second, integration is “… coherent, collective action and that this is achieved 
through conversation and shared practice among community members”.66 Competing groups, 
especially those that may be disadvantaged, may attempt to undermine the integration of 
certain CSR issues and activities by proposing alternatives to the company. Thus, dominant 
coalitions can try to restrict the range of alternative learnings and ideas and ensure the course 
of action is followed. Third, institutionalization is “embedding organizational innovations in 
the systems, structures, strategy, routines, and investments in information systems and 
infrastructure”.67 CSR issues and activities can disrupt the company’s current state and 
trigger internal resistance. To overcome potential resistance, learning can be systematically 
integrated in predetermined decision processes, such as procedures, plans, or information 
technologies. Fourth, intuition is “… the process through which individuals first recognize 
patterns in their experience that allow them to imagine new solutions and opportunities”.68  
The company’s learning process focuses on building individual expertise on CSR to align 
and reinforce the company’s preferred approach to project planning, risk tolerance, etc. 
Moreover, reference points, such as what is in scope for CSR, are pre-determined within this 
process. This can include mentoring, routine training, behavioral instruction, and incentive 
plans to ensure members gain the expertise appropriate for the company’s culture and 
preferences.  
The change caused by CSR issues, whether real or perceived, can trigger behaviors 
within the company which can either advance the company’s CSR agenda or defend the 
status quo. Potentially affected groups may develop different assessments of the cost and 
benefits of this change to their interests, and the company as a whole
69
, which can ultimately 
influence the level of commitment of various departments/units to the CSR-related change. 
Although the company is expected to move on a common platform to address a CSR issue or 
implement a particular CSR activity, it may be in fact fragmented leading to inconsistencies, 
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for example, between public company statements and the actual behavior or actions of 
different groups involved behind the scenes. The level of commitment by these groups can 
influence how comprehensively decisions on CSR issues and activities are integrated in the 
company’s strategy. The company can commit to CSR, but individuals,70 departments and 
units are often left to implement it. 
While the normative core remains pervasive in prevailing theories and concepts to 
explain CSR behavior, equally pervasive is the business case. As noted earlier, instrumental 
theory is considered a primary reference for decision making in business organizations. 
Relational and political theories, as well as managerial concepts embed an instrumental core, 
e.g. managing the interests of the company.  Furthermore, contemporary interpretations and 
explanations of CSR theory continue to evolve and increasingly point to social responsibility 
integral part of the base business and not necessarily a discreet function. Consider the efforts 
to produce products and services that reach the base of the pyramid; the market growth of 
impact investing (e.g. social projects with a return on investment); using social investments 
to unlock constraints to market development and business growth; and company cost-savings 
in deploying new energy technologies that reduce carbon emissions at the same time. 
Economic theory tends to treat CSR decision-making as a means to optimize market 
conditions for the firm. Political theory treats CSR decision-making as part of a negotiated 
process between competing individuals and groups that transact with the organization’s 
system. In either case, certainly deserving of more analysis, the business case for CSR would 
not be completely dominated by a superimposed social responsibility goal that eroded the 
firm’s value to its owners and operators.  
2.4. Organizational Structure and Process 
A company’s structure can provide important insights into how CSR issues are 
integrated into corporate strategy and plans, especially as companies are becoming more 
complex, geographically distributed and less hierarchical.
71
 To examine the decision process 
for CSR issues and activities in complex business organizations, we apply James 
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Fredrickson’s premise that a company’s strategy will follow the company’s structure, and the 
structure’s complexity will affect its decisions on CSR.72  
2.4.1. Complexity 
Structural complexity refers to an organization having many groups and functions 
that are interrelated. It relates to its vertical and horizontal differentiation and spatial 
dispersion.
73
  Complexity is relevant to the discussion of CSR behavior because of the 
involvement of different individuals, departments/units, and internal ‘coalitions’ and their 
motivations in the broader decision process.
74
 The more division of labor and coordination in 
the organization, decision points, and geographies it operates in the more complex the 
organization. As a result, decision-making is not easy to locate inside the organization, and 
decision-making on CSR issues or activities may not reside in a single department. 
Moreover, as complexity increases so does the probability that (i) members will become less 
sensitized to a strategic issue or simply ignore it; (ii) decisions must satisfy an extensive set 
of internal stakeholders; (iii) political negotiations will likely determine action; and (iv) the 
integration of strategic decisions will likely be low.
75
  
A company doing business in multiple geographies and jurisdictions would need to 
manage a range of CSR issues that reflect society’s changing expectations of the company or 
its sector. This can be in the form of NGO activism, voluntary codes of conduct, new 
regulations, introduced legislation, etc. Needless to say, CSR can become major source of 
ongoing uncertainty for the company and impact the decision process. Overreliance on 
existing corporate processes can limit the scope of data and information that would inform 
the decision process exposing the company to threats associated with changing 
circumstances. Then again, strategic CSR issues can be unknowingly or deliberately 
neglected because of the department/unit’s task-specialization and predisposed views. Even 
if the external environment the company operates in pose risks or opportunities, the structure 
of the company can still direct a course of action that may or may not serve the interests of 
the company. While there has been substantial research and literature on external influences 
and factors that may shape CSR behavior, less analysis has been done on internal factors and 
conditions.
76
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There are a number of potential impacts and implications complexity can have on the 
decision process for CSR issues and activities. The structure’s complexity can influence how 
individual departments/units and other internal groups treat and manage CSR issues. To 
complicate matters, because of its abstract nature CSR is not well-positioned as a goal or 
strategy that unifies the firm because it is subject to different definitions, interpretations, and 
goals by different groups with varied levels of understandings and interests. CSR issues and 
activities are already atomized throughout the organization and roles and responsibilities are 
not well understood. For example, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), an instrument to hold 
American companies liable for alleged human rights abuses overseas, can be construed as a 
legal issue, but prevention or establishing a pattern of effort and engagement to minimize the 
likelihood of a human rights abuse can be construed as a community affairs issue. Moreover, 
engaging in the debate as to how to use the instrument, as well as advocacy campaigns to 
strengthen it can be construed as a public affairs issue. Organizational territories can be 
blurred and become a source of ongoing tension affecting the management of the CSR issue, 
especially when the issue is connected to a high profile external event or attracts significant 
executive attention.  
Next, the more task-specialized the department or unit the more they may have 
parochial perceptions. The pursuit of data related to CSR can be skewed because individuals 
may be predisposed to focus on information that is important to their department/unit. 
Furthermore, the internal dissemination of this data and information can also be engineered 
in a way to highlight specific CSR issues and activities relevant to the interests of the 
department/unit, especially to senior executives. For example, the framing of the CSR issue 
and the strategic changes can be influenced by the private interests of different 
departments/units.
77
 Groups framing the issue and the change it would entail would need to 
communicate a version of reality that not only develops common understanding, but also 
secures critical ‘buy-in’ and support among key internal groups that would be impacted and 
possibly resist. Middle managers of different departments/units can be important in this 
regard.
78
 Figure 2 illustrates their strategic positioning inside the company. They can select 
which CSR issue they will raise to senior management, how it will be framed to them, and 
the suggested course of action.
79
 Not only do they have access to senior management, they 
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have access to the decision process. During phases of key decision points, they can influence 
the decision process and eventually affect the available options and choice of how the CSR 
issue will be managed.
80
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Figure 2: Strategic Positioning of Middle Managers 
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In a complex setting, building consensus around the company’s CSR goal(s) can be 
difficult. First, it may be nearly impossible to reconcile all of the diverse interests of various 
groups, especially in complex business organizations. There can be cognitive dissonance 
within the company as to the meaning and materiality of the CSR issue affecting who is 
responsible for managing the issue and how to manage it. This may be negotiated by 
different departments/units motivated by their private interests. Second, different 
departments/units impacted by the CSR issue may focus their attention and resources on 
where and how the decision process is initiated, how CSR and other business issues and 
priorities are treated in the process, and the enabling/constraining factors related to the 
comprehensiveness of the decisions once they are made. Third, and in connection to the 
second point, managers may focus on the means for attaining decisions, but not necessarily 
on the company’s CSR goals. As a result, CSR issues that are important to the company can 
receive appropriate attention; however, it can also receive limited to no attention and action, 
while CSR issues important to the department/unit can receive significant attention and 
action.  
2.4.2. Decision Process 
Because of structural complexity, multiple participants are involved in the company’s 
decision process, including individuals, departments/units, and coalitions.
81
 James 
Fredrickson describes the decision process (see Table 3) using six characteristics that have 
strong grounding in theoretical literature.
82
    
Process Characteristics Description 
1. Process Initiation Concern of how and where the process is initiated in the organizational 
system 
 
2. Role of Goals Issues regarding the role that goals play in the decision process 
 
3. Means/Ends 
Relationship 
Concerned with the relationship that exists between alternatives and goals 
 
4. Explanation of Strategic 
Action 
Considers alternative explanations of the process that resulted in strategic 
action 
 
5. Comprehensiveness in 
Decision-Making 
Attempting to identify the factors that limit the comprehensiveness of the 
strategic decision process 
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6. Comprehensiveness in 
Integrating Decisions 
 
Concerned with how comprehensively individual decisions are integrated 
Table 3: James Frederickson’s Description of Process Characteristics 
Highly complex companies must have sufficient flexibility and capacity to adapt to 
all the contextual issues where they operate, which includes participation and input from 
differentiated groups throughout the enterprise. Individuals and groups at different levels and 
sites throughout the company are exchanging data, information, and insights that can affect 
the decision process. Moreover, the dynamics of their ongoing interactions and engagements 
may determine how comprehensively decisions on CSR issues and activities are being 
integrated in corporate strategy and plans.
83
 Because the traditional theory of the firm tends 
to ignore the affects of macro-organizational behavior
84
, it is important to examine its 
relationship to complexity and the management implications for CSR in complex business 
organizations.  
2.4.2.1. Macro-organizational behavior 
Macro-organizational behavior places importance not on the individual stakeholder, 
but rather the company’s broader social structures and environment. Macro-organizational 
behavior is defined as “conflict or power of major sub-systems or organizations and the 
contextual, as opposed to individual, factors that help explain and manage these features of 
organizational life”.85 Conflict is a “condition that is manifested when the goal oriented 
intentional behaviors of members of one unit or a coalition of units result in block-directed 
behaviors and expectations of members of other organizational units.” Implicit are the role 
personal goals and objectives can play in driving behavior. Each unit is a study in itself and 
they are treated as separate systems. The organization (company) is described as a coalition 
of self-interested groups sharing common attributes: (i) competition for finite resources; (ii) 
dependence on, and transaction with, the external environment; and (iii) displaying public 
support for the organization’s mission, while pursuing contrasting goals and objectives for 
private gain.
86
 When considering these attributes, the company appears to be in a constant 
state of conflict. Conflict between these units cannot be easily resolved by assigning an 
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overarching goal or mission, such as a CSR strategy or policy, designed to cut across all 
department/units. Their goals and preferred placement within the larger system sometimes 
act independently of the system itself.
87
 
Macro-organizational behavior has several characteristics that may have important 
implications for the decision process related to CSR issues and activities. Because power is a 
valued commodity, internal struggle between individuals, departments/units and internal 
groups is a common feature.
88
 Power is considered an ability or resource, as well as how it is 
exercised,
89
 and it is used in subtle ways to achieve desired objectives. There are several 
attributes of power at the group level: (i) access and control of resources; (ii) contingency or 
reliance on the group to cope with uncertainty; (iii) activities that are central to the company 
and cannot be substituted by another group; (iv) power of one group to influence another 
group; and (v) constructing a false or exaggerated sense of reality to steer the company into 
areas where uncertainty will be managed by the group. The behavior of these groups would 
appear to be incongruent with the explicit goals and mission of the firm.
90
 This is because the 
company exists in two states: rational and irrational.
91
 In the rational state the behavior of 
groups appears to be aligned with the company’s mission and by and large understood in the 
public sphere. However, the company also operates as a socio-political institution where 
competing groups seek to secure power. This perspective shifts the analysis of the decision 
process to a different set of issues, such as power acquisition and use, internal competition 
and conflict, and the practicality of actions to attain private goals.  
Another characteristic of macro-organizational behavior is the redistribution of power 
and influence. Because of resource and contingency issues, at any given time a 
department/unit can hold a certain value within the company and exert influence over its 
decision process. CSR practices have increasingly focused on proactive measures to mitigate 
risks to the company, such as impact assessment processes. Within complex business 
organizations there are dedicated teams that manage CSR.  Such groups can “perform a range 
of activities that maintain the link between the organization and its environment to represent 
and protect the firm.”92 They are responsible for engaging with external CSR issues and 
stakeholders and sometimes negotiating outcomes for the company. These groups can accrue 
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considerable power because they not only transact with the external environment, but 
internally too; “Getting CSR on the agenda of top management teams is a political process 
and the motives may vary and conflict.”93  
Different departments/units may also be tasked to address a specific set of CSR issues 
and each may have a different interpretation of its impact and the means to manage it. 
Consequently, group members can pre-select decision factors that others will likely accept – 
but surreptitiously advance the group’s agenda – or participate in legitimated committee 
structures to co-opt other groups.
94
  With regard to a company’s decision on a CSR issue and 
activity, rational behavior “…presumes that individuals and groups will not attach their own 
definitions and decision criteria to achieving the ‘goal’.”95  The reality is that different groups 
may have their own opinions about what the overall goal of the company should be and how 
it should be pursued. Whether they can reconcile private interests with the ‘greater good’ of 
the company may determine the direction and outcome of the decision process. 
2.4.2.2. Premise for decision-making 
Given the proliferation of demands and expectations by society, we would assume 
that CSR receives a significant degree of focus and attention by companies and management. 
And despite best efforts to attend to CSR issues or deliver CSR-related activities, the list of 
demands can be never-ending. Through various forms of corporate communications (e.g. 
CSR reports, web, conference presentations) companies will describe how they are managing 
societal expectations to demonstrate their accountability to their stakeholders. Companies can 
produce CSR communications that are not necessarily reflective of how they think and 
behave, and also something distinct and separate from their organizing strategies and 
practices. In May 2008, a group of scholars and business leaders assembled to lay out a road 
map for reinventing management. They created a list of issues that business managers should 
address or risk failure in the future. Among those issues listed was the need to fully 
institutionalize CSR into their management systems.
96
  Yet, the ongoing economic downturn 
has served as a measure of CSR’s resilience over the long-term. To the point, if a company 
accepts the value of CSR, they will likely continue to support it. If a company views CSR as 
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an intangible value that is not necessarily connected to business success, they may scale back 
their commitment to CSR.
97
  
The reality is that a company’s CSR cannot tackle every social issue, and moreover, 
companies must contend with a multitude of other business issues, such as profit, 
competition, taxes, political risk, customers, the economy, or legal liability. The issues can be 
endless. Sometimes there can be trade-offs between issues and priorities, which can influence 
the decision process.  
Decision-making related to CSR is not a given; it coexists with other organizational 
issues, concerns and priorities. Every issue, including social responsibility, is attended to 
simultaneously, particularly in highly complex companies. Moreover, these issues can be 
revisited, re-prioritized, and renegotiated internally depending on the immediacy and urgency 
of constraints and opportunities confronting the company. The company can have different 
premises for decision-making and CSR may not be treated equally or consistently in relation 
to other competing issues.  
Having different premises for decision-making can also impact the company’s CSR 
strategy and consistency with its values. Similar to other company issues, CSR issues are not 
always considered ‘strategic’ to the company. To be treated as a strategic imperative, it 
largely depends whether or not the CSR issue will have a significant impact on the 
company’s ability to meet its strategic objectives. Jeremy Galbreath, drawing on the work of 
several scholars, identified six dimensions of strategy: (i) achieving the mission in the long-
term; (ii) internal and external issues that impact the company’s ability to achieve its mission 
(strategic issues); (iii) markets the company should compete in; (iv) products and services to 
offer customers in chosen markets; (v) internal resources needed to compete; and (vi) 
competitive advantage. At any given time, one of the six strategies may be more important 
than others,
98
 which may or may not include CSR. If CSR issues are not integrated into the 
company’s broader strategy, “… a company runs the risk of equating CSR with codes of 
ethics, triple bottom line reports, and PR.”99 Here again we refer to complexity and macro-
organizational behavior. The company’s decision process can either delink CSR from its core 
strategy rendering it a largely voluntary or non-essential issue, or the decision process can 
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make CSR an imperative by linking it more directly to the company’s strategy and plans. 
Because a company can have different premises for decision-making, many 
departments/units can be interested in CSR and treat it in different ways.  
The choice on a CSR issue or activity, at any given time, can demonstrate that the 
company is either consistent or inconsistent with its values, or consistent or inconsistent with 
its strategy. Kunal Basu and Guido Palazzo identified four rationalizations to describe 
potential decisions by a company: (i) greed for power and aggressive drive toward wealth 
creation; (ii) philanthropic activities that are separate from the core business and CSR is 
excluded from business strategy; (iii) usually under greater scrutiny and sensitive to external 
issues and pressures and the potential impact on the bottom line; and (iv) more inclusive of 
economic and social objectives and there is a public goods lens to produce products and 
support policies.
100
  
There are behavioral and cognitive features that can help explain potential decisions. 
This includes the company’s (i) ideological tendencies; (ii) pursuit and maintenance of 
legitimacy – appear to be in alignment with societal expectations [can be for transactional 
purposes] or institutionalization of values and norms into the culture and management 
systems of the firm; (iii) use of strategic language to influence internal and external 
stakeholders, to maintain legitimacy, and to explain decisions; and (iv) leadership and the 
direction they set – they can be transformational, transactional or instrumental.  This is a 
useful explanation to help categorize why they pursue it and how they demonstrate it. It also 
provides insight as to how different characteristics of a company may influence its CSR 
decisions. However, there are operational realities as a result of structural complexity. There 
are instances where two or more features are demonstrated by the same company and perhaps 
in different circumstances. What accounts for the dual use? Highly complex companies may 
have different rationalizations occurring at the same time. A company can also determine 
what constitutes legitimacy; not just external stakeholders. There are internal drivers too. The 
typology tends to focus on external influences, but not what may motivate and influence 
internal decisions. There can be specific tendencies of departments/units that are expected to 
manage the CSR issues and different personalities of leadership team members. Essentially 
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companies can choose to pursue an opportunity or address a potential risk. Their decisions 
can be aligned or misaligned with their prevailing values or strategy. Macro-organizational 
behavior can help to explain the variance and choice. 
Complexity and associated macro-organizational behavior can influence and shape 
the company’s strategic choice on a CSR issue or activity, and by extension affect the 
outcome for the organization. Because information will crosscut multiple departments/units, 
the comprehensiveness of decision-making can be constrained because decision processes 
can be shaped by the structure’s effects. One such effect is related to the ‘bounds of 
rationality’. For example, different departments/units will experience cognitive limitations to 
assess the data and information they receive, and time limitations to formulate the right 
decision. This can be attributed to their experience with the CSR issue, the control of 
information thereby limiting their full access, or the amount of internal discussions they are 
required to carry out to assess the issue.  
Furthermore, the choice the company makes may not accurately reflect the strategic 
action the organization will actually take since “…strategic action is incremental and tends to 
be a result of an internal political process.”101 Consequently, choices on CSR issues and 
activities may not account for the full range of threats and opportunities confronting the 
company thereby making its decisions on CSR – and the associated outcomes – perhaps less 
than optimal. Political behavior is often viewed pejoratively because of its emphasis on self-
interest to shape decisions that may not be in the best interest of the organization. 
Departments/units engaging in organizational politics tend to conceal their true motives to 
influence the broader organization to adopt their specific proposals. They can employ a range 
of discreet tactics to advance their self-interest, such as controlling the flow of data and 
information that would be used as input into the decision process. 
2.5. Discussion 
By examining the decision process, there is perhaps an alternate view to explain a 
company’s CSR behavior. The decision process can influence a company’s position on a 
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CSR issue, what activities it will undertake, or conversely what it will ignore altogether. 
Moreover, the decision process can be shaped by the company’s structure. 
 
Figure 3: Determinants of Influence on CSR Decision-Making Process:  
Consideration of the Complexity  
Complex companies are comprised of multiple departments/units, coalitions, and sub-
groups that may vie for resources to influence their version of CSR that may have little 
bearing on the company’s CSR. They can be motivated by many different factors: external 
pressures, internal power and territory, stories and metaphors about behavior, personal 
convictions, and the context the company operates in. On the other hand, structural 
complexity can identify emerging social issues or trends and tailor local responses to local 
issues. There is a healthy dose of flexibility and efficiency in complexity. One of CSR’s 
unique characteristics is that it is malleable, which means it can be interpreted differently by 
various departments/units.  
Senior managers will make choices for the company which has been influenced by its 
decision process. However, the decision process may reflect the two states of the company – 
irrational and rational – and the meaning of success can be different between the company 
and the groups that operate within it. Thus, managers may tend to seek a satisfactory solution 
rather than the optimal one. This may explain why some CSR issues and activities become 
institutionalized and some do not. More importantly, this extends to the company’s 
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performance on CSR,
102
 including how CSR is measured and communicated. For example, 
the internal disconnect between various groups and agendas can affect the way CSR is 
communicated internally and externally.  When CSR integration is fragmented, “… some of 
the clueless communications that result raise questions about management’s commitment and 
whether they ‘get it’ or are more interested in protecting market share...”103 
Parochial perceptions can affect how far and deep decisions are integrated into 
company strategy. The more task specialized they are the more their perceptions are 
parochial. The strength and divergence of their goals makes the decision process political. 
This can increase or decrease the impact of organizational goals, and produce strategic 
actions that are either incremental departures from the company’s current state or something 
more transformative toward a desired state. When pursuing a course of change within the 
company, the neglect or oversight of macro-organizational behavior can cause initiatives to 
fail and in some cases dispose of it sponsors.
104
 
Arguably, decision-making on CSR, if reduced to macro-organizational behavior, can 
undermine the moral underpinning of CSR; that it should be the right thing to do for the 
company despite other competing issues and interests. In other words, macro-organizational 
behavior cannot be the driving force behind a company’s CSR. There should not be an 
internal struggle between purists or ‘believers’ and functionalists or those that seek reward 
for its implementation.
 105
  The notion of a CSR strategy would lose its meaning and 
significance if strategic action is taken after extensive political-like bargaining between 
groups.  
These effects have neither been widely recognized nor investigated because the 
literature has been somewhat fragmented and underdeveloped. One possible reason is that the 
unobtrusiveness of complexity and macro-organizational behavior is an obstacle to 
understanding true company behavior. Interestingly, legal research on corporate culture has 
begun to examine whether a company’s management processes can be a source of 
organizational liability.
106
 The research shifts the emphasis from the individual and his/her 
actions to the business organization as the basis of liability. While criminal liability tends to 
be linked to individual behaviors, these behaviors may be influenced and shaped by the 
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complexity of the company; “Corporations can only ever act through human beings, yet the 
actions of human employees or agents always occur within the matrix of these 
[organizational] hierarchies, structures, and attitudes.”107  
Another interesting example reflects the recent work of Harvard University Professor 
John Ruggie under a mandate of the United Nations Secretary-General on business and 
human rights. He recommends a corporate due diligence framework inferring that the 
institutionalization of CSR in the company’s management system is a precondition to 
actually demonstrating respect for human rights; as he comments at a conference, “We're 
glad that you respect human rights and that you say so. But how do you know? How do you 
know that you respect human rights? So what we are doing is we've suggested what you need 
to have is an adequate and appropriate due diligence system.” 108 According to Professor 
Ruggie few companies have an internal system that enables them to be aware of, sensitized 
to, and effectively address potential human rights-related impacts from their operations. 
Thus, human rights due diligence is part of the institutionalization of CSR, or in this case 
creating an organizational norm to prevent and/or manage human rights issues. Beyond 
aspirational statements, such as a company code of conduct or ad hoc one-off activities to 
address human rights issues, the due diligence concept intends to advance the integration of 
CSR into the company’s “broader enterprise risk management systems”109, which can affect 
how the firm thinks about and makes decision on human rights issues.  
Finally, we cannot ignore the historical antecedents of CSR, which has been shaped 
by global events, the trending toward greater deregulation, and multinational 
competitiveness.
110
 Early observations and analyses of business and society issues helped to 
develop theories and concepts to explain CSR behavior. These theories have common 
characteristics; namely a strong normative core with relational and instrumental attributes. 
They continue to provide important insights into what may influence a company’s decision 
on a CSR issue and the outcomes of those decisions. And, we continue to form logical 
assumptions that decision making is based on these explanations, or a company’s inventory 
of CSR activities disseminated in the public domain. However, without further analysis into 
the decision process itself, we may take for granted that these are the explanations for a 
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company’s choice for a CSR activity or position on a societal issue. Decisions on CSR issues 
and activities are not a given. It can be shaped by the company’s structure and complexity; 
“power and politics is the social energy that transforms insights of individuals and groups 
into institutions of an organization.” 111 Additionally, a company’s CSR commitment and 
strategy can be in a state of flux responding to the ongoing concerns of the company and the 
varied interests of different departments/units,
112
 as the rationality of goals and actions lies in 
the individuals or groups and not some superordinate goal.
113
   
The limited attention to the company’s decision process to explain choices on CSR 
issues and activities is the basis and impetus for my research investigation.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
3.1. Research Goal 
As discussed in the literature review, intra-organizational factors are emerging as a 
line of inquiry to address some of the potential improvements in explaining CSR behavior in 
current theory and management concepts. Company behaviors on CSR are either explained 
as an outcome of a normative, instrumental or relational consideration, or an outcome of a 
change management scheme. Looking more closely at the decision process can encourage 
greater understanding of the means, and help to reorient and retool research on CSR behavior 
around the company’s structure.  
Qualitative research methods were selected for this study because there was a priori 
hypothesis derived from earlier research explaining how structure can influence strategy. 
This alternative view behooves researchers to examine whether structure can also influence a 
company’s CSR directive or strategy as opposed to conventional notions that a CSR strategy 
or policy can influence the organization. CSR issues and activities may not be treated as 
separate and distinct from other ongoing business issues and activities and as a consequence 
it may undergo the same strategic decision process. These are meaningful issues to 
investigate if we are to advance the research agenda on CSR.  
Once more my research goal is to understand whether the structural complexity of 
companies can shape and influence the decision process of a company’s CSR. While there 
are other dimension-specific structures that can be studied, namely centralized and 
formalized business organizations, this research is intended to examine the decision process 
of complex business organizations. These companies generally have the following 
characteristics: an average +/-5,000 to +/-100,000 employees, several different or 
complementary lines of products and services, differentiated departments/units, and operate 
in multiple markets domestically, regionally and globally. These business organizations 
typically disperse goals, resources and capacities to address a range of business issues and 
objectives, and decision-making can occur in local units, as well as various departments 
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throughout the enterprise. There can be stark differences between the company goals and the 
goals of business units operating locally.
114
 They have to contend with not only domestic 
issues, such as customization of products and services or complying with local rules and 
regulations, but also global issues, such as international legal instruments, ‘soft law’ 
frameworks, and reputational management.  
Described in this section is the research design to investigate the effects of 
complexity on the decision process for CSR issues and activities. I will describe the 
methodology for the collection of data, the analysis of data, validity issues, ethical 
considerations, and finally my role as the researcher.   
3.2. Research Design  
Complex structures can be illustrated through different organizational charts, 
organigrams, diagrams, ‘decision trees’, etc. The macro-organizational behavioral features of 
complexity can occur in ways that are obvious in a company setting, but more often than not 
it can be subtle. Figure 4 illustrates the research design framework for this study. The design 
follows a simple, logical process that was fit-for-purpose to accomplish the research 
objective. 
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Figure 4: Qualitative Research Design 
The literature review would identify, collate, and analyze the relevant knowledge and 
information available on the decision process for CSR. I gleaned from existing literature that 
complexity and macro-organizational behavior centered on the interactive engagements of 
different individuals, departments/units, and internal coalitions/groups within the company’s 
operating system. Moreover, there was increasing research and examination of the 
management system and process of companies and how this affected CSR behavior. And, 
there was a potential opportunity to further this research by focusing on the structure of the 
organization and its decision process.  
The research would need to draw out first-hand descriptions, experiences, 
perceptions, and beliefs of individuals and groups indirectly or directly involved in the 
decision process of a specific CSR issue or activity. The aim was to have a reinterpretation of 
the past to explain what happened and why in relation to the decision process. In addition, the 
peculiarities of structural complexity, especially macro-organizational behavior, would be 
embedded in narratives to help explain how the decisions were made and the key factors 
influencing the process. Personal accounts would also need to be organized in such a way 
that the decision processes can be analyzed and compared. The findings from the analyses 
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could then support current research investigations of intra-organizational issues to explain 
CSR behavior.  
During the planning phase of the research design, I conducted a pilot research project 
to test some of my assumptions, as well as the approach I would use to collect the data and 
analysis (see Figure 5). The pilot’s objective was to understand the pattern of social 
interaction between different groups inside the company regarding CSR, including between 
the parent company and its business unit. It was not the objective to generalize the findings to 
other companies or how CSR is developed in Japan.  
 
Figure 5: Depiction of Decision Process  
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The main subject of the research was the decision process of a complex Japanese 
insurance company operating in Southeast Asian markets. I studied the current trends and 
drivers of CSR related to Japanese companies to ensure I was familiar with the nuances of 
Japanese CSR compared to Western concepts. I also studied the concepts of CSR in the 
Southeast Asian market where business was conducted. The process I used was a series of 
face-to-face dialogue sessions with several officers of the company in Japan and in the 
Southeast Asian market. They were asked to reconstruct the decision process setting of how 
typical CSR issues and activities were developed and described how it functioned. They were 
prompted during the discussion to offer their personal perceptions and beliefs of what 
happened, why and how.  
Based on the dialogue sessions, the main findings revealed that managers controlling 
the funding and administrative processes in the business unit influenced what CSR issues 
would be addressed and what activities would be developed. By facilitating the management 
meetings, they controlled each phase of the decision process and decided the outcome in 
spite of active exchanges by other middle managers and staff during the decision meeting. 
They also controlled the flow of information to influence the decision process. For example, 
a survey was sent to the in-country staff prior to the management meeting, but the survey 
pre-identified what CSR issue the business unit would address and types of activities to 
implement; leaving little opportunity for alternatives to be generated.
6
  
Prior to and during the decision meetings middle managers actively used nimawashi, 
a term used by the middle managers referring to the Japanese practice of internal lobbying in 
order to secure consensus. The decision meeting was largely for the ‘illusion of consensus’, 
as the decision criteria and resolution was decided prior to the meeting. The findings from 
this pilot helped to inform my research design, which is described in the next several 
sections. 
                                                     
6
 The pilot project was accepted for presentation at the Nottingham University International Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility Conference: Agendas for Asia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2006). 
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3.3. Data Collection  
Several important considerations were fully taken into account regarding the data 
collection process. While there are inherent restrictions to accessing a subject’s private 
content, such as internal memos, strategy papers, presentations, or email exchanges of a 
company, having privileged access to this content may only provide partial information on 
the macro-organizational context. We would still need to know the factors behind the 
content. There are similar limitations in using only freely available content, such as a 
company’s annual CSR or sustainability reports, web stories, conference presentations, or 
other marketing materials available in the public domain. The content is generally descriptive 
inventories of CSR activities or likely outcomes of a decision process. It may provide clues 
into why a particular position or activity was chosen, but not necessarily how, including 
different alternatives and why one alternative was selected above another, or no alternatives 
were selected.  
This limitation extends into the use of written questionnaires or surveys sent to 
participants to complete. While this may have been useful to generate data on macro-
organizational behaviors and individual beliefs of its impact and implications on decisions 
related to CSR, the risk issues were similar to direct observation. The subjects may be 
overly-cautious even resistant to documenting data, stories, insights, and decisions that could 
harm the company, as well as their employment. Even if the documents passed through 
internal reviews before being shared, the responses can be ‘sanitized’ and as a result limit the 
value of the data collected because key information embedded in the personal stories would 
be missing. Moreover, I would not be able to enter into a discussion or dialogue to clarify or 
extrapolate their responses. Finally, documenting responses by the subjects may not 
illuminate the company’s macro-organizational context in which the CSR activity takes 
place, such as the driving business case behind the activity, the individuals, departments/units 
directly or indirectly involved and how they interacted with one another, or the complexity 
construction of the business organization.  
There are also inherent limitations to directly observing participants in their own 
company settings, which may reveal parochial behaviors. Besides logistical, procedural, and 
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confidentiality issues, subjects would likely be sensitive to displaying their private agendas 
or sharing specific decisions on CSR issues that can compromise reputational, legal and 
security considerations. Yet, even having privileged access may not reveal the macro-
organizational issues that may influence and shape that subject’s behavior. Being in the 
presence of the subjects or being known to be in the room, the behavior of the observed 
subjects can be orchestrated or contrived to conceal their true motivations. Being open and 
visible about their private agendas may have repercussions for that individual or group in the 
future.  
Finally, it is important to note that some companies can be under pending or current 
litigation for CSR-related issues, or addressing reputational issues as a result of third party 
campaigns that target an issue the company may be associated with. All of these 
considerations were factored into the approach to collect data and information.  
Against this backdrop, the preferred approach was to use individual dialogue sessions 
and to frame the discussion around the decision process for a random CSR issue or activity 
selected by the subject. There were some advantages to this approach. My relationships with 
these subjects would enable me to: (i) secure agreement to conduct the dialogues and 
document their accounts, especially on sensitive CSR issues; (ii) elicit meaningful 
information and insights pertinent to the data collection; and (iii) have an ongoing dialogue 
with the subjects in order to clarify the complexity issues, which was also pertinent to the 
data collection. Also, being practicing CSR professionals, we are encouraged to promote 
continuous learning and good practices. Thus, I offered to share the findings of the interviews 
with them, with no attribution to the authors, to support their own work to manage CSR 
activities in their respective companies or with their clients. This was offered to help the 
subject’s feel this was a mutually-beneficial experience while safeguarding their 
confidentiality. The subjects appreciated and accepted this offer of exchange.  
3.3.1. Selection of subjects 
The research required the collection and collation of a sample of decision processes 
on CSR issues or activities. The sample was not intended to be representative of any one 
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particular industry, a specific category of individuals, or any specific CSR issue or activity. 
Being a practicing CSR professional, I was able to use purposeful selection. According to 
Joseph Maxwell,
115
 purposeful selection serves two important purposes for the research: (i) 
“achieving representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals, or activities selected”; 
and (ii) “establish particular comparisons to illuminate the reasons for differences between 
settings and individuals.”  Because structural complexity is characterized by differentiated 
departments/units, and also because CSR issues and activities may not be located in a single 
place within the company, selecting only individuals having the title ‘CSR’ in the company 
could limit the value of data. A range of perspectives from different departments/units, 
individuals, and internal coalitions would help to enrich the narratives about complexity and 
the potential effect on decision processes. It also helps to prevent possibly narrowly-
conceived ideas of where CSR issues and activities may be located in the company. 
Therefore, I diversified the selection to represent a cross-section of subjects involved as a 
participant-observer in the decision process (see Table 4.1, 4.2). Sixty subjects were 
identified for the dialogue sessions. Four subjects declined the invitation and fifty-six 
accepted. The sample of decision processes included several complex transnational 
companies from North America, Europe, Asia-pacific, and Latin America. It also included 
several industries, including among others, energy, mining, computer, health, chemical, 
communications, banking, marketing, electronics, and management consulting. While the 
investigation of the decision process was intended to be stable, having some variation in the 
nationality and sector of the company may help prevent selection bias.  
Next, the sample of decision processes included internal company officers from 
various departments, such as CSR/sustainability, security, public affairs, corporate policy, 
and corporate giving/philanthropy. And, external consultants from the fields of government, 
public relations, law, CSR service firms, industry associations, international public affairs, 
and academia. Within this sample, there are individuals that are former employees of the 
company or the external service organization, and more than one individual from the same 
firm or external service organization. Internal officers must operate in the system and they 
will have important access to the decision process. Their experience and retrospective 
analysis can be as direct participants or as observers in the decision process. External 
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consultants or advisors may have a particular view of the decision process that can also 
enrich the narratives. As outsiders, they can have privileged access to structural complexity 
and macro-organizational behaviors in ways that I could not as the researcher. For example, 
they can be contracted to serve as facilitators or ‘change agents’ to help progress the 
development of a CSR activity in the company. They can also be contracted by specific 
departments/units in order to help them advance a private agenda. Both internal and external 
subjects not only can recount the time, setting, and what happened, but they have the 
opportunity to do a look-back and refine why and how it happened.  
The subjects chosen for this research interfaced with structurally complex business 
organizations and transacted with the decision process connected to a particular CSR issue or 
activity. A sample of fifty to sixty decision processes was adequate to analyze and compare 
the potential effects of structural complexity and macro-organizational behavior on the 
decision-making process. Within the sample, it was necessary to have sufficient diversity of 
attributes associated with structural complexity to minimize probable explanations around a 
specific attribute, such as function/department, products/services, number of employees, or 
business markets. Moreover, diversity of attributes helps to center the analysis closer to the 
totality of structural complexity and its potential influence on the decision process. The 
sample for this research includes (i) twenty-two different service, base business, and external 
functions; (ii) seventeen different industry sectors; (iii) a range of two thousand to three 
hundred thousand (2,000-300,000) employees; (iv) a range of five to one hundred markets; 
and (v) a range of two to three product and/or service lines. There were a sufficient amount 
of safeguards embedded in the fifty-six subjects to facilitate a informative baseline analysis 
of CSR decision processes in complex business organizations.   
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Subject 
ID 
Group Industry / 
Sector 
Department / 
Unit 
Location7 Products / 
Services 
Number of 
Employees 
Number of 
Markets 
1 A Health Govt. Affairs USA Pharmaceutical/
Research 
+50,000 +20 
2 A Energy  CSR Eastern Europe, 
Africa 
Oil/Gas +20,000 +10 
3 A Energy CSR USA, Africa Oil/Gas +20,000 +5 
4 A Info. 
Technology 
Law and Policy USA Internet/Advertis
ing  
+10,000 +20 
5 A Mining CSR USA, Global Metals, Minerals +20,000 +5 
6 A Energy CSR Northern 
Europe 
Oil/Gas +20,000 +20 
7 A Energy Security USA, Africa Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +100 
8 A Chemicals CSR USA, Global Applied 
Materials 
+50,000 +100 
9 A Energy CSR USA, Global Oil/Gas +20,000 +5 
10 A Energy CSR USA, Africa Oil/Gas +10,000 +10 
11 A Banking Sustainability Japan, UK Project 
Finance/Investm
ent 
+10,000 +20 
12 A Energy CSR Canada, Africa Oil/Gas +3,000 +5 
13 A Energy Corp Policy USA Oil/Gas/Mining +50,000 +100 
14 A Computer CSR USA, Global Software/Internet +50,000 +100 
16 A Energy CSR Western 
Europe, Central 
Asia 
Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +20 
17 A Banking Risk Management USA Project 
Finance/Investm
ent 
+100,000 +100 
18 A Energy Public Affairs USA, Central 
Africa 
Oil/Gas +50,000 +20 
19 A Banking Risk Management USA, Global Project 
Finance/Investm
ent 
+100,000 +100 
20 A Energy CSR USA Oil/Gas +10,000 +20 
21 A Energy Govt. Affairs and 
CSR 
Canada, Latin 
America 
Oil/Gas +2,000 +10 
22 A Energy Social 
Performance 
Western 
Europe, Central 
Asia 
Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +20 
23 A Health CSR USA, 
Switzerland 
Pharmaceutical/
Research 
+20,000 +100 
24 A Energy Law Western 
Europe, Global 
Oil/Gas +50,000 +100 
30 A Technology Philanthropy USA, Japan Software, 
Electronics 
+20,000 +20 
31 A Energy Social 
Performance 
Western Europe Oil/Gas +50,000 +50 
                                                     
7
 Location includes headquarters, domestic and overseas business units. 
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32 A Mining CSR Western 
Europe, Global 
Metals, Minerals +100,000 +20 
42 A Mining  Int’l Affairs Latin America, 
East Africa 
Metals, Mines + 100,000 +20 
47 A Marketing, PR Corporate 
Citizenship 
Japan, USA Research, 
Strategy  
+5,000 +10 
48 A Energy Corp Policy USA Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +100 
49 A Energy Social 
Performance  
USA Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +100 
50 A Energy CSR Northern 
Europe 
Oil/Gas +20,000 +20 
51 A Management 
Consulting 
Philanthropy USA Strategy,  
Management 
+20,000 +20 
52 A Energy Corp Policy USA, Global Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +100 
53 A Energy Social 
Performance 
Western Europe Oil/Gas/ 
Renewable 
+50,000 +20 
55 A Energy  Public Affairs USA Oil/Gas +50,000 +20 
56 A Mining CSR Western 
Europe, Global 
Metals, Mines +200,000 +50 
Table 4.1: Group (A)  
 
Subject 
ID 
Group Sector Products / 
Services 
Location Industry 
Example 
Location Number of 
Employees 
Number 
of 
Markets 
15 B Professional 
Service 
Legal, CSR 
Advisory 
USA Apparel Global +10,000 +50 
25 B Marketing, 
PR 
CSR Research, 
Strategy 
USA Finance, 
Insurance 
USA NA NA 
26 B University CSR Research, 
Advisory 
USA Beverage, 
Energy, 
Computer 
USA, 
Global 
+100,000 +100 
27 B Consulting CSR Strategy,  
Management 
USA Retail USA, 
Global 
+500,000 +20 
28 B Consulting CSR Strategy,  
Management 
USA Energy USA +50,000 +100 
29 B Government Govt. and CSR North 
America 
Energy, 
Communication, 
Agriculture, 
Apparel 
Global +100,000 +50 
33 B University CSR Research, 
Advisory 
USA Computer  USA, 
Africa 
+50,000 +100 
34 B Consulting  CSR Strategy, 
Management 
Denmark Finance, Energy USA +50,000 +100 
35 B Consulting  CSR Research, 
Strategy 
USA Energy USA +50,000 +100 
36 B Service NGO Health 
Research, 
Policy 
USA Health/Pharma USA +20,000 +100 
37 B Association CSR Research, 
Advisory 
Netherlands NA Netherlands NA NA 
38 B Service NGO CSR Research, 
Advisory 
UK NA Global NA NA 
39 B Consulting  CSR Research, 
Strategy 
USA Energy USA +50,000 +100 
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40 B Professional 
Service  
Legal, CSR 
Advisory 
USA Energy USA, 
Africa 
+10,000 +10 
41 B Government  Govt. and CSR  North 
America 
Consumer Goods Global +10,000 +50 
43 B Association CSR Advisory, 
Policy 
USA Beverage, 
Computer 
USA +100,000 +50 
44 B Marketing, 
PR 
CSR Research, 
Strategy 
USA NA Global NA NA 
45 B Association CSR Advisory, 
Policy 
UK Energy Global NA NA 
46 B Service NGO Corp. Risk 
Management 
USA Mining Canada, 
Latin 
America 
+2,000 +5 
54 B Consulting CSR, 
Stakeholder  
USA Energy, Apparel Global +20,000 +10 
Table 4.2: Group (B) 
3.3.2. Dialogue design 
The goal of the dialogue was to collect meaningful data and information to address 
the research objective. Figure 6 illustrates the design. During the planning phase, dialogues 
were facilitated by unstructured questions to enable the subjects or ‘teller’ to (i) build a story 
around a specific CSR activity where they participated in or observed its development; (ii) 
recreate the setting where the development occurred; (iii) describe the internal process to 
reach a final decision on a course of action; (iv) describe macro-organizational behavior 
issues related to the process; and (v) share their belief whether the decision process was good 
for the company. Decision process questions (see Table 5.1, 5.2) were based on the stages of 
strategic decision making in organizations based on the work of V.K. Narayanan and Liam 
Fahey, “The Micro-Politics of Strategy Formulation.”116 Narayanan and Fahey’s research 
demonstrated how specific macro-organizational behaviors can influence different stages of 
the decision process: activation, mobilization, coalescence, encounter, and decision. This 
frame to facilitate the dialogues was used because it is anchored in gestation and resolution; 
two basic decision concepts associated with decision-making processes in business 
organizations. The gestation phase “… involves a period of time when activities by selected 
members result in an issue (decision) being sponsored for resolution and an alternative(s) for 
adoption… Resolution marks a period when an organization appraises alternatives and 
decides whether or not to take action…"117 
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Subjects were invited by email notification or phone call. In advance of the dialogue 
session, each subject was informed of its purpose, “To describe the process for selecting a 
CSR activity or a course of action to address a CSR issue.” They were provided with 
logistical information and procedures to conduct the dialogue, how the data would be used, 
and assurances of confidentiality and non-attribution. Non-disclosure agreements were 
prepared in the event subjects wanted additional assurances. The subjects were also asked to 
identify a specific ‘real life’ CSR issue or activity they directly participated in or observed its 
development within the company, and expected to be prepared to provide a personal account 
of how the CSR activity developed within the company.  
During the data collection phase, the dialogue questions were used to facilitate fifty-
six sessions on the strategic decision process, and to draw out personal observations and 
beliefs related to the complexity context and whether or not it influenced or shaped the CSR 
activity outcomes. While complexity and associated macro-organizational behavior may not 
be obvious to the subjects, it was assumed through the natural course of discussion they 
would reveal key issues and events that would provide insight into these aspects. The 
dialogues were conducted through conference calls and face-to-face meetings. The duration 
of the dialogues lasted on average sixty to one hundred twenty minutes. Both approaches 
were based on practical decisions given the limited availability of the participants, as well as 
geographic locations outside the United States (location of the researcher) and time zones. 
Dialogues were recorded by hand-written note-taking.  
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Figure 6: Illustration of Data Collection Process 
The dialogue process was divided into two groups. Group (A) dialogues comprised 
internal company staff, and Group (B) dialogues comprised external consultants and 
advisors. The sample was divided in order to tailor the discussions and help generate any data 
that can be generalized with internal staff experiences and external consultant experiences.  
Group (A) dialogues were performed as free-flowing discussions. In the first phase, 
subjects began by identifying and framing the CSR issue or activity and then described what 
triggered it and the action plan to address it. The questions were used to prompt a look-back 
into the organizational setting and decision process that eventually led to the outcome. The 
semi-structured conversation enabled the subjects to inject personal beliefs, perceptions, and 
insights into what happened and why specifically related to the decision process. After 
recounting the decision process, the dialogue moved into a second phase where the subjects 
were asked to reflect on their experience, especially if they felt the process and outcome was 
positive or negative for the company. This part of the dialogue focused on their perceptions 
of the impact and implications of the process with respect to the company.    
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Decision 
Process 
Description
8
 Facilitating Questions 
Activation Individual recognition of 
potential issues. Major 
actors are individuals.  
Describe how the CSR issue became activated. 
Did the CSR issue belong to any specific group/department? 
Was there consensus within the company about how the issue 
should be addressed, or who should address it? 
 
Engagement Mobilization: Individual 
to collective-level 
awareness. Major actors 
are initial individuals and 
those whom they contact.  
 
Coalescence: Temporal 
alliance if individuals 
with shared interests. 
Major actors are coalition 
leaders and followers.  
 
Encounter: 
Representation and 
justification of strategic 
alternatives. Major actors 
are coalition members and 
antagonists. 
Was it necessary for other groups to become involved to address 
the CSR issue? If so, why? 
 
Describe how the groups engaged on the CSR issue.  
Why did they choose to engage on the CSR issue?  
Did a formal or semi-formal working group, coalition, or 
committee develop to address the CSR issue? If yes, why?  
 
Identify who was involved and how the group functioned.  
Were there any conflicts within the group?  
Did the group develop alternatives to address the CSR issue? If 
yes, please describe in general?   
 
Describe the process for developing the alternatives to address 
the CSR issue.  
Did any particular group advocate for a specific alterative? If 
yes, who and why?  
Decision Organizational 
engagement around the 
issue. There are zones of 
consensus. The major 
actors are mediators.  
Describe how the preferred alternative was decided.  
 
Was there resistance among any groups? If yes, why? 
Did any person or group influence the decision outcome? If yes, 
why? 
Summation Reflection and review.  Would you agree or disagree that the decision process around 
CSR was a negotiated process between different groups? Please 
explain.  
 
Would you agree or disagree that some groups influenced the 
outcome? Please explain.  
 
Would you agree or disagree that the process and outcome was 
good for the company? Please explain. 
 
                                                     
8 Activation, Engagement and Decision adapted from Narayanan and Fahey. 
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Did any particular group benefit from the outcome? Please 
explain.  
 
Looking back at the process, was there any critical factor that 
influenced the outcome? If yes, please explain.  
 
Table 5.1: Facilitating Questions for Group (A) 
Group (B) dialogues were also free-flowing, semi-structured conversations. However, 
some facilitating questions were added to draw out more their ‘outsider’ views into the 
setting, process, and complicating factors. Arguably, external consultants and advisors would 
have a different vantage point compared to internal staff. Table 5.2 lists the additional 
questions that were used to facilitate the dialogues.   
Decision Process Facilitating Questions 
Activation   Which group addressed the CSR issue?  
Was this the right group in your opinion? Please explain. 
Engagement 
 
If more than one group addressed the CSR issue, did you find consistency in terms of 
the goals, objectives, or how the CSR issue was framed? 
Engagement, Decision 
 
Did you observe or were made aware of group activities or tactics during the decision-
making process. If yes, please explain.  
Do you feel the group activities or tactics were critical to the decision process? If yes, 
why?  
Summation  Do you feel the decision outcome was good for any particular group? If yes, please 
explain. 
Table 5.2: Facilitating Questions for Group (B) 
During the data organization phase, dialogue notes were collated, transcribed and 
refined into individual decision process ‘stories’. Follow-up sessions were conducted with 
several subjects to clarify comments and statements. The data was reviewed against the 
research question and dialogue objective to ensure relevant information was captured. The 
data was also used to generate initial comparisons on the decision process, complexity 
construction and context, and macro-organizational issues that may have influenced the 
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decision process. These comparisons provided the baseline information to be further 
examined through narrative analysis.   
3.4. Data Analysis 
The analysis focused on first person narratives to reinterpret the decision process for a 
specific CSR issue or activity. Because complexity and macro-organizational behavior can be 
understated or not well understood by individuals directly or indirectly involved, narrative 
analysis is an appropriate methodology to generate comparisons.  
Narrative analysis was selected for several reasons and draws significantly from the 
research methods of Catherine Riessman.
118
 To explain narrative analysis, we start with the 
narrative. Narrative is understood to be an oral, written, or filmed account of events told by 
others or to oneself. Accounts are defined as “storylike constructions containing description, 
interpretation, emotion, experience, and related material”.119 For the purpose of this study, 
narrative is defined as “talk organized around consequential events. The teller takes the 
listener into a past time or “world” and recapitulates what happened and then makes a 
point…”120 There are three elements in this definition: (1) talk (or the perspective of the 
teller); (2) the consequence of events; and (3) the “world” or context of the teller. Thus, for 
the purpose of this study the strategic decisions on a CSR issue or activity cannot be fully 
understood without the point of view of what happened and its significance by the teller, 
including the key events or actions during decision process and the company’s structural 
complexity; the setting where the events took place.   
Narrative analysis has been used to make sense of the transformative aspects of one’s 
experience or what he/she bears witness to within a social context. This includes research to 
explain reasons for marital divorce, coping with chronic illness and other traumatic events, or 
the undercurrents of one’s political activism and broader social movements.121 As explained 
by C Wright Mills, “narrative analysis can forge connection between personal biography and 
social structure.”122 This connection, as noted by Mills, is an important feature in the 
research. CSR agents told their story at a specific point in time, and also within a particular 
setting in which they had to transact with to exist and endure. Specific events, issues, and 
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contexts that are relevant to some form of transformation can be meaningful for a particular 
audience. They can be organized, connected, and evaluated to show significance and 
consequence.  
The aim of narrative analysis is not a presentation of the past, but rather to interpret 
what happened and give it meaning. It examines the construction of a story and the sense-
making and sense-giving behind it. How stories are told is equally, if not more important, 
than what is told. Subjectivity, therefore, was valued in the personal accounts. Subjectivity is 
rooted in personal perspective and socio-historical context that can be meaningful and 
significant, as well as connect to a broader social trend or phenomena. In this case, there was 
connection to the trend of integrating CSR issues and activities within the companies who 
have committed to do so. And, connected to the emerging societal expectations and inquiries 
regarding how management systems and processes are embedding CSR.   
The CSR story is often explained through a cause and effect relationship or a 
sequence of events that are intended to fit in a neat model. The normative, instrumental, and 
relational concepts are some of the current explanations of CSR. These are intended 
consequences for the firm, which may include reputation gain, shareholder value, or 
mitigating emerging operational, legal, or regulatory risks. Or, simply, the firm becomes 
enlightened, makes some policy or process changes, and then becomes the ‘good’ company 
in the eyes of the public.  
Narrative analysis centers the inquiry not necessarily on the story, but the plot. “Story 
is the raw, temporally sequenced, or causal narrative of life – the expected arrangement”.123 
Attention is not on the conventional construct, but rather the substance underlying the plot’s 
‘twists’ or turning points. Vignettes of the story are pieced together to support a set of 
emerging propositions or theory. Inside the company, complexity and the undercurrents of 
macro-organizational behavior can pervade and influence CSR decision-making. The 
sequence of events and actions that shaped strategic CSR decisions, and the setting that 
facilitated it, can show potential variance, as well as opportunities, with current CSR 
theories.   
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Against this backdrop, one of the main reasons narrative analysis was chosen is 
because the research examined the socio-political aspects of the decision process for a CSR 
issue or activity. The decision process is therefore treated as a social phenomenon, which 
includes interactions between groups, behaviors and motivations, contextual settings, and 
external events shaping organizational behavior. A retrospective analysis of the time, setting, 
and internal dynamics was crucial to deconstructing the formal aspects of the process of 
decision-making and reconstructing the social processes and the embedded meanings of what 
happened, why it happened, and how it happened. There were additional reasons for selecting 
narrative analysis. The teller and I were allowed to be actively engaged in the dialogue 
sessions, which enabled the process to construct relevant and meaningful narratives. While 
the teller can make sense of his/her experience, I was able to request them to elaborate and 
clarify scenes, statements, points of view, and perceptions. Next, the approach provided an 
organized way to capture and document personal accounts for analysis. I used a data 
reduction technique in narrative analysis that is discussed later. Unlike a questionnaire or 
survey, or a highly structured interview, the transcribed data can be interpreted by the 
meaning of what the subject said; how it was said; and how it was said in a specific context. 
Moreover, peculiarities and particulars that were embedded in the subject’s narratives were 
preserved, which can be significant to understanding what happened, how it happened and 
why.  
The dialogue sessions were transcribed to form a set of narratives. This was in the 
form of question and answer, arguments, and other forms of conversation. To analyze the 
narratives, W. Labov’s framework to organize the dialogue material and reduce it to the core 
narrative was used.
124
 Bell’s core narrative approach “…provides a skeleton plot, a 
generalizable structure that investigators could use to compare the plots of individuals who 
share a common life event”.125 Using this approach I was able to select features of the 
narrative that are meaningful to the decision process, including specific content, unfolding 
plots, and the way it is told to represent the subject’s experience with the decision process 
and internal setting. Non-essential aspects from the narratives were either parked for later 
analysis or discarded altogether. 
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To develop the core narratives, I used Labov’s framework: 
 
Figure 7: Adapted from W. Labov’s Framework for Core Narratives 
Labov’s framework allowed me to segment personal accounts into a set of common elements 
that are applicable to any story: (1) the abstract or a summary of the substance of the 
narrative or what follows; (2) orientation to the issue, such as time, place, situation, and 
participants; (3) carry the complicating action or the sequence of relevant events; (4) 
evaluation or the consequences of the event, and lessons learned and practical insights for 
society’s broader benefit related to the phenomena being studied; and (5) resolution/coda or 
what happened and how this is connected to the present. These categories are further 
discussed in the Findings (see section IV). Appendix A contains the transcribed narratives 
using Labov’s framework.   
Next, by using Labov’s framework, the core narrative from each subject was further 
reduced into ‘decision process plots’ (see Figure 8), or events and patterns that make up a 
story, in order to make comparisons across the sample. 
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Figure 8: Illustration of ‘Decision Process Plot’ 
The plots included (1) activation or the subject’s articulation of what triggered the CSR issue 
or activity and the setting at the time it was triggered; (ii) engagement or the involvement of 
different actors, and the nature of their involvement, to address the CSR issue or activity; and 
(iii) decision or the process by which alternatives, and the preferred alternative, to address the 
CSR issue or activity were developed. Comparisons are further discussed in the Findings 
(section IV). Appendix B contains the full data reduction of the decision process plots.  
3.5. Validity Considerations  
Regarding the validity of the data collection, there were two central issues to address. 
First, would I select data based on my own preconceptions or biases? Would I deliberately 
seek data that supports my research agenda and ignore competing explanations? Because of 
my own professional experiences working in large, complex business organizations, as being 
a CSR practitioner, there was a strong tendency for me to unconsciously focus on specific 
data and information that validated my own assumptions. There was also a tendency to seek 
subjects that have the same viewpoint or assumptions, which are based on our professional 
relationship and similar experiences with decision processes. Second, because the subjects 
are my peers, would I inadvertently select only subjects that are similar to my profession, 
position, or department? Moreover, would I unintentionally influence what the subject says 
about the decision process to, again, to validate my own assumptions about the decision 
process and CSR?  
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These validity risk issues were also elevated because of the narrative case 
methodology I chose to use to help me conduct the dialogues. For example, my role in the 
dialogues was less passive and more interactive to facilitate the discussion and draw out 
meaningful data and information. It was essential that I recognized and incorporated these 
validity issues into my work-flow to collect and analyze data and form conclusions. 
However, I felt it should not be the overarching goal or objective to remain completely 
detached from the values and expectations I bring into the research, as well as my own 
knowledge of the subject matter.
126
 Both the teller and listener have a role to play in 
reconstructing the time and setting, and interpreting the subtleties of complexity and macro-
organizational behavior and its potential influence on the decision process. This was a critical 
aspect in the narrative analysis approach.   
Another validity issue relates to the sample. Without proper emphasis upfront in the 
study, there can be confusion as to whether the sample is in some way representative of the 
broader population of CSR initiatives. And as a result, doubt can be cast over the findings 
and whether it represents what is going on inside companies. My literature review 
demonstrated that there is no one-size-fits-all CSR professional or activity because what is 
understood as a CSR issue or activity crosscuts many different groups and functions, 
especially in complex business organizations. For this study, the focus was not on the CSR 
initiative, but rather on the decision process. The process for decision-making was common 
in complex companies and therefore was a stable aspect to analyze.  
Related to the sample is the justification of giving the subjects the freedom to discuss 
a CSR issue or activity of their choice. They could select an example that followed a decision 
process, while being involved or aware of other CSR issues or activities that did not. The 
subjects were not led to select a CSR issue or activity that followed the decision process. The 
dialogue objective was to understand the process for selecting a CSR activity or a course of 
action, which can include an unchallenged, straightforward decision by the CEO on the 
preferred alternative.     
I took additional steps to address these validity issues. First, I employed several 
methods to collect the data. These included telephone and face-to-face dialogue sessions, and 
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purposeful selection of in-house staff and external consultants from different nationalities 
and sectors. Second, I selected different types of CSR professionals in order to construct the 
narratives. These include: (i) individuals currently working as CSR professionals inside 
companies; (ii) individuals working as external consultants or counselors to support CSR 
activities of a company; (iii) individuals with particular characteristics, e.g. embedded 
‘change agents,’ observers/witnesses, and subject-matter experts; and (iv) a panel of 
individuals all working within the same company on the same CSR activity. By using 
varying the approaches and subjects, I helped to minimize interpretability of the results. 
Next, my dialogue sessions included subjects who were involved in the same decision 
process for the same CSR issue or activity.  The ‘telling’ process is therefore enhanced 
because we were in a privileged position to develop meaning of what happened and why 
together. Although my note-taking consisted of very detailed descriptions of the subject’s 
first-hand accounts, I solicited feedback from the subjects to clarify what was said and what 
was occurring at the time. Finally, the dialogue sessions were semi-structured, which allowed 
me and the subjects to search for any discrepant cases and competing explanations.  
In using the narrative analysis methodology to analyze the data, there were additional 
validity issues I considered and incorporated into my work-flow.
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 The first issue is the 
persuasiveness of my analysis. It is important to recognize that interpretation of the narrative 
is a snapshot in time and may not be applicable in a future or different setting. As Riessman 
states, “Our texts have unstable meanings.”128 This aspect is captured in the discussion of the 
findings. The implications of the analysis are not fixed; rather, it should encourage the 
continuous improvement of research on intra-organizational issues to explain CSR behavior. 
The next issue is the coherence of my analysis. In general, there should be a ‘global’, ‘local’ 
and ‘themal’ coherence. Riessman refers to this as (i) the subject’s attempt to explain and 
justify an action (global); (ii) how the subject uses language and tone to effect in the narrative 
(local); and (iii) common issues or content the subjects used repeatedly (themal).
129
 The last 
issue is the practical application of my analysis. By sharing the research work with others, 
and by others making it useful and applicable, I can help increase its validity. This can be 
done by describing the methodology and making the primary data available to other 
researchers. One of the advantages of being a CSR professional is that I am part of a 
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community of practice that can further examine these issues drawing from real-life 
experiences.  
3.6. Ethical Considerations 
The research topic and the disclosure of information were sensitive issues to the 
subjects. Disclosure of any type of data or information for public consumption was an 
inherent risk. In particular, the subjects were asked to describe how internal factors shaped 
and influenced decisions related to a company’s CSR. They were asked whether they 
believed it was good for the company. And, a great deal of personal beliefs was injected in 
conversations. All of this data and information was documented by me. Again, some of the 
subjects were under current litigation, pending litigation, or targeted by third party campaigns 
associated with a particular social issue. Any intentional or accidental disclosure of 
information and attribution could become discoverable in a court of law or strengthen third 
party campaigns against the subject. Protecting the subjects was the key ethical 
consideration.  
As the researcher, it was not only my primary responsibility to design the research, 
but to uphold professional and ethical standards in the conduct of the research. It was 
important to take the necessary steps to address the main ethical issues mentioned earlier. In 
negotiating the relationships with the subjects for the dialogue sessions, I explained how the 
data was going to be assembled and analyzed, as well as the potential risks and how I plan to 
mitigate those risks. Non-disclosure agreements were made available if requested by the 
subjects. There were no taped or digital recordings of the interviews and I did not use a third 
party to conduct the interviews. While there can be similar levels of risk by my own note-
taking, I tried to minimize the ‘document trail’ of having multiple sources of recorded data 
and information. It is also worth noting that subjects can be more guarded if they know they 
are being recorded, or they are unfamiliar with the facilitator, which can influence how they 
tell their stories, convey personal beliefs, and answer particular questions. Along this same 
point, there was no attribution in collected data, analysis, and iterations of the thesis 
regarding the subject’s name and affiliation. Next, there would be no future effort to disclose 
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the subject’s name and affiliations in any way, shape or form, including external discussions 
(e.g. conference presentations) concerning the dialogue sessions and findings. Finally, there 
would be no attempt to utilize the data for the purpose of seeking comparative advantage for 
the company I am employed at, any future places of employment, or aiding my colleagues in 
peer companies.  
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Chapter 4. Findings 
4.1. Introduction 
The analysis and findings are divided in two parts. Part one attempts to generalize the 
decision process connected to CSR issues or activities. Largely based on the teller’s 
retrospective experience and analysis, significant events, cause and effect correlations, 
coincidences, and key turning points are weaved together to describe what happens; why it 
happens; how it happens; and the implications. Part two attempts to address the fundamental 
question of whether or not complexity and macro-organizational behavior can influence the 
decision process for CSR issues and activities.   
4.2. Part One: Decision Process Characteristics 
The transcriptions of fifty-six dialogue sessions were reduced into five categories 
using Labov’s framework, which helped to develop the core narratives and comparative 
analyses across the sample (see Appendix A). The categories are summarized as follows: 
1) Abstract: This refers to the subject’s reason for selecting and telling the story. It 
centered on a specific CSR issue, e.g. climate change; or a specific activity, which may 
include a project, program, corporate standard or process, corporate guidance or tool, 
corporate strategy, or change management scheme. The teller chose the activity.  
2) Orientation: This refers to the subject’s primary reference points related to the 
story. This includes location and conditions, actors and behaviors, and timeframe of when the 
events took place. All of this serves to orient the teller and listener to the context of the 
decision process where the CSR issue or activity was being developed.  
3) Complicating Factor: This refers to the chain of events, key issues, and turning 
points that may have significant meaning to the decision process and the CSR activity’s 
development.  
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4) Evaluation: This refers to the teller’s particular insights and perspectives of the 
underlying reasons behind what happened, why and how. It serves as an opportunity for the 
teller to emphasize or reinforce key issues and learnings. These insights are brought in during 
the course of story-telling.  
5) Resolution/Coda: This refers to the outcome of the decision process and takes us 
back to some of the reasons the teller chose to tell it.  
Orientation (setting) and Complicating Action (sequence of events) showed a 
discernible pattern across Group (A) (see Table 6.1). Activation of the decision process 
started with a specific company problem/opportunity to address a CSR issue. External 
factors, such as the company facing a reputational crisis, were common triggers for the 
problem/opportunity. Next, the decision process involved multiple groups with differentiated 
responsibilities and functions. A single group, such as the CSR department/unit, did not 
necessarily have ownership over the issue or how it was to be managed. Finally, macro-
organizational behaviors affected the decision process. This typically involved the use of 
tactics either to preserve and protect the status quo or to advance or negotiate new 
alternatives to address the issue. Common in point two and three above were the private 
goals and objectives of specific groups or individuals engaged in the decision process. In 
most cases, these groups and individuals exercised self-interested behaviors to develop those 
goals. These aspects are further discussed in the next few sections.  
4.2.1. Activation started with a new problem or opportunity  
Imminent change or potential disruption to the current state of the company presented 
a change or challenge to the way CSR issues were being presently managed. A form of 
external pressure was usually connected to the change, which included: (i) third party 
activism around a CSR issue associated with the company or industry (e.g. human rights) and 
ongoing scrutiny of company or industry performance; (ii) emergence of a global voluntary 
standard of conduct or ‘soft law’ measure to guide or control companies; (iii) regulatory 
changes on a social issue or policy; (iv) local project-related risks where the company 
operates (e.g. community protests); and (v) corporate reputation risks associated with a CSR 
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issue. The status quo typically referred to the company’s current division of functional 
responsibilities, resources, and contingency management as it related to emerging issues and 
threats to the company.  
The external event prompted a perceived or actual change to the company. Moreover, 
embedded in this change was a problem that needed to be addressed and in the same vein, a 
potential opportunity to address it. In some cases, new groups or functional responsibilities 
were formed to address the problem and this was linked in many cases with opportunistic 
behaviors by some sponsor. This also precipitated territorial and other defensive behaviors 
from other groups. Impacted groups typically wanted to protect current resources, their 
privileged access to senior management, the current portfolio of CSR issues, projects and 
responsibilities, and contingency management of CSR issues or social risks that can impact 
the company.     
4.2.2. Multiple groups engaged 
The disruption to the status quo and the opportunities that availed initiated 
engagement by different internal groups. Rarely did it seem that one specific group would 
manage the implications of the external event. In addition, it was also not clear who was 
ultimately responsible for the CSR issue or activity or had the appropriate resources and 
capacities. Again, the nature and ambiguity of the CSR issue, including its risks and 
opportunities to the company, crosscuts with differentiated functions prompting the 
involvement of several groups in some way. Owners of the issues and the tools and processes 
to manage them were generally expected or required to assemble across different functions, 
such as project teams, technical working groups, task forces, steering committees, etc. within 
the corporate headquarters, as well as overseas subsidiaries and business units.   
4.2.3. Engaged groups used tactics  
Macro-organizational behavior was apparent in the decision process, and ‘political’ 
tactics were exercised by different groups for different reasons. Some groups were impacted 
by the perceived or actual change in the company because of the external event. Directly 
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through, as well as outside, formal decision processes different groups negotiated alternatives 
to manage the issue. However, groups also negotiated to benefit their internal positioning, 
such as expanding their roles and responsibilities in the company or protecting their existing 
territory and mitigating future impacts. A range of tactics were used and collated as: (i) 
specific use of language and content that would resonate with certain internal stakeholders to 
get buy-in; (ii) deliberate framing of the issue aligned with their internal roles and 
responsibilities; (iii) alliance and coalition building or ‘strength in numbers’; (iv) ‘backroom’ 
discussions and influence tactics with key stakeholders and decision-makers; and (v) 
strategic utilization of internal and external ‘change agents’ (e.g. consultants) to advance 
private goals and objectives within the company.   
Subject 
ID 
Orientation Complicating Action 
1 • opportunity triggered change to status 
quo: stakeholder relations with NGOs 
• competitive environment and no 
leadership support; domination of one 
group  
• multiple groups impacted 
• engendered resistance and protection 
of territory 
 
2 • identification of problem that required 
change management: potential community 
grievances associated with operations 
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics used to sell solution: 
community relations instead of 
security 
• tactics used to gain leadership 
support 
3 • opportunity to change status quo: integrate 
social issues in risk assessments 
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics were used to sell product: risk 
assessment 
• tactics used to gain leadership 
support 
4 • external pressure to trigger change status 
quo: government scrutiny over human 
rights issue 
• multiple groups impacted 
• change management happened and 
no resistance  
• leadership provided air cover and 
shield from internal politics 
5 • opportunity to change status quo: 
centralize process consistency of 
grievance mechanism procedure across 
enterprise  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell solution and 
overcome potential resistance 
6 • opportunity to change status quo by a 
group: moving CSR remit into different 
group 
• background of leadership support and 
• tactics used to sell idea  
• tactics used to protect turf 
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merger legacy 
• multiple groups impacted  
7 • problem identified to change status quo: 
community grievance toward company 
operations 
• multiple groups impacted 
• groups benefitting from status quo  
• tactics used to sell new alternative, 
get buy-in 
• tactics used to protect turf 
8 • opportunity identified to change status 
quo: external pressures at play from 
standards and stakeholder activism 
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics used to sell concept and 
solution: integrate sustainability into 
business strategy 
9 • opportunity identified to change status 
quo: social responsibility framework to 
complement environmental risk 
assessment – get into core business   
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics used to sell concept and 
solution 
10 • two opposing cases of organizational 
behavior: leadership (CEO) and political 
construction (small and consensus-driven 
versus large and turf-oriented)  
• multiple groups impacted 
• engendered opportunity to pursue a 
solution or exercise resistance to it 
11 • process change to the status quo: project 
finance sustainability principles 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell process and get 
buy-in  
• tactics also used to resist it 
12 • opportunity identified to change status 
quo: operationalize policy 
• backdrop of external campaigns and 
scrutiny 
• multiple groups 
• tactics used to sell plans and get buy-
in 
• concept not negotiated, but the 
“how” 
13 • problem and opportunity identified to 
change status quo: create community fund 
to prevent disruption  
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics used to sell alternative and get 
buy-in 
14 • opportunity identified to change status 
quo: new vision for CSR – computer skills 
training) 
• multiple groups impacted 
• counter to prevailing business 
strategy of not tying to business 
development  
• tactics used to sell idea and get buy-
in from leadership and powerful 
groups internally and in the business 
units 
16 • problem and opportunity identified to 
change status quo: rule of law program to 
optimize market for existing operations)  
• backdrop of external pressure and 
stakeholder scrutiny; competing program: 
• weak or fragmented tactics to sell 
alternative – not enough was used 
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regional development 
• multiple groups impacted 
17 • external pressure to induce change to 
status quo: climate change position  
• backdrop of hurting base business: getting 
deals 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell position and 
strategy and overcome resistance 
 
18 • problem identified to change status quo: 
security and human rights policy 
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics used to sell concept and get 
buy-in within a formal issue 
identification process 
19 • process change to status quo 
• backdrop of negative perceptions of a 
group; also external pressure and scrutiny  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell process change 
and get buy-in; also overcome 
resistance 
20 • external pressure triggered change to 
status quo: human rights policy 
• backdrop of CEO opposition to a new 
policy  
• multiple groups impacted 
• tactics used to sell concept and 
overcome resistance 
21 • external pressure triggered change to 
status quo: new risk assessment – 
integrate into other processes  
• backdrop of legacy issue and leadership 
buy-in for change; and small company – 
easy to push through 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to overcome resistance 
22 • external pressure triggered change to 
status quo: human rights guidance 
• backdrop of guidance versus management 
system: focus on safety and CEO support  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell idea and get buy-
in 
23 • external pressure triggered change to 
status quo: NGO engagement 
• backdrop of reorganization 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics not used well to sell idea and 
get buy-in 
25 • external standard/pressure triggered 
change to status: quo anti-corruption 
policy 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell process and get 
buy-in and overcome resistance 
30 • external crisis triggered change to the 
status quo: disaster  
• backdrop of local strategy and decision-
making versus parent (Japanese) 
• tactics used to get buy in 
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• multiple groups impacted  
31 • external standard/pressure triggered 
change to the status quo: incident/rating 
human rights performance  
• backdrop of lack of understanding 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to get buy-in and resist 
change,  
32 • external incident/pressure triggered 
change to the status quo 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell process and get 
buy-in 
42 • lack of understanding and competition for 
contingency 
• backdrop of owner of resources is owner 
of CSR  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell agenda 
48 • external issue/pressure triggered change to 
the status quo: law suit 
• backdrop of competing interests and 
contingency management among key 
functions  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell agenda and 
negotiate alternatives 
49 • external pressure triggered change to the 
status quo: law suit  
• backdrop of crosscutting issue and 
inconsistent understandings  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics were used to advance agendas 
and influence the internal decision 
making process 
50 • external pressure triggered change to the 
status quo backdrop of competing interests  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics were used to elevate CSR 
group to handle contingency - form 
alliances, co-opt on content and sell 
to executives 
51 • new internal process triggered change to 
the status quo 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell new process: 
alliance formation 
• lack of political strategy may have 
led to failure to secure support 
52 • external pressure/issues triggered change 
to the status quo 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics were used to sell strategy and 
issue priority – target senior 
executives 
• opportunistic to elevate CSR group 
53 • external pressure/issues triggered change 
to the status quo backdrop of integrating 
CSR in existing process  
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics were used to advance agenda 
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55 • new internal process triggering ‘future 
tension’ to the status quo 
• multiple groups impacted 
• NA 
56 • new process triggered change to status 
quo, different understandings and opinions 
of solution 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to advance agenda 
• sell to local stakeholders and prevent 
resistance and secure buy-in 
Table 6.1: Group (A) Plots  
Using Orientation and Complicating Action, the plots illustrated three patterns across 
Group (B), and two of the patterns were similar to Group (A). Among the involved groups, 
there was a general sense of inconsistency regarding the company’s overall CSR objectives, 
priorities, and/or understandings. This aspect was not only connected to the involvement of 
multiple groups, but also the crosscutting characteristic of the CSR issue. Next, a third party 
was strategically utilized to advance the interests of a particular group. A summary of the 
Group (B) plots is summarized in Table 6.2. These aspects are further discussed in the next 
few sections.  
4.2.4. Inconsistency of objectives and understandings 
Across the sample, there was a discernible pattern of inconsistency regarding the 
company’s goals, objectives, priorities, and/or understandings related to CSR or the means to 
manage the issues. Several reasons were suggested, which can be collated as the atomization 
of the issue and the abstraction of CSR, the urgency and immediacy of the external event, the 
complex structure of the company, and the existing roles, responsibilities, and territories to 
manage CSR issues and activities. Similar to Group (A), a single department/unit that was 
both recognized and accepted by the company to handle all CSR-type issues was not 
obvious. Moreover, the ‘CSR’ group in the company, both in title and function, was seldom 
the sole possessor of the issue, strategy or activity to manage it.  
Depending on the company’s complexity, CSR issues typically were bifurcated into 
sub-issues, including public policy, community relations, safety, operations, legal, reputation, 
regulatory, or government affairs. And, their weighted value and importance to the company 
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can be influenced by an external event impacting the company, or the parochial interests by 
those groups designated to manage the sub-issues.  
4.2.5. Use of third parties  
Group (B) highlighted a common trend where external third party groups were used 
to elevate awareness of, or advance, a particular idea or solution on behalf of certain groups 
in the company. The nature of the services requested of the third party was political. Internal 
groups were either motivated by self-interest, opportunism or to benefit the greater good of 
the company and society; nonetheless, they felt the need to leverage external consultants or 
service firms to sell their ideas and solutions or overcome internal resistance.  
In most cases, third parties were instructed to communicate or frame issues in certain 
ways that would resonate with key influencers and decision-makers, or ‘co-opt’ other 
individuals and groups with the aim of securing their buy-in for an idea or solution. The 
services provided by these external firms and consultants extended beyond technical CSR 
work. They were used as internal ‘change agents’ and became part of an internal strategy of 
the sponsoring group.  
Subject 
ID 
Orientation Complicating Factor  
15 • inconsistent understanding and framing 
• multiple groups impacted  
• tactics used to sell ideas  
• tactics used to protect turf 
24 • inconsistent goals and objectives 
• multiple groups impacted  
• crisis creates tension over 
contingency management  
• opportunism develops because of 
vagueness and for contingency 
management  
26 • different agendas, but consistency when 
CEO actively engaged 
• multiple groups impacted 
• external pressure triggers change to 
status quo 
• compete for handling contingency 
the more CSR is elevated 
• tactics used to influence and get 
allies 
27 • different understandings  
• multiple groups impacted 
• external pressure triggered change 
to status quo 
• under backdrop of CEO 
engagement  
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• tactics used to adopt and integrate 
change management 
28 • CSR strategy is a significant change to 
status quo 
• political construction of company 
engenders political behaviors: difficult to 
centralize CSR 
• multiple groups impacted 
• protect territory – some groups that 
handle contingency management 
and process are territorial 
29 • not clear who owns CSR  
• multiple groups impacted  
• third party used as a tactic to frame 
issue in certain way – worked for 
policy people only 
33 • not clear who owns CSR 
• inconsistent goals and objectives 
• multiple groups impacted 
• third party used to communicate 
CSR in a certain way 
• have incentives for impacted groups 
34 • not clear who owns CSR 
• inconsistent goals and objectives 
• different framing of the issues 
• multiple groups impacted  
• third party used as a tactic to sell 
idea; failure without using tactics 
35 • not clear who owns CSR 
• inconsistent goals and objectives 
• different framing of the issues 
• multiple groups impacted 
• use third party as a tactic to sell 
agenda and overcome resistance 
36 • different goals and objectives/inconsistent 
messaging 
• no alignment 
• multiple groups impacted 
• backdrop of internal reorganization 
37 • different owners of CSR 
• inconsistent framing 
• multiple groups impacted 
• backdrop of low understanding of 
CSR  
• tactics were used to misdirect and 
undermine contingency 
• conflict was healthy and helped to 
spur internal engagement 
38 • dependent on the CSR issue 
• led to inconsistent framing 
• multiple groups impacted  
• backdrop of self-interest  
• tactics were used to protect territory 
• tactics were used for resistance or 
making biased recommendations 
39 • decision making on CSR was not clear 
• multiple groups impacted  
• backdrop of crosscutting issue: 
different functional touch points  
• third party used as a tactic to sell 
agenda or secure buy-in 
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40 • decision making or owner of CSR is not 
clear 
• inconsistent solutions to CSR issues 
• multiple groups impacted  
• third party used as a tactic to sell 
risk 
• had a positive effect: unified 
different groups – alliances 
41 • groups had limited decision making: power 
rested with law function) 
• inconsistent objectives and solutions  
• multiple groups impacted 
• NA 
43 • decision making and owner of CSR is not 
clear 
• multiple groups impacted 
• backdrop of political structure of 
organization, leadership goals, and 
resource control 
• middle management’s competing 
interests affected leadership views 
44 • inconsistent objectives 
• multiple groups impacted  
• as CSR issues/risk shifted 
ownership shifted, control of 
resource, visibility and contingency 
was a political driver 
• tactics have a positive effect – spurs 
attention and leads to innovation 
45 • decision making on CSR was not clear  
• multiple groups impacted 
• NA 
46 • owner of CSR was not clear 
• different solutions 
• territorial issue 
• multiple groups impacted 
• backdrop of the power structure – 
break up CSR  
• third party was used as a tactic to 
frame, co-opt, and sell solution 
47 • inconsistent objectives and understandings 
• multiple groups impacted  
• backdrop of undefined issue and 
vagueness  
• used third party to sell agenda and 
get buy-in 
 
54 • ownership of CSR is unclear and there are 
inconsistent objectives, 
• external crisis induces CSR activism 
• multiple groups impacted  
• backdrop of competition for 
contingency and resources 
• third party used as a tactic to 
advance agenda and influence 
internal client groups 
Table 6.2: Group (B) Plots  
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4.3. Part Two: Complexity and the Decision Process 
Using Narayanan and Fahey’s framework, the transcriptions of fifty-six dialogue 
sessions were reduced into four categories, which helped to comparatively analyze the phases 
of decision making regarding complexity’s effects on the decision process for CSR issues 
and activities. Appendix B contains the full data reduction of the decision process plots.  
1) Activity: This refers to a firm’s strategy, project, program, corporate policy or 
process under the rubric of corporate responsibility. This may include a (i) social investment 
project to provide access to basic human needs to a community where a firm operates; (ii) 
corporate funding or donations program for post-disaster relief or reconstruction in a country 
or community; (iii) corporate policy on human rights or environmental protection; (iv) 
environment/social/health due diligence process for projects; and/or (v) corporate strategy on 
CSR or issue related to CSR, i.e. corporate alignment with an international standard of 
behavior.  
2) Activation: This refers to the individual level of recognition of the CSR issue or 
activity. It centers on the individual’s cognitive articulation of the CSR issue or activity and 
what may have influenced it: (i) his/her association to it; (ii) historical context; and/or (iii) 
prevailing corporate conditioning that may affect language used to describe it and/or coping 
mechanisms, e.g. problem-solving and decision-making processes.  
3) Engagement: This refers to the collective level of engagement by more than one 
group within the company. This can be through formal engagement, such as a standing 
committee, working group or task force. This can also be through informal engagement, such 
as ad hoc working groups or relationships with other key groups to interpret or define a CSR 
issue or advance the CSR activity or a dimension of it.  
4) Decision: This refers to the intra-organizational decision process to generate 
alternatives in order to select a final course of action to address a CSR issue or activity.  The 
process typically consists of data collection and analysis, generating different scenarios, 
evaluating advantages and disadvantages for each scenario or alternative, and making a final 
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decision on a course of action. The process may also include some process of ‘look-backs’ or 
ongoing improvement in order to modify the course of action.  
4.3.1. Activation  
Across the sample, during the Activation phase of the decision process a recognition 
pattern of the current state of the CSR issue or activity emerged. Nine recognitions were 
common across the sample, which can be summarized along the two dimensions: (1) 
crosscutting feature of CSR functions and norms; and (2) organizational complexity.   
4.3.1.1. Crosscutting feature of CSR functions and norms 
Two recognitions across the sample were associated with group functions and 
embedded norms. First, a common recognition pattern was the different understandings, 
interpretations, objectives and priorities in the company associated with the CSR issue. How 
the issue was framed to others also varied according to the different groups impacted by the 
CSR issue. Second, because functional responsibility and sources of ‘power’ are dispersed 
within the company, there were varying perceptions of how it should be managed and who 
should manage it. Subjects believed the efficiency to manage the CSR issue was embedded 
in different groups and its placement and treatment expanded internal boundaries and 
engendered opportunistic behaviors by some groups. These recognitions illustrated how the 
crosscutting characteristic of CSR issues and functions can trigger different and sometimes 
competing interpretations, as well as how the issue should be managed.  
4.3.1.2. Organizational complexity 
Four recognitions across the sample were associated with the complexity of the 
company: (1) functional complexity, (2) competition, (3) opportunism, and (4) change 
management. First, the company’s structure was a basis for internal misalignments over the 
handling of CSR issues. The subjects highlighted the complex structure of their companies 
where power, influence, roles and responsibilities were dispersed not only within the 
corporate center, but across geographies, including subsidiaries, profit centers, or business 
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units. As a result, a clear ‘owner’ and ‘decider’ was not always apparent. Second, external 
threats or a confluence of crisis-like event (e.g. law suit, NGO activism, shareholder 
resolutions) affecting the company were framed as CSR issues and this framing often 
garnered CEO and other executive attention to CSR, and by extension,  to potential groups 
that could best manage the company problem. Shifting contingency was linked to shifting 
resources. This helped to initiate competitive and territorial-like behaviors between different 
groups within the companies.   
Second, CSR issues that had, or was perceived to have, a material impact on the 
company provided a ‘window of opportunity’ for different groups to compete for the 
opportunity. This included internally positioning the group to be the focal point to manage 
the company issue, and moreover, increasing interaction with top leaders. Opportunism was 
exercised by instances of ‘power-grabbing’ or ‘elevating the importance of an issue’ to 
executives based largely on their self-interest. Third, the subtle or overt suggestion of change 
within the company, as a result of the CSR issue, was a central recognition among the 
subjects. Change was often precipitated by some form of external event or threat that posed a 
current or future reputation, operational, regulatory or legal issue to the company. It was also 
prompted by the introduction of a new organizational strategy, process or tool to help 
manage the CSR issue. The management of change did not always happen with 
administrative ease. There was awareness that change was associated with a disruption to the 
existing organizational structure and order.  
 Within the six recognitions discussed above, macro-organizational behavior was an 
undercurrent. This pattern also showed to be sequential among the sample. External pressures 
elevated leadership attention to the CSR issue. Next, the CSR issue engendered multi-group 
interaction and sensemaking of the issue (i.e. what it is and who has the responsibility to 
manage it). Then, emerging company strategies, plans, processes, etc. to manage the CSR 
issue impacted the groups and altered the current state of the company. Some of the potential 
sources of macro-organizational behavior are summarized as follows.  
External events and pressures: Threats to the company can include emerging 
international CSR standards, regulatory issues, legal action, stakeholder activism, or 
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operational disruptions. These pressures posed a material risk, whether perceived or actual, 
and problem for the company. Action to cope with, and find solutions, to the problem was 
necessary.   
Leadership attention: Awareness and attention of the CEO and/or top leadership 
members to specific CSR issues influenced and shaped how internal groups treated the issue 
and interfaced with one another. Leadership did not always have an effect on the direction of 
the company’s decisions. Rather, it was their mere interest in the CSR issue and the 
opportunity for internal groups to develop or expand their access to these individuals.  
CSR variability: In most cases, the treatment of CSR by the company led to 
conflicting understandings, goals and priorities. CSR was largely issue-centric, and therefore, 
often times stakeholder-centric. In other words, the existing order of the company had 
already pre-assigned certain groups to manage certain issues.  
Transformative effects: The onset of organizational transformation around a CSR 
issue was often unsettling to the natural order. It stoked territoriality, as well as opportunism 
among internal groups who depend on the company’s resources for their ongoing relevance. 
The management of change, therefore, was often executed within a context of competing 
interests.  
4.3.2. Engagement 
Across the sample, during the Engagement phase of the decision process two 
common patterns emerged: (1) multiple groups were involved in the formulation of options 
for preferred ideas and a course of action; and (2) tactics were exercised by these groups 
during the engagement to advance, block or negotiate preferred ideas.  
4.3.2.1. Multiple groups and functions 
Four main groups were typically involved in the Engagement phase of the decision 
process and this was dependent on the CSR issue. First, the executive body was involved. 
This typically included the CEO and/or top leadership members. Second, operational groups 
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were involved. This included advisors, officers, and middle managers from the operational 
side of the business; both in headquarters and in the business units. Third, service functions 
were involved. This included advisors, officers, and middle managers from service groups, 
such as law, security, human resources, procurement, and health, environment, and safety. 
Fourth, policy groups were involved. This included advisors, officers, and middle managers 
from CSR, government affairs, and public affairs. 
 The sample showed more than half of the fifty-six subjects involved the Law 
function. The participation of corporate counsel was prominent in the narratives. They were 
included in the engagement phase to assess the potential legal risks related to the CSR issue, 
as well as the selection of activities to manage it. In some cases they were involved due to 
current litigation against the company.  
 Across the sample, there was a common set of underlying drivers for multi-group 
engagement on a CSR issue or activity. There was recognition of identification or assignment 
to the issue whether this was real or perceived; again the issue did not rest with a single 
group. Next, there was recognition of potential impacts and implications that may affect the 
group. Operational groups, for example, typically needed clarity of internal buy-in, 
endorsement, or opposition. Service groups, particularly government affairs, CSR, law, risk, 
or philanthropy typically wanted to know how decisions may affect existing policies, 
strategies and reputational issues that they have been managing. Next, the 
comprehensiveness of decisions into the selection of preferred actions generated the need for 
a diversity of perspectives and consensus among key groups. It was also a requirement for 
gaining the support of top leadership to actually implement the preferred action.  
To achieve the requisite buy-in and consensus during the decision process, informal 
and formal cross-functional working groups were established to develop and negotiate a 
preferred course of action. Some of the subjects alluded that working groups were sometimes 
used by certain groups to co-opt others into a specific idea or solution. A common feature of 
the intra-group engagement included the assignment of a ‘champion’ or ‘change agent’ to 
help overcome potential resistance to an idea. Also, participation in the working group was 
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source of empowerment of many groups; there was an opportunity to pursue private interests 
and agendas or simply to be ‘seen and heard’ in the company.   
4.3.2.2. Macro-organizational behaviors 
Macro-organizational behavior was apparent in the Engagement phase. A number of 
tactics were used by different departments/units to influence and shape the decision process.  
The subjects cited instances where language was intentionally used to frame a CSR 
issue or activity, influence the intended internal stakeholder, and achieve a desired goal or 
objective. Subjects typically used the ‘business case’ to frame their issue, and incorporated 
company- or department-specific words and phrases that were unique to the company. This 
was essential not only to initiate attention to the issue, but also to get buy-in from the 
stakeholder that it was indeed an issue they should care about. In most cases, the subjects 
used ‘risk’ language to elevate the issue to resonate with internal stakeholders. A CSR issue 
was typically framed as a risk to the firm, and/or a CSR activity was sold as an opportunity 
and solution to overcome the risk.  
Crafting the issue was also another deliberate tactic. For example, the subjects 
selected external or internal data to bolster the CSR issue or reinforce their arguments, e.g. 
third party reports, internal information or statistics, case studies, intra-organizational ‘stories 
or rumors’, external stakeholder meeting reports, or benchmarking activities of peers and 
competitors. Next, issues were crafted in ways that would appeal to interests of the 
stakeholder they were trying to influence. Again, the abstract nature of CSR enabled 
influencers to profile CSR issues as a ‘legal issue’; a ‘public affairs issue’; or ‘technical-
operational issue’, etc. They also framed the issue using immediacy or priority, such as 
linking the issue to an emerging reputational, legal or operational risk. In connection to intra-
group meetings on the CSR issue, there were conscious attempts by a group to add on, or 
subtract from, information on the meeting agenda in order to steer the discussion and 
outcome in a way favorable to the group’s interest.   
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Another deliberate tactic was the use of external consultants as an extension of the 
group. Subjects identified external consultants as ‘change agents’ to help sell a CSR activity 
or a particular version of the CSR issue consistent with the sponsoring group. Some of the 
actions they were expected to perform were intended to shape and influence company 
thinking about the threat posed by the CSR issue and/or the coping mechanisms. For 
example, prior to a meeting with a group that is targeted for influence external consultants 
were coached by the sponsoring group on how to orchestrate the conversation, what to say 
and how, the positions of particular persons, and whom they should focus on. Next, external 
consultants were requested to undertake research to produce specific evidence to promote or 
reinforce the sponsoring group’s proposal related to the CSR issue and how to address it. The 
ability of the external consultant to express independent opinions about the CSR issue or how 
it should be managed by the company can be neutralized by the sponsoring group, especially 
if the contractual terms and compensation to the external consultant are managed by the 
sponsoring group.  
Outside the formal decision process, ‘backroom discussions’ or the creation of ad hoc 
issue or working groups aimed to co-opt key stakeholders to support a certain view that 
would benefit the goals of a sponsoring group. Informal ‘corridor’ conversations were used 
by sponsoring groups to ‘shop their ideas’ to key decision-makers or those in a position to 
influence them. They were also utilized to deliberately weaken another group’s concept, 
proposal or plan related to how to the management of the CSR issue. In these instances the 
intentional uses of language helped to craft and communicate the CSR issue to the internal 
consumer. By portraying the CSR issue in a certain way, it also enabled the sponsoring group 
to highlight the expertise or contingency capacity of the sponsoring group while contrasting 
other groups. Subjects also described instances where potentially resistant groups were 
invited to join an informal working group or task force created to address the CSR issue. The 
subtle, yet underlying driver was to align their views with that of the sponsoring group. 
Along the same lines, the sponsoring group formed informal alliances with other groups that 
shared similar objectives. Both tactics helped to promote the sponsoring group’s concept, 
proposal or plan within the company. More importantly, both tactics provided an ‘illusion of 
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consensus’ to decision-makers and substantiated that sufficient levels of internal stakeholder 
support was secured.  
 Perpetuating the Engagement phase during the decision process or delaying or 
‘orbiting’ (e.g. never landing on a resolution) key decisions by certain groups was a subtle, 
yet purpose-driven tactic to prevent critical inter-group agreements from occurring. These 
were intentional efforts to block another group’s CSR concept, proposal or plan from 
progressing, which required a certain level of feedback, consensus or buy-in from other 
groups. For example, participating groups would select individuals to represent them in the 
meeting, but the individual had no formal decision-making authority, nor was he/she 
delegated any. The individual attends meetings only to observe or take notes; all the while 
the expectation is that he/she provides some decision on issues and actions. Next, inter-group 
emails and other communications requesting feedback and decisions were never 
acknowledged. Again, this enables decision support matters to continue ‘orbiting’ during the 
engagement process.  
Participating groups also intentionally kept other groups uninformed or ‘in the dark’ 
regarding a version of the CSR issue or action plan that was sold to executives and the 
associated resolutions. The uninformed groups continue working for a certain period while 
key resolutions have been made largely without their input. Finally, the sponsoring group of 
a CSR proposal concealed critical data and information to produce incomplete analyses. For 
inter-group decisions, this tactic can delay the formulation or consideration of a particular 
group’s CSR proposals or plans, while intentionally shifting attention to the sponsoring 
group.   
Similar to issue-crafting, issue-selling leveraged the profile of other persons or groups 
to advance the sponsoring group’s ideas, and attempted to control organizational structures 
and processes to manage how data and information was disseminated. Across the sample, 
inter-group meetings and workshops was a common method for considering CSR issues or 
action-planning. Subjects intentionally used this approach to sell a specific version of the 
CSR issue or course of action to other key persons and groups. The sponsoring group, for 
instance, pre-selected and then inserted individuals into the workshop who had certain 
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attributes (e.g. subject-matter expertise) that made them effective promoters of arguments, 
concepts, proposals or plans of the sponsoring group. Moreover, the meeting agenda was 
orchestrated intentionally to sway participants to think and feel in a certain way. This was 
exercised by the subtle use of chosen words and information in the document hand-outs or 
key remarks, such as highlighting the potential ‘legal’, ‘financial’, or ‘technical’ risk of the 
CSR issue to the firm. Depending on the sponsoring group, the underlying motive was to 
reinforce their key arguments and capabilities to manage the CSR issue.  
Next, across the sample subjects described internal efforts to target key internal 
stakeholders that needed to be ‘educated’ and influenced because of their significance to the 
company’s decision process. For example, key senior executives were furnished with specific 
data, information or arguments that would in turn empower him/her to serve as an ‘executive 
champion’. On account of his/her power and influence, building the executive champion 
provided the necessary legitimacy or ‘air cover’ for the sponsoring group to move ahead and 
schedule internal briefings, form working groups, and sell the CSR concept, proposal or plan 
to other groups. They can also be used to deal with potential resistance by other groups and 
executives. Again, because of their standing, he/she can set decision criteria that are 
consistent with the sponsoring group, or speak directly to other executives to try to sway their 
thinking. Furthermore, prior to key decision phase meetings, subjects lobbied their peers 
and/or senior managers or executive on a particular version of the CSR issue or action plan. 
This was carried out through formal briefings, informal meetings, and presentation of data 
and information.  
4.3.3. Decision 
During the Decision stage of the decision process, typically where a course of action 
is deliberated and chosen related to a CSR issue, the sample highlighted a pattern in which 
the subjects believed (1) macro-organizational behavior (tactics) influenced the CSR 
outcome of the decision process; (2) the CSR decision process was good for the company; 
and (3) the CSR decision process benefitted certain groups.  
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4.3.3.1. Macro-organizational behavior (tactics) influenced the decision process 
 After telling their story in the dialogue session and reflecting on the decision process, 
a majority of the sample believed that macro-organizational behaviors affected the 
company’s decision process related to the CSR issue or activity. Subjects considered macro-
organizational behaviors, 
including the tactics the 
groups used, as both a 
positive or negative 
influence on the decision 
process and outcomes.  
Positive influence 
includes triggering 
executive and broader 
company awareness and attention, activity, and innovation to address the CSR issue. Without 
the tactics, the opportunity to address the CSR issue, or to place the company in a better state, 
would have been missed or lost. A new or updated policy, business process or practices 
adopted by the company are considered positive influences. In some cases, it simply 
provided the company with a starting point with the alternative being no action at all. 
Negative influence includes recommendations that served the group rather than the company, 
stifling company creativity and innovation, or overlooked opportunities to better manage the 
CSR issue. Regardless of the impact, subjects believed macro-organizational behavior was 
necessary in terms of stimulating the decision process, driving the company toward action, 
delivering a resolution.   
Subjects also believed macro-organizational behavior and associated tactics enabled 
the company to negotiate for something better; trading-off one CSR concept, proposal or 
plan for another. Several subjects believed that CSR issues and activities are negotiated 
within the decision process inside their company. This belief supports prior research on the 
premises of decision-making. CSR issues are part of a broader set of issues and priorities 
(34) 
(8) 
(13) 
influenced outcome 
did not influence 
outcome  
no comment  
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 
Figure 9.1: Belief that Macro-organizational Behavior (Tactics) Influenced the Decision Process 
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attended to by the company and often simultaneously. Moreover, CSR concepts, issues, or 
activities can be influenced by group sense-making and self-interests.  
Next, macro-organizational behaviors helped to identify, elevate, and develop a CSR 
activity that otherwise would not have happened. It helped to spur and promote internal 
engagement among differentiated groups and functions around a CSR issue or activity during 
the decision process. The alternative is to rely on prior methods, old plans, or maintain the 
status quo, which may not have benefitted the company or society. Conversely, subjects also 
believed macro-organizational behaviors and tactics, or lack thereof, led to missed CSR 
opportunities for the company. There were instances of preventing internal engagement on a 
CSR issue or activity during the decision process, rejecting an alternative that would have 
been more effective in addressing a CSR issue the company was facing, or following a 
particular direction of a group that had parochial perceptions and biased set of 
recommendations. Moreover, subjects believed there would have been a different outcome if 
it was not for the tactics. An outcome that was influenced and shaped by a ‘technical’ group 
may have been different if it was influenced by a ‘legal’ or ‘public affairs’ group. This aspect 
would also affect the distribution of resources and capacities, including contingency 
management within the company.    
 While a majority believed macro-organizational behaviors influenced the outcome, a 
small sample of subjects believed it did not. The reasons varied. For example, there was 
strong protection of a preferred alternative by a senior executive, which they believed 
prevented group tactics from undermining the course of action. Another case suggested the 
smaller size and reduced complexity, and clear authority by the CEO shielded the company 
from excessive or harmful macro-organizational behaviors. The smaller size and reduced 
complexity suggest that levels of complexity matter and can have an effect on the decision 
process. The company can have low levels of functional differentiation and spatial 
dispersion. Lastly, while subjects indicated macro-organizational behaviors did not affect the 
outcome, their narrative seemed to indicate that specific tactics were used to ‘orchestrate’ and 
promote a desired course of action. Macro-organizational behavior may not have been 
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essential to the company’s understanding of CSR, but rather on how it was to be 
implemented.  
4.3.3.2. CSR decision process benefitted the company 
 After describing their experience and reflecting on it during the dialogue session, a 
majority of the subjects believed that the decision process was good for the company. 
Subjects cited both tangible, as well as intangible benefits for the company. Tangible benefits 
were primarily specific CSR ‘products’, for example, adoption of a corporate CSR policy, 
creation of guidance documents, or development of new business processes. Another tangible 
example was the creation of dedicated staff positions to manage a CSR issue or activity.  
Intangible benefits often complemented the tangible benefits; in other words, there was a 
multiplier effect or additionality that was good for the company. These were collated as (i) 
integrating CSR issues into the 
existing management system and 
process to improve company 
efficiencies; (ii) generating more 
executive awareness of CSR 
issues and support to manage it; 
(iii) better engagement with 
external stakeholders and 
overcoming reputation issues; (iv) serving as a unifier to pull together internal groups and 
relevant functional skills and competencies to manage the issue; (v) connecting CSR issues 
closer to business materiality; (vi) raising the CSR issue to a strategic level in the company; 
and (vii) changing company practices to solve difficult CSR issues. Once more, regardless of 
the positive or negative influence on the company’s strategic decision process, macro-
organizational behaviors were impactful according to the subjects.  
(47) 
(8) 
good for company 
no comment 
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 
Figure 9.2: Belief that the CSR Decision Process was Good for the 
Company  
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4.3.3.3. CSR decision process benefitted certain groups 
 Upon reflection of their own experience, either as direct participants or observers of 
the decision process, a majority of the subjects believed that the process benefitted the group 
that initiated the tactics, and other groups that indirectly benefitted. The benefit was either a 
tangible product or an intangible advantage, such as greater executive attention to the CSR 
issue and the group’s capacity to manage it. The benefit for certain groups can be somewhat 
transformational. It disrupted the status quo and shifted responsibilities, resources, capacities 
and contingency management between different groups. This supports the earlier argument 
that CSR issues can alter the current 
state of the company. A common 
pattern across the sample was that 
most groups gained some advantage 
from more visibility with senior 
executives, increased access to 
specific leaders, and overall higher 
status inside the company. They also 
benefitted from having expanded 
roles and responsibilities in order to manage the CSR issue or develop new activities. In line 
with this point, some groups expanded their functional boundaries because of the CSR issue, 
or conversely protected existing ‘territory’. Finally, some groups gained greater ‘ownership’ 
of a specific CSR issue and more access to technical and financial resources. Also, being 
‘good’ for groups were not homogeneous; in other words, some groups benefitted, but 
benefitted in different ways. For example, not all groups gained more access to resources or 
became more visible inside the company.  
While some groups benefitted a small sample of subjects believed that the decision 
process did not benefit groups. In general, complexity and macro-organizational behaviors 
may have served as barriers to new ideas and innovations being sponsored by the group. 
Some of the subjects felt their ideas, or the ideas of other groups, would have been more 
optimal. Several examples were highlighted from the dialogue sessions, such as high levels 
(37) 
( 4) 
(15) 
good for group 
bad for group  
no comment  
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 
Figure 9.3: Belief that CSR Decision Process Benefitted Certain 
Groups 
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of functional differentiation engendering a political-like corporate culture that condoned ‘in-
fighting’ and competition between different groups. This type of setting benefitted groups 
with significant power and influence inside the company, and as a result, their ideas and 
proposals had a much better chance of being considered by decision-makers. Similarly, some 
groups felt structural complexity undermined the group’s ability to gain the necessary 
influence to develop a new CSR activity. These examples support the view that there is 
greater potential for conflict between different groups when power and influence becomes 
concentrated in a specific group to cope with a particular issue(s). 
Next, a prevailing business model left little room for a CSR proposal or activity to be 
considered. There was a great deal of resistance by more powerful, established groups, 
especially those closer to the business-side of the company and therefore supportive of the 
present model. They would naturally perceive a CSR proposal or activity that could 
transform the business model as a potential threat to the group’s positioning or influence in 
the company. Likewise, a predominant corporate strategy led by a few powerful groups 
continued to supersede any consideration of a CSR proposal or activity. While the CSR 
proposal may have benefitted the company in different ways, the sponsoring group had little 
chance of developing it; perhaps even less chance in implementing it.   
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4.4. Discussion  
Kunal Basu suggests that the durability of CSR is related to how deeply it is 
integrated in the company’s decision process.130 However, durability can also be determined 
by the company’s structural complexity. CSR is not implemented by plans and schemes; it is 
implemented by the company’s leaders, staff and departments and it would be naïve to 
assume their skills, knowledge, opportunities and motivations are all the same. For top 
management this can be a challenge; “The institutionalization of new ideas and practices 
does not simply happen; it depends on the actions of interested actors who work to embed 
them in the routines, structures, and cultures of organizations.”131 
Where a strategic CSR initiative may impact different groups, leadership often 
underestimates the dimensions and influence of their reactions.
132
 Different 
departments/units, coalitions, and other groups, depending on their interests, may not 
necessarily embrace a CSR issue or activity, even though it is in the best interest of the 
company and society. During the decision process they can react to the CSR issue or activity 
by erecting barriers and resisting; supporting broader organizational changes, but for 
opportunistic reasons; or publicly support the issue or changes, but secretly pursuing 
opportunities to undermine them to advance a hidden goal. In highly complex business 
organizations, groups as participants and recipients of its decision process may not be 
passive. They can also determine the outcome. A high level of commitment or belief in the 
CSR directive can reflect the group’s resourcefulness or initiative to implement CSR 
activities, and moreover, develop new ideas and innovations to improve performance. A low 
level of commitment, or conversely a high level of resistance, can reflect the group’s mere 
compliance while using various tactics to undermine the directive in ways that can serve the 
group’s broader interests.133 This can also result in weak and fragmented activities that do 
little to improve company performance or benefit the communities and societies they are 
intended to benefit. Could some of the alternatives generated to address a CSR issue have 
been more optimal than the preferred alternative that was chosen? While the company will 
address CSR issues that serve the best interest of the company, the underlying motives 
department/units and other internal groups may have played a role in influencing and shaping 
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what this is. We may never know because the organizational reality related to CSR decision 
processes is largely unknown and therefore unexplored.  
These issues were, and continue to be, central to my research and why I spent several 
years investigating theory, concepts, and case studies to explain CSR behavior and 
retrospectively making sense of my own observations and experiences. The dialogue sessions 
and subsequent narratives provided a rich collection of first-hand data for analysis to address 
the central inquiry of my research. From my investigation of the strategic decision-making 
process several findings emerged that support existing literature on the potential impact of 
structural complexity and different premises for decision-making. These are discussed in the 
next few sections.  
1) CSR issues or activities are not necessarily separate and distinct from the company’s 
decision process.   
Lars Christensen, Mette Morsing, and Ole Thyssen researched the polyphony of 
CSR.
134
 They concluded that companies attend to different business issues and concerns 
concurrently and decision-making on CSR issues would be affected by these other 
considerations. When a problem or external pressure emerges and framed as CSR, the 
materiality of the issue to the company and how it should be addressed can potentially impact 
established roles and responsibilities of different departments/units. Even with clear 
definitions, policy prescriptions and management processes, which are broadly understood 
and accepted by the company, CSR’s meaning and its activities can still be subject to 
different interpretations and influences.  
CSR issues, therefore, may not necessarily be given special consideration in the 
decision process, and moreover, they may not be immune to the various effects of the 
company’s complexity. At different points in time the company can face risk and uncertainty 
issues, including those involving CSR. This can include a renewed effort around risk 
management and positioning for future growth during the current economic downturn; the 
frequency and severity of reputational risks; or the maturing of a so-called CSR infrastructure 
that “…attempts to effect change by using mechanisms such as peer pressure, visibility, 
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rankings, activism, and, increasingly, mandate to pressure companies to improve their effects 
on people, the planet, and societies.”135   
Because the company attends to numerous concerns and priorities simultaneously, a 
CSR issue would be contextually defined and different departments/units may be involved in 
the development of alternatives to address it. Depending on the characteristics of the issue, 
during the Engagement phase of the decision process some groups can be in a privileged 
position inside the company and can bolster or weaken the influence of other groups or 
displace their expertise and ideas.
136
 Moreover, research suggests that normative arguments 
may have less legitimacy within the company compared to instrumental ones.
137
 CSR issues 
can be reframed as economic arguments during the Activation phase of the decision process, 
which can be used to legitimize the issue by being more aligned with the company’s ongoing 
concerns. While this reframing can help to move the issue through the Activation and 
Engagement phases, it also can affect the development of alternatives and resolution during 
the Decision phase. As a result, CSR issues and activities can either be elevated and 
developed or lost or diluted during the decision process.  
Consider the hypothetical example of managing CSR issues and external 
stakeholders, a common yet challenging task for highly complex companies operating in 
multiple environments. The activities of the non-governmental sector (NGO) are a significant 
factor in helping to shape the meaning of CSR.
138
 In this environment companies need to 
build their credibility given society’s perceived ‘high trust’ in this sector.139 However, their 
significance to companies may not lie in the CSR issue they are advancing, but in their power 
and motives, which can vary, and their motives can influence how the company will address 
the CSR issue in decision processes. NGOs can be motivated by the need to assist the 
company to address a particular societal issue, or to drive them into changing their behavior 
through ‘name and shame’ in public fora or advocating for regulatory measures and 
litigation. The decision process may involve multiple groups and agendas depending on the 
urgency, immediacy, and materiality of the issue. The alternatives developed to address the 
issue can include legal, operational, financial, and reputational considerations and the final 
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decision may have less to do with addressing the CSR issue, but more to do with protecting 
the financial and reputational aspects of the company.  
2) The decision process for CSR issues and activities can be influenced and shaped by 
the company’s complexity.  
Complexity refers to how the company is structured internally. Again, the more 
differentiated the functions, and the more geographies it operates in, the more complex the 
organization. Moreover, “… the strategy/structure relationship must acknowledge that the 
strategic decision process and its outcomes can be facilitated, constrained, or simply shaped 
by the structure’s direct effects.”140 Complexity issues were largely unexplored in early CSR 
theories, but it is increasingly being considered in current investigations. We see this, for 
example, in managerial theories where there is greater focus on internal processes (Kunal 
Basu, Guido Palazzo, François Maon, Adam Lindgreen, and Valérie Swaen). Yet, there is 
opportunity to develop greater research linkages with research on decision-making, 
complexity, and macro-organizational behavior (Robert Miles, Richard Cyert, James March, 
James Frederickson). It was my aim to look into some of these potential connections.  
Again, the sources of a company’s complexity are its functional differentiation and 
spatial dispersion. In unstable environments, characteristic of highly complex companies, the 
distribution of power among various groups may be necessary for the company’s ongoing 
survival.
141
 Depending on the dimensions of the CSR issue (regulatory, legal, reputation, 
etc.), multiple departments/units and other internal groups can become involved in the 
decision process. Each would have specific roles, functional responsibilities, and resources 
and these attributes would be brought into the decision process. Some groups may have more 
influence than others, and at different times during the decision process. Thus, building 
alliances with other groups may be necessary in order to build a broad-based constituency 
within the company supportive of their CSR ideas.
142
  
The cost and benefits of alternatives and potential outcomes can play out in the 
decision process, sometimes intensely, among the impacted groups. There is greater potential 
for tension when resources and responsibilities can become concentrated in a group to cope 
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with a particular issue. The company’s overall dependence on a particular group is perhaps a 
measure of its overall power and influence.
143
 The dialogue sessions revealed that internal 
groups did consider the implications of the decision process. And those groups with relative 
power and influence were better positioned either to promote or block ideas, or expand or 
defend their relative position within the company. Some of the tactics included controlling 
what signals get transmitted from the external environment, interaction between groups 
around the interpretation of CSR-related issues and events, or reference points that can guide 
decision-making. One of the important implications of high complexity is the difficulty in 
coordinating and controlling decision activities.
144 
3) Macro-organizational behavior can have a positive or negative impact on CSR.  
Macro-organizational behavior is a side effect of complexity. Again, the focus is not 
centered on the individual stakeholder, rather its broader social system and the groups that 
operate within that system. Thus, implicit in complexity is struggle and potential conflict 
between groups that may have contrasting goals and agendas, and varying forms of power 
and influence. Also implicit is ‘non-rational influence’, as the desired outcomes may be 
different than that of the firm as a whole.
145
 In this regard their behaviors can be subtle and 
covert, yet purposeful and determined to advance their private interests. While we may 
assume that rationality will prevent groups from ascribing their own interests to achieving the 
company’s CSR goals, rational behaviors can also be diluted by the groups’ self-interests. 
Interestingly, almost all the CSR activities used by the research sample described underlying 
motives of internal groups and the range of tactics used to pursue their goals.  
Conflict between groups is viewed as dysfunctional by classical theorists and 
therefore should be repressed or eliminated in organizations. The dialogue sessions provided 
examples of how political behaviors by different groups led to recommendations that did not 
serve the best interest of the company, suppressed innovation that could have led to better 
management practices and external performance, or maintained the status quo (do nothing), 
which served the interests of the group, but not necessarily the company.  
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Then again, conflict is not necessarily dysfunctional in companies; “…conflict may 
function to maintain an optimum level of stimulation or activation among organizational 
members and contribute to the organization’s adaptive and innovative abilities.”146 The 
dialogue sessions described how groups, during the decision process, generated and elevated 
CSR concepts, proposals and plans, spurred fresh thinking and innovation on business 
processes or practices, or simply ‘started something’ for the organization. It was better than 
the alternative which was nothing. Decision outcomes shifted roles and resources to other 
groups that had the capabilities to address the CSR issue, develop the CSR activities, and 
improve the company’s performance. The alternatives and resolutions generated from the 
decision process can have a negative or positive influence on the company’s CSR. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Implications 
Shifting the examination of CSR behavior from an outcomes-oriented analysis to a 
mean-oriented analysis provided some valuable insight into how structural complexity can 
influence how a company will address a CSR issue or develop a CSR activity, e.g. strategy, 
policy, process, or project.  
By deconstructing the company’s decision process, we could begin to draw 
meaningful connections from prior research that focused more on organizational systems and 
behavior. Removing the core features of existing CSR explanations, namely normative, 
relational and instrumental concepts, we were able to apply alternative frameworks, 
including strategy and structure relationships, premises for decision-making and macro-
organizational behavior. These frameworks build on the growing body of research related to 
managerial constructs to explain a company’s CSR behavior. Indeed, the evolutionary 
process of integration and institutionalization of CSR in business strategies and management 
systems should naturally shift research away from purist constructs or abstract concepts and 
explanations to “… the institutional factors that might trigger or shape such [CSR] activities 
in the first place.”147 
Increasingly using alternate frameworks can help address an unmet need to further 
understand the broader dimensions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ a company makes a decision on a 
CSR issue or activity. And, it can help us understand why there can be inconsistencies 
between a company’s public communications to appear socially responsible and its actual 
performance. It can also help researchers and practitioners recognize that the effects of 
complexity, and its influence on CSR strategy and plans, can be somewhat predictable and 
manageable. For example, it can help us to understand and perhaps forecast the development 
of alternatives and/or choice of action in the decision process. Narayanan and Fahey’s stages 
of strategic decision-making illustrated how at different stages in the decision process groups 
can mobilize, coalesce, engage internally, and attempt to influence the outcome. Moreover, a 
commitment by different group(s) to a decision outcome can develop early in the process,
148
 
which may help explain why some aspects of a CSR strategy emerge and why some can be 
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suppressed. Despite access to learning, data and resources that can lead to informed, 
objective decision-making on the company’s CSR, goals and preferences are not always 
shared by all members. What we may find is that other interests can be elevated above the 
overarching interest of the company, and often pursued under the pretext of rationality. 
Christensen, Morsing, and Thyssen’s argument that CSR issues co-exist with other ongoing 
concerns shows that at any given moment CSR issues can be contextually defined, which can 
affect how it will be treated during a decision process; and moreover, the likely course of 
action to address it. Some of these issues are informed by the foundational research of Miles, 
Cyert and March on macro-organizational behavior and Frederickson on structural 
complexity. In a nutshell, structure matters and CSR behavior can be shaped and influenced 
by the company’s structure.      
This final section of my thesis summarizes the main conclusions drawn from my 
research. I also offer propositions that attempt to connect the structure/complexity 
relationship to a firm’s CSR behavior. I will also discuss the limitations of my research and 
the potential implications for an expanded research agenda on the intra-organizational 
aspects of CSR.  
5.1. Conclusions 
To start, the conclusions are preliminary. There is still more data and analysis that is 
needed to fully develop the objective that I set out for this study, which was to better 
understand the effect of high complexity on decision processes for CSR issues or activities. I 
wanted to contribute to the emerging lines of inquiry where investigation and theory 
development is moving more toward intra-organizational factors, and where normative and 
relational factors are implicit.   
The structure/complexity treatment of the firm offered an interesting perspective on 
company behavior and the potential affect on CSR. It centers the analysis not on top leaders 
and individuals, but rather on the company’s dynamic internal context, particularly the 
operating system and the internal groups (e.g. departments, units, coalitions) that are 
dependent on the organization’s resources for legitimacy, goal-attainment, and survival. It 
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also recognizes that resources and contingency are dispersed throughout the organization, 
and at any given time can be redistributed between different groups. This is potentially 
relevant in two ways: (i) CSR goals, strategies or activities are not a given; and (ii) decisions 
on CSR issues and activities may or may not be in the best interest of the company.  
Next, linking complexity to the decision process highlighted the potential limitations 
of using current concepts to explain a company’s CSR behavior. The decision process, even 
for CSR issues, can be affected by larger forces inside the organization. By removing the 
potential explanations for decision-making from current CSR theories, we found potential 
variance when associated with complexity issues. Normative aspirations or goals were 
insufficient to explain a company’s decision process for CSR issues and activities. Public 
statements and private actions can be misaligned. Relational concepts do not account for the 
different treatment and prioritization of issues and stakeholders in decision-making. While 
political concepts tend to explain CSR behavior as a response to the constraints of political 
institutions, it may not recognize how CSR can be leveraged by companies to influence and 
shape public policies and institutions to favor the company.
149
 Managerial concepts may 
ignore the internal socio-political context that management systems and processes must occur 
in, and how this can affect decisions on what processes need to change and how to change it. 
Much of the potential variance may reflect organizational realities; thus more empirical 
research is needed to build a stronger foundation of knowledge on CSR behavior.  
With this summary, we can begin to address my original inquiry rephrased as a 
question: What effect did high complexity have on decision processes for CSR issues or 
activities? 
From the study, there were two main effects of complexity: (1) CSR issues and 
activities can be treated contextually by the company; and (2) complexity can influence the 
alternatives that would be generated to address the CSR issue or activity. These conclusions 
are discussed in the next few sections.  
1) CSR issues and activities can be treated contextually by the company. 
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The CSR issue would not necessarily enter the company’s system as a monolithic 
‘CSR’ issue. It enters the company’s complex structure where different groups with issue 
specializations, functional responsibilities, and institutional structures that support them exist. 
The issue and activities can be assessed and compartmentalized by different functions into 
different interpretations.   
Because of its abstract nature, CSR is not always well-positioned as a superordinate 
goal or strategy of the company and its ‘strategic’ imperative or understandings can be 
subjected to the readings and goals of different groups. Moreover, these groups may have 
latent or current private interests and varied levels of power and influence inside the 
company. The dimensions of the CSR issue may already be atomized throughout the 
company based on prior framings, past performance, or legacy issues, e.g. group assignments 
or management process changes. As a result, clear roles and responsibilities may not be well-
founded and boundaries between different groups can become more blurred and a source of 
new conflicts. These issues can be especially pronounced when CSR is connected to a high 
profile crisis or significant executive attention and focus. The current complexity of the 
company can initiate these secondary effects and influence how the CSR issue or activity is 
treated during the decision process.  
The CSR issue would also enter the company’s ongoing concerns and strategies. This 
can include events in the political economy, competitive issues, markets, financial health, 
legal threats, product development, etc. At any given time, any one of these issues can 
become prioritized and elevated as ‘strategic’ to the company. CSR issues and activities can 
be watered down in the company’s strategy or disconnected altogether if it is not embedded 
meaningfully into what the company is trying to achieve. This can be especially complicated 
given that the company can be operating in multi-domestic and global markets, producing 
differentiated products and types of services, facing a confluence of threats (e.g. regulations, 
economic slowdown, and legal issues), undergoing reorganization, or pursuing several goals 
and strategies concurrently. As a consequence, CSR issues and activities would likely be 
assessed in relation to the company’s priorities and strategies, which can be reoriented to its 
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ongoing concerns and may not be a static process. (See Figure 10.1 for graphic illustration of 
how CSR issues and activities may enter the company). 
The company’s structural complexity and attention to ongoing concerns can therefore 
treat the CSR issue and activity contextually, which can affect the decision process. This may 
include locating the source of the CSR issue (e.g. the problem or opportunity), assessing how 
it was framed to the company, and determining the decision criteria. Also, complexity, 
macro-organizational behavior, and different premises for decision-making can limit the 
extent and quality of information to make rational decisions or reinforce the ‘bounds of 
rationality’. This can affect how comprehensively CSR decisions are integrated into company 
strategy.  
 
Figure 10.1: Illustrative Example of a CSR Issue Entering the Company’s Complexity   
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2. Complexity can influence the alternatives to address the CSR issue or activity. 
At specific stages in the decision process, groups will need to work collectively to 
sponsor a set of alternatives or preferred alternative to address the CSR issue or activity. 
Where there are high levels of organizational complexity, the “strategic action will be the 
result of an internal process of political bargaining…”150  The sources of complexity, namely 
the dispersion of task specialization, access to information and decision criteria, can cause 
groups to attach their own meaning and purpose to the alternative, which may or not support 
the broader strategies of the company. Moreover, the alternative put forward may be limited 
in scope, or framed in a specific way, related to the CSR issue. It must respond to the 
constraints influenced by the private interests of sponsoring groups, which is an effect of the 
bargaining process where costs and benefits of the alternatives to the impacted groups are 
evaluated. As a result, the ‘strategic’ aspect of the CSR issue for resolution can lose its 
importance as the alternatives become more narrowly-conceived. There is a healthy dose of 
reality associated with this process, which can sometimes seem unthinkable in connection to 
CSR, which has a strong normative element. The resolution may only have increments of 
change from the company’s current state. Yet, the process is not necessarily negative for 
CSR. The strength and diversity of groups tasked to resolve the issue can elevate CSR issues 
to higher levels in the company, develop new technologies or practices to manage it, and set 
in motion new structures or processes that can ultimately advance company performance. 
The implications can go beyond the company and shape the behavior of industries and 
sectors, e.g. establishing a voluntary code of conduct to manage the issue at a global scale. It 
is beyond the scope of this research, however, to evaluate the outcome of decisions on a 
company’s CSR performance, which is an opportunity for future research.  
Secondary effects of complexity, or macro-organizational behavior, can also have a 
significant effect on the generation of alternatives. The decision process for CSR may not be 
divorced from the company’s socio-political context. Department/unit goals and strategies 
can act independently of the broader goals and objectives set by the company’s leadership. 
Groups are transacting with the organizational system to access and control resources, 
prevent substitution of tasks and functions, protect territory, internally selling ideas and 
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issues, etc. Consequently, conflict and the exercise of power may be inevitable in the 
decision process and the resolution of these interactions is reflected in the alternatives (see 
Figure 10.2). It may be near impossible to know how much of the company’s interest versus 
the group’s private interests are allocated in the preferred alternative decision.  
  
Figure 10.2: Illustrative Example of Complexity’s Potential Influence on the Decision Process 
Argued in this study is that the company’s structure should not be ignored as an 
influence on CSR behavior. Internal complexity can affect the ongoing organizational 
‘sensemaking/sensegiving’ of CSR issues that can shape decision criteria around options or 
alternatives to address the problem or opportunity. The findings from the narratives 
highlighted how macro-organizational behaviors were prevalent, and in most cases, 
necessary to spur action to resolve the CSR issue. A majority of the CSR cases cited in the 
narratives attributed some form of political-like tactics and inter-group bargaining, and there 
were more beliefs regarding its positive impact than negative ones.  
As my aim was to examine some of the potential the linkages between CSR theories 
and organizational behavior, the findings from my the core narratives and comparative 
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analyses reinforce James Fredrickson’s propositions regarding the effects of complexity on 
decision processes, which are adapted for the purpose of this conclusion section. 
Proposition 1: The findings illustrated a consistent pattern whereby the decision 
process involved multiple groups with differentiated responsibilities and functions, as well as 
varied treatment of the CSR issue or activity. Connected to this, there was also a pattern of 
inconsistency in understandings, goals, and objectives related to the CSR issue or how to 
manage it. 
Therefore, high levels of organizational complexity can lessen members’ recognition 
of the CSR issue’s broader strategic importance to the company. Parochial perceptions of 
CSR issues and activities can influence how departments/units and other internal groups 
assess the issue; often attaching their own interpretations or opportunistic views. This is 
complicated by the vagueness of CSR as an understanding or superordinate goal, and the 
ongoing consideration of other contextual issues important to the company’s survival.  
Proposition 2: The findings showed a pattern whereby different groups employed a 
range of tactics to influence and shape the decision process based on their parochial 
understandings and self-interests, and a belief that the decision process benefitted certain 
groups (and not always the company).  
Therefore, high levels of organizational complexity may require decisions on the CSR 
activity to satisfy multiple interests, which can limit how comprehensively decisions will 
address broader company goals. Different departments/units, coalitions and other internal 
groups will be engaged directly and indirectly during stages of the decision process and 
assign parameters to the alternatives and/or preferred alternative. 
Proposition 3: The findings indicate that because of the involvement of multiple 
groups, alternatives to address the CSR issue or activity were negotiated. Negotiation had 
both positive and negative aspects, e.g. negotiating for something better or negotiating for 
something less than optimal. This aspect is also discussed by prior research by Lars 
Christensen, Mette Morsing, and Ole Thyssen whereby CSR issues can be subjected to 
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different premises for decision-making because of the ongoing concerns it must attend to at 
the same time.  
Therefore, high levels of organizational complexity may require some form of 
negotiation between impacted groups to develop the preferred alternative to implement the 
CSR activity. Along the lines of Proposition 2, different departments/units, coalitions and 
other internal groups will seek an outcome that can advance or protect their specific interests, 
which may or may not serve the broader goals and strategies of the company.   
Proposition 4: Building upon Propositions 1-3, high levels of organizational 
complexity can limit how far and deep decisions on the CSR issue will be integrated in the 
goals and strategies of the company. Because decisions are based on political bargaining, and 
likely to be incremental or ‘small fixes’, the integration may be low.  
For broader society, can complexity uncover the real nature of a firm’s CSR, such as 
its commitment, durability, and consistency? The purpose of this study was not to fully 
address societal implications; mainly because the research would not fully examine the 
outcome for the company. Still, the research did provide some insight into the relationship 
between the structure and complexity and the dimensions of commitment, durability, and 
consistency related to social responsibility. The decision process showed that the complexity 
context, including macro-organizational behavior, can support and sustain a commitment to a 
certain CSR issue or activity. For example, having broad spans of control enables the 
company to capture critical social responsibility cues from the different operating 
environments and ensures they are receiving due attention. Raising awareness, when perhaps 
awareness was not apparent, can be a positive impact. A dominant group can also exhibit a 
strong ‘political’ commitment at the early stages of the decision process. They can maximize 
existing power inside the company to influence a complex web of groups and leaders to 
ensure the CSR issue will be addressed. The dominant group can leverage the operating 
system to influence learning and communications structures, decision criteria, and the 
preferred alternative that not only can resolve the problem or opportunity, but steer the 
company toward continuous improvement on social responsibility.   
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Conversely, it can be used to challenge current or future commitments to CSR goals 
and strategies. It can use internal structures and process to scuttle plans, undermine 
innovation and new ideas, or perpetuate the status quo to bring advantage to the group. A 
dominant group with significant sources of power, influence, and contingency capacity can 
sustain this effort over a period of time. Complexity, at any given time, can affect the 
company’s commitment to a CSR issue or activity, the durability of prior decisions and 
actions, and the consistency of how it addresses the same CSR issue under different 
conditions.  
The research also pointed to some discrepant data. In some cases complexity may not 
have influenced the company’s decision process. For example, tactics were not used to 
influence the preferred alternative in some narratives. There was a belief of a strong 
alignment across multiple groups and leaders on the CSR goal and strategy. Control from the 
corporate center or an exceptionally strong CEO engagement buffered any opportunism or 
self-interested agendas. Next, complexity can vary depending on the structure. A smaller 
structure may not have engendered the same level of macro-organizational behaviors than 
perhaps larger ones.  
5.2. Limitations of Research  
There are several limitations of this study. Correlating complexity and secondary 
effects to CSR decision-making in companies was limited to complex business organizations. 
Because structure was a critical factor, the decision process may vary related to other types of 
organizational structures. Using Fredrickson’s prior research on structure and strategy,151 
highly centralized structures can activate CSR issues differently; engagement may be low or 
in the hands of a few top leaders, and decisions may be more rational. The cognitive 
limitations of top leaders may restrict the comprehensiveness of decisions. Similarly, highly 
formalized structures may activate CSR issues based on a formal monitoring and assessment 
system; engagement may be limited and rely more heavily on standardized processes, and 
decisions will focus on meeting precise organizational goals. Under this structure the close 
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attention to details from using standardized processes may limit the comprehensiveness of 
decisions.  
The type of external operating environment can also affect the decision process. The 
study did not control for this variable; yet, prior research from Fredrickson suggests that 
decisions can be different in stable environments where decision data and information is 
more identifiable and predictable.
152
 On the other hand, in unstable environments decision 
data and information may not be identifiable and predictable, and sensemaking is difficult. 
Cognitive dissonance is often a factor associated with decision-making in these 
environments.  
Other limitations are related to use of the narrative case methodology. While the 
study provided valuable insights into the complexity construction of business organizations 
and implications on CSR decision-making, it may be impossible to know the true motivation 
of individuals, especially using third party accounts, and how this may have affected decision 
processes. Intent can be influenced by individual or group attributes and characteristics, such 
as needs, wants, desires, values or predispositions. Knowing true intent may have helped to 
clarify actions being in the best interest of the group as opposed to the company’s broader 
goals and strategies.  
The narrative approach highlights a particular time and setting where events occurred, 
and uses introspective and retrospective discourse to reveal underlying issues and drivers. 
While this approach was highly useful in generating a set of narratives to understand internal 
factors and its potential influence on CSR decision-making, there were limitations. First, 
because this is contained within a specific time and setting, understanding the extent of its 
impact – positive or negative – may be restricted. In particular, what is the duration of the 
impact or outcomes? Which groups were the winners and losers overtime; did the 
organization benefit or not and how? Additional research would help us to understand the 
long-term impacts and implications of complexity on CSR.  
Next, the findings may have limited applicability and validity because of what 
Riessman calls coherence: justifying what happened, explaining it, and finding 
 109 
 
commonalities.
153
 For a specific CSR activity confined to one organization, there was limited 
engagement of subjects involved. While one of the central findings from the study was that 
multiple groups were impacted, coherence can be strengthened if impacted groups were 
made integral to the data collection and analysis. For example, the study could have 
conducted interviews with the different departments/functions and consultants involved in 
the same CSR activity.  
5.3. Implications for Further Research  
Basu and Palazzo suggested a CSR research agenda that investigates intra-
institutional triggers and factors. They collected and collated emerging research and concepts 
that examined the outcomes of CSR activities.
154
 However, they suggested inherent 
limitations in these conceptual explanations with sustainability of the outcomes as a central 
argument. It draws attention to inconsistencies in the CSR activities, such as low durability 
with the absence of external pressure, selective firm engagement, (e.g. strategic versus non-
strategic), and waning leader interest and attention. Recognizing this knowledge gap, they 
suggested organizational sensemaking as a predictive aspect for investigating the 
sustainability of a company’s commitment to CSR.  
However, we must also consider the structure/strategy relationship further and its 
effects on CSR because “…the cognitive and motivational orientation that is induced by a 
particular structure will affect how a stimulus is perceived and acted upon.”155 As suggested 
earlier, more empirical-based research is needed to strengthen the foundations of knowledge 
to explain CSR behavior. The decision process is a useful constant to examine because so 
much of business is about making ‘decisions’.  
There is an opportunity to expand the study to examine alternative structures and the 
potential impact on decision processes, as well as alternative decision process patterns and 
characteristics that have not been fully investigated. Different cultures, for example, may 
have varying types of company structures and decision processes that are ‘fit for purpose’ in 
design and function. The advancements in information technologies can offer new insights 
into complexity and decision-making; having more access to decision data and information 
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related to social responsibility issues can improve decision quality and moderate the effects 
of complexity. It can also exacerbate complexity issues by providing too much access to 
information. These can have implications on developing alternatives to address CSR issues 
and activities.  
The study investigated decision processes in companies where it was implicit that 
CSR was not fully institutionalized; in other words, where CSR was not a superordinate goal 
or strategy. Examining a sample of companies where a CSR strategy is institutionalized can 
provide alternate explanations of the decision process. For example, the course of action to 
address the CSR issue is based on a rational decision process where actions more effectively 
advance the broader company goals and strategies.    
The external operating environment is also another area of study. Much of the 
descriptive cases explaining CSR behavior tend to indicate influence by external events and 
pressures depicting unstable environments. Alternative explanations related to the decision 
process can derive from studies where the external environment was stable. Because decision 
criteria are more identifiable and predictable, would this steer the company toward greater 
conformance with external expectations? For companies operating in multi-domestic and 
global markets, would this effect how socially responsible the company can be in one 
location compared to another?  
Common in companies is scenario planning exercises where a number of variables 
are introduced into a decision process and teams are expected to make strategic choices to 
achieve certain business goals. This can be expanded to participant-observer studies to 
examine the structure/complexity relationship on CSR decision making. This can involve 
multiple simulations of intra-group dynamics; reconstructing institutional processes, time 
periods, and externalities that can influence the decision process. The simulations can also 
recreate the realities of having access to imperfect information and making decisions that are 
often time-sensitive and under some form of internal constraint. It can provide additional 
perspectives and understandings into how certain groups interpret and treat CSR issues; how 
CSR issues are treated against other competing issues and concerns; patterns of decision-
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making and key influencers; and how comprehensively decisions are integrated in goals and 
strategies.  
At its core, so much of social responsibility is the relationship between companies 
and society. Since its formative years, this relationship and analysis has been constant. Thus, 
the practical and applied insights from this type of empirical study, as well as others, should 
aid business managers and support the continuous improvement of companies. Leaders and 
middle managers can leverage these learnings and insights to transact with the internal 
system more effectively to sustain the company’s CSR commitments, to make strategic 
decisions and actions more resilient, or to build greater consistency with company goals and 
strategies.  
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Appendix A: Core Narratives 
Subjects Abstract Orientation Complicating Factor Resolution/Coda  Evaluation 
Organization type Point of the story; reason 
for telling it and for listening 
 
 
Information on the time, place of 
events, identities of participants and 
initial behaviors 
 
 
Sequenced clauses that reports the 
next event 
 
 
Final clause that returns narrative 
to the time of speaking 
 
 
Information on the consequences of 
the event for societal benefit – 
personal insights, perspectives, 
learnings of what happened, why or 
how 
Health (1) Integrated external 
stakeholder engagement 
strategy  
 
Philanthropy group 
 Ran the meetings 
 Included field officers 
 Formal cross-functional 
group 
 Linked to SVP reports 
 
CSR group 
 
International Public Affairs group 
 Includes international 
policy 
 
Poor management 
 
Needed to work with philanthropy 
group; used status of philanthropy  
 
Because not integrated, did not waste 
time with international public affairs 
 
After [key person] left, new person 
changed goals 
 
Philanthropic programs around 
investments in certain countries 
 
Competitive behavior 
 No superimposed CSR 
strategy  
 
Culture is to fight 
 Fight for budget 
 Overlapping responsibility 
 Systemic 
 
CEO successor  
Turmoil –  “Politically cut 
throat place” 
 
Competitive behavior 
 
Competition and lack of integration 
Integration not considered 
 
Expanded territorial behaviors 
 Communications and goals 
sent with independence  
 
Craft concerns with their input – co-opt 
informal groups 
 
Territorial behaviors – Speaking at 
conference (example) 
 Block CSR from speaking 
 Talk in ‘orbit’ – talked to CSR 
person in a certain way 
 Philanthropy – keep within 
our shop 
 Influential within company 
 Respond to NGOs is a waste 
of time 
 Engagement with critics did 
not resonate with peers 
 
Issue-selling happens 
 Educate about 
threats\regulatory creep  
 Impact the business model 
(legal/IPs and business 
operations)  
 Philanthropy – moral 
language 
 Engagement – risk 
language  
 
 
Political behavior influenced 
the outcome 
 Unhealthy behavior 
 Lack of political 
support and stability 
prevented integration 
 
Outcomes 
 Company did not 
benefit 
 Philanthropy benefited 
– in charge of CSR; 
more resources, 
contingency, defined 
programs and direction  
 
Continue with event driven 
engagement with external groups 
 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
 Competing interests: 
Different groups more 
engaged separately; no 
umbrella “big picture” – 
believed in current 
structure  
 There was “no 
organizational cohesion”  
 
CSR would have been a better fit – 
manager did not want it 
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Philanthropy versus international 
public affairs 
 
“Always in my business” 
 
There was no integration as part of 
the plan 
 
“SVP believed in the existing CSR 
engagement strategy” 
 
Competing interests – Different 
groups more engaged separately; 
no umbrella “big picture” – 
believed in current structure  
 
There was “no organizational 
cohesion”  
 
Energy (2) Country X case: Build 
CSR strategy – crude oil 
transportation, provide 
structure, cut through tribal 
areas 
 Expect a lot of 
stoppage and 
shootings  
 Operations in 
desert 
 Sensitive 
country – tribal 
relations 
 Multiple risks 
 
Security 
 Not able to handle it; to 
expand must solve it 
 
CSR group involved 
 Find solution… why was a 
strategy needed? 
 
Use consulting company 
 Social impact assessment 
process 
 Local team created – local 
and internationals  
 
Change agent (CSR manager) – 
influence and implement, bring in 
concepts, involved in sensitive 
countries 
 
CSR Corp directive 
 Go into Exploration and 
Production (E&P) 
 Community development 
standard part of E&P 
 Open discussion of issues 
 Stop in 12 months all 
stoppages 
 Focus on essential items 
 Align all stakeholders  
 
Framing: Ex management of 
international business 
 Present in all meetings 
(2007) 
 “tell me what you think” 
 All managers (country 
operations, field 
managers, technical 
Buy-in is guaranteed because there 
are local problems 
 
Tactics: 
 Internal stakeholders is the 
board 
 “convince them you are 
an expert” 
 Mitigate risk 
 Resonate with audience 
“risk management” is well 
known 
 Turnkey projects – 
management must deal with 
developing country issues 
 Bring in E&P experience in 
CSR – implement new 
structure and CSR targets 
 Solution in key operating 
areas – solved similar 
problems 
 “realistic picture of my 
contribution” 
 Not necessary to build an 
internal coalition; might be 
necessary in other cases 
 
Aware of human rights – back up of 
local managers 
 
Inform circle of people to catch you up 
CSR 
General managers – below were 
resistance, fear of non-transparency; 
influencing GMs not a good idea –
territorial behaviors  
 
Company has limited resources in CSR 
Political behaviors affected the 
outcome 
 
Outcome was good for company 
 Created more 
visibility for the CSR 
group 
 More sensitive 
operating 
environments part of 
their remit 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
“convince them [internal 
stakeholders] you are an expert” 
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managers) – “cowboys” 
 No answers in harsh 
environments 
 
Local approach in country X 
 Reporting issues – mainly 
financial not social 
 Operations manager is the 
most important 
 General manager (filter to 
the HQ) – “local king” 
 
Sustainability and corporate affairs 
department, HSE, CSR, Law, Corp 
Governance 
 
 
Country X officers: No interest in CSR – 
“I live there; you don’t” 
 Sensitive operating 
environments are calling – 
new business is in these 
areas 
 
Energy (3) Social risk assessment 
process for existing 
assets 
 Emerging 
issues, trends, 
risks 
 
 
Need to sell “risk”  
 Scenario playing process 
 Decentralized at asset 
level – EG asset 
 Sometimes not 
implementing – wait for 
something to go wrong to 
use or enhance tool 
 Education and 
communication 
 Miscalculated by people 
 Jealousy – did not think 
about it 
 Above ground reviews 
 Get SMEs to feed into 
evaluation  
 HRIA interfaces with 
political social risk 
assessment 
 
No triggers – “comes across desk” 
Business trigger, policy, process 
 
Cross-functional working group 
formed 
 Cross-functional team: 
HR, HES, Law, PA, GA, 
Risk Assessment 
 Think through issue 
 External stakeholder 
mapping  
 Each groups looks at 
issue differently 
 Education process 
 
Asset manager is the most 
important; relationship building 
with asset manager  
 Sit through process and 
see tools 
 
How to influence: 
 Case study material 
 Back up what trying to say 
 “from what angle are we 
looking at it” 
 Desktop research  
 Peer competitive issue 
 Strong language or risk – 
push back by law  
 Use crisis stories 
  Shock factor influenced 
thinking  
 
Issue fall in remit of group member 
 Convincing needed – push 
back 
 Don’t want a certain number 
(risk rating) 
 “we are better than score” 
 Downstream – don’t want to 
be told what to do 
 No extra work 
 Make it asset specific 
 Involve the “budgets” 
 Want to influence actions 
 
Need to show a successful outcome 
Need team to be included in actions 
Need asset manager to have 
performance commitments 
 
 
Political behavior affected the 
outcome 
Showing the benefits of 
CSR 
Senior management – lots 
of push back 
Meet with different 
organizations  
Without CEO leading – 
fallen and failed 
 
Outcomes:  
 The CSR group 
benefited 
 Increased visibility 
 More personnel  
 Expanded territory in 
procurement and 
Downstream 
 More accepted  
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Educate a lot of people about it: 
 Workshops to teach CSR 
with assets – deliberate 
strategy, piloting 
workshops, use the 
language of the asset 
people to sell – risk, 
strategies, business 
process 
 Get buy-in on strategies – 
use risk  
 
Climate change – raised profile 
(becoming more important) 
 Sexy to work on – more 
people to work on it 
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HES: impact assessment process – 
have CSR influence  
 Owners of management 
process  
 
Communication 
(4) 
New business and 
human rights program 
 
Cross-functional group created 
 Law enforcement  
 Law 
 Policy 
 Communications  
 International Groups 
 Senior leadership 
 Engineers – cyber 
security  
 
No need to create group – already 
strong buy-in on issue 
No resistance  
 
[Note: person interviewed was new to 
position and company; may not know 
historical issues that lead to the 
program] 
Ethos of company was access to 
information  
 
Crisis/event-driven: 
 Government request for 
data  
 Conflicts with local and 
international norms for 
human rights 
 
CSR functions/volunteer program is 
completely separate  
 
Business and human rights program 
– high visibility because of crisis 
 
By cross-function and region – no 
decision making power; reports to 
general counsel and CEO 
 
New activities: 
 HRIA for new markets 
 Risk scenarios 
 Global network initiative 
 Capacity building 
 Stakeholder engagement 
 Research support  
 
“Dramatic way – given how it 
was based, there was a fair 
amount of consensus” 
 
“mach 2 – general agreement” 
 
“Alignment” 
 
Political behavior did not affect 
outcome 
 Shielded by general 
counsel   
 Political behaviors not 
a factor; or at least not 
aware of it 
 
Outcome was good for group and 
company 
 Lots of visibility, but 
has not expanded 
territory 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Business and human 
rights was a new field 
between groups 
 
 
Mining (5) Community grievance 
mechanisms 
 
Different mechanism at different sites 
 Consistent approach 
needed 
 External tools coming out 
 
CSR manager saw this as a 
weakness and made a case  
 Dialogue  on what is going 
on 
 Deal with 
Communications group 
– engage and influence   
 
Other functions involved: 
Legal 
Communications 
Site General Managers 
 
Must sell this – buy-in needed; 
“hardest part” 
 Grievance Mechanism 
interpreted differently by 
all groups 
 
Corporate was easy – people knew 
 Need to sit down at site 
level 
 Issue selling – not a hard 
sell 
 
Internal advocacy group developed 
 Internal communications 
 Social and environmental 
group 
 Key players identified 
 Legal out 
 
Territory: Environmental team – 
existing incident reporting system – 
incidents should be reported in their 
system 
 
Low resistance:  
 Gap was known 
 Growing pains because of 
acquisition 
Site support – more awareness 
and buy-in 
 
VP/Senior management – show 
performance is good; get buy-
in  
 
Political behavior was part of 
the negotiation  
 
The outcome was good for both 
the company and sponsoring 
group 
 Company can 
communicate to 
stakeholders 
 Building process and 
making improvements  
 CSR group has more 
visibility 
 
Management process for what 
people are doing anyway  
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
“make your lives easier” 
“better performance” 
 
Organizational capability – “tool to 
help you guys” 
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Energy (6) Reorganization of CSR:  
Remove social aspects 
from HES function 
 
 
Trigger: CSR to move to 
Communications  
 No consultations or 
warnings 
 Head of CSR – moved on 
– no leadership 
 Prompted an excuse to 
move CSR 
 Reporting line through 
Communications group 
 Strong resistance within 
HES and management 
team  
 Leadership vacuum; seize 
opportunity 
 “social” – used to be 
part of HES 
 Overlap on CSR 
 
No information why it happened 
Head of unit – orchestrated 
internal communications 
Triggered minor change; new 
communications strategy 
(brought CSR into 
communications – 
personal agenda – Corp 
communication rep in the 
senior leadership 
committee 
Driver – wish for the senior 
committee to control 
sustainability agenda 
Get greater engagement into 
projects 
Challenged by external 
pressures 
Communications group to be 
more integrated into the 
business 
 
Middle management absent 
 Upstream has built alliance 
to resist – built HES ties and 
networks 
 Using relations to stop 
reorganization  
 Represent key business 
functions  
 
Tactic: Use external (credible) 
processes with HES 
 Risk assessment 
procedures: CSR are 
assessed with HES risks 
 Impact assessment 
procedure 
 Community engagement 
processes 
 
Internal tactics: 
 If not written down; much 
weaker 
 Effort to have it written – 
formalize it 
 Cannot take it out by Corp 
communications 
 HES leads processes; Corp 
communications does not 
 
Lots of back room discussions on 
how to erect barriers 
 Communications – HES 
(conflict disrupts work) 
 Different understandings of 
what CSR means 
 Corp communications – 
wanted to unify and manage 
agenda 
“Will placement affect what CSR 
means for the company – question 
not answered 
 
Upstream has tried to influence 
senior leadership committee 
 
SVP international upstream aware of 
what is going on 
 
CEO wants this to happen (don’t 
know why…) 
 
EVP communications tight with 
senior leadership committee 
 
Sell Corp Communications agenda 
through information 
 Specific phrases were used 
Political behavior influenced 
and shaped the outcome 
 
Outcome:  
 No resolution; will 
happen  
 Strengthen Corp 
communications – 
more power and 
influence  
 Stand-off 
 Change (?) 
 
How much spin was in current 
story – does he really believe it 
will help company and drive 
implementation?  
 
Is it highlighted in senior 
leadership committee; so good for 
company 
 May influence 
behavior 
 has improved how we 
are collaborating with 
HES; taken more 
seriously – though 
same decision making 
because of separation  
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Change can bring 
opportunities 
 Conflict can be positive 
 EVPs are negotiating 
 CEO will be the referee, 
but will stand up for 
Communications  
 Person dependent – new 
EVP communications will 
challenge it  
 Safer to be close to HES 
(tied to base business - 
Upstream) 
 
 123 
 
to get buy-in (CSR group 
bought in) 
 “communication is much 
more than distribution of 
information” 
 
Territorial issue between Hydro and 
Statoil 
 Communications and CSR 
versus international 
upstream 
 Have not seen the 
opportunity side 
 Lose collaboration with HES 
on following up on project 
risk assessment and impact 
assessment  
 Reorganization happened 
after merger with Hydro 
 70% of people in 
international HES (Hydro) / 
100% Hydro CSR 
 Corp CSR staff are Statoil  
 
Energy (7) Risk management 
strategy: Community 
relations programs 
versus Security 
programs in operations 
where there is ongoing 
violence/conflict  
Leadership briefed there was 
security concerns; no linkage 
between security and community 
relations (CR) 
 Security spend is high; CR 
spend is low 
 No Corp plan 
 Community problems in 
1999 – 2002 
 
 In Corp, no cross-
functional engagement 
between Security and CR 
 Security determined 
procedures and handled 
contingency 
 
Issues: Local employee used local 
customs  
 95% nationals – rewarding 
jobs to extended 
communities and ethnic 
connections 
 
No owner of CSR; there was low 
understanding  
 Understanding of CSR 
was contributing to 
problems; CSR is “paying 
to problems” in operations  
 Perception: CSR was 
used for personal gain  
 
No production because of attacks; 
“crisis trigger” 
 
Joint team was created – look at 
solution a different way 
 Procurement, CR, Security, 
Law 
 “sensitive way to dispose 
this person” 
 
Procurement/CR: push on CR 
agenda: 
 Behind close doors 
discussions  
 “Change agents” – head of 
CR and Security 
 There were a number of 
agendas 
 
Also a problem: local with locals – 
“no white men”: 
 Tried to sabotage plans 
 Lots of corruption; making 
money on status quo 
 
Selling to leadership: 
 document presentation on 
main improvements 
 Sustainable 
partnerships/growth of fields 
 Cash – cannot take away 
spend 
 Couch as change process 
CR has power to influence 
outcome – owned by CR 
 More visibility and 
leadership 
 Security and CR were 
asked to find a 
solution 
 Company leadership 
bought into it 
 Status quo – focus on 
security – continue 
issues with community 
and local level 
corruption 
 Continue personal 
agendas 
 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 Soft issue solution – 
not an engineer 
solution 
 CR wanted to elevate 
its position – 
champion CR 
approach 
 
The outcome was good for the 
company and good for CR 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Leadership tactics: 
 Private meetings – bring 
people on board 
 Public meetings – 
emphasize aspects to 
move plans 
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CR: emerging as a solution at the 
junior supervision level 
 Increasing security forces 
– more push back from 
community elders 
 Security cannot deal with 
community people 
 
Selling ideas: 
 Have workshops away 
from site 
 “Facilitate ideas”; “guiding 
them to solutions” 
 
Cross-functional meetings: 
 Security management 
 Operations management 
 No CR people 
 Investigation found 
increasing security failures  
 Found it was community 
people 
 
Informal community of interest 
CR and Security: 
 CR short-changed  
 Security budgets approved 
quickly; no question 
 Support general manager 
versus sabotaging him 
 Close gap versus help 
separate – driven by 
agendas 
 
Resource access issue 
Competing interests 
 
CR solution – ideas being sought to 
get back into tough areas; 
Management asked for a different 
plan 
 “Do whatever it takes” 
 Data collected and 
analyzed by sub-groups 
to came up with a 
different plan;  
 
and risk 
 Held private meetings of 
experts (everyone making 
money) 
 Held public meeting – locals 
– professional development; 
opportunity for community 
 “need a different way of 
selling” 
 
 
Chemicals (8) Mandate: Elevate from 
traditional corporate 
citizenship role and align 
a strategy with the 
business  
No role for Corp citizenship several 
years ago; philanthropy existed but 
no global role 
 Driven by core business 
strategy and 
transformation of the 
company 
 
Other drivers: 
 Commitment to 
Brought in external data to validate 
the issue  
 UN Global Compact 
 Educating individuals 
 
More tactics: 
 Lots of back door 
discussions / offline 
communications 
 Influence c-suite executives 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 Moving in CSR space 
and getting heads 
there 
 Negotiate for 
something better 
(trade-off) 
 
Prioritize – build into internal 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Education, prioritization, 
negotiation 
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sustainability (water use) 
and corporate citizenship 
(CC) or “social issues” 
 
Grow internationally in markets: 
Local relations needed for new 
assets 
 Grow market facing 
business – close to 
consumers 
 More understanding of 
CSR needed 
 Grow through Joint 
Ventures 
 How to bring in value into 
JVs 
 
Human rights and business 
external trend 
– the issue needs to be grounded in 
business strategy  
 
Cross-functional Sustainability team – 
c-suite of company: 
 CEO 
 Chief sustainability officer  
 General counsel 
 CFO 
 Manufacturing 
 Engineering 
 Business units 
 
External trends – UN work on 
business and human rights 
 Individual flagged it; 
Sustainability team framed 
it 
 
Getting key allies: 
 Cross-functional working 
group 
 Government Affairs 
groups (in-country, key 
markets)  
 Ask EU to comment 
 “paint the external context” 
 “what does this mean to 
us?” 
 Met informally as a group 
 
Sign to UN Global Compact: 
 VP of business line 
against it; interpretation as 
new labor standards  
 
Outlined influence to strategy 
(couched as risk) 
 
 Business risk – way to sell 
issue 
 Took existing policies and 
practices with international 
standards; tie to business 
strategy 
 Participate in more CSR 
public affairs 
 Sign onto UN Global 
Compact 
 Pushing strategy 
 M&A due diligence 
 Educate senior leadership 
 Brought in white papers and 
existing practices 
 Educate us and build our 
understanding – give us 
direction 
process; secure resources and 
readiness  
 
The outcome was good for the 
company 
 Also good for CSR 
group – more visibility 
with executives; 
viewed in a different 
light 
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Energy (9) Develop social 
responsibility framework  
 
Social responsibility framework – 
attached to the CSR group 
 Issue: buying assets 
without full analysis – 
need for realizing risks, 
reputation risks 
 Formulate metrics 
 Better management of 
above ground risks 
 
Internal groups accepted existing 
HES process 
 CSR, HES, Law, Int’l 
teams, Operations, 
business development, 
government affairs 
 Law – dealt with legal risks 
 HES – continuous 
improvement effort 
 Government affairs – 
interests to be systematic 
Realized power was diffused 
 Lack staffing and Corp 
radars 
 Separate alliance for 
government affairs and 
business 
intelligence/strategic 
planning – their own 
visibility  
 
Within groups there were 
peculiarities; “gentleman’s 
agreement – form a team and 
coordinate” 
 Formulizing process 
 Over loading (laundry list); 
different interpretations of 
issues 
 
CSR leadership committee – 
executive committee with members; 
have oversight 
 Lobbies members 
 Focus on group interests 
 Issue crafting tailored to 
interests – the value for 
them 
 
International assets had visibility 
with leadership/CEO  
 EVP – production and 
exploration 
 Business case driven – 
messages and couch 
problems in the business 
 Strong opportunity – CSR 
group dealt with new assets 
l 
 
Political tactics shaped 
outcome 
 Influence tactics for 
good 
 Good for government 
affairs 
 Good for CSR group 
 Led to mandate  
 
Outcome was good for 
company 
 
 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
(started as a negotiated process) 
 
Critical factor – need to preserve 
best interests of company 
Energy (10) Educational program in 
business market 
 
Cross-functional team: 
 E&P, Chairman, Law, 
Government Affairs, 
Business Units 
 
Steering committee 
E&P and external NGO 
 
Buy-in – understanding there is much 
at stake 
 There was low resistance 
 No territoriality or 
partisanship 
 
Major program – Corp advantage – 
legacy  
 
Part of business strategy  
 
 
Chairman and senior management 
buy-in 
 major social contribution 
beyond production sharing 
agreement  
 
 
Political behavior did not 
influence the outcome 
 
The outcome was good for 
company and CSR group 
 CSR group profile 
elevated 
 Influenced community 
investment – good 
business role (group 
seen as value to 
business) 
 
CSR may not have been a 
negotiated process in this case 
 “nature of the company” 
 “small” 
 “CEO authority is clear – 
no political dynamics” 
 
OPPOSITE CASE 
 
Experience in Pharmaceutical 
Corporation: 
 
New CEO had a shift in perception 
of CSR – drag on bottom line 
 Low support – difficult to 
execute 
 
CSR group had to justify existence 
 Staff led discussion to step 
up HIV/AIDS 
 CEO “We are not an 
HIV/AIDS company” 
 So much given away; 
“critical stakeholders still 
hate us” 
 Business model needed to 
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change – pricing 
 But host countries set 
prices  
 Activist pressures: one of 
the largest pharmaceutical 
company and largest 
target; not just as a 
solution 
 
Change in management  
 Because change of 
leadership 
 Willingness to kill 
stakeholder goals 
 
In-fighting  
 Encouraged local 
behaviors; included and 
condoned 
 
Another CEO change 
 HIV/AIDS background 
 Gained attention of 
CEO/chairman 
 “need to play in the 
sandbox” – external 
stakeholders  
 
Banking (11) Implementing the 
Equator Principles (EPs) 
into project financing  
 
Most important issue for the bank – 
project finance 
 2003 adoption by 
leading banks – 
management found a 
new business trend and 
led by senior 
management direction 
 
Was in financial group (CSR) – then 
transferred to project finance division 
Sustainable development department 
 Need to impact loan, 
deal teams, and project 
finance 
 
Needed support: 
 Most important – deal 
team members  
 Need to orchestrate and 
accept 
 Head of project finance 
division 
 
External consultant was used 
(change agent) – experience in due 
diligence 
 
One year before implementation 
worked with consultant and developed 
manual of procedures  
 
Tokyo team was created 
 Appoint FT person 
(internal change agent) 
 
Support from each branch – project 
finance team has close relations with 
Tokyo  
 Wore “double hat” 
 Tokyo head (most 
important) 
 
Conflict of interest – EPs should be 
separate from the deal 
 Resistance – credit division 
“already doing it”  
 Needed support at prep 
stage 
 Internal procedures – did 
not include them 
 Tactic – no response 
 Compromise – division 
head spoke with London 
 Loan agreement with EP 
report 
 
Political behavior did not shape 
the outcome 
 
Department assigned to 
implement  
 Consultation and 
negotiation 
 Project finance deal 
 
Outcome was good for good for 
Bank and Sustainability 
department 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Need to orchestrate and accept 
 
External consultant was used  
 
Need to know all project finance 
people; all key persons of all branches 
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Three credit divisions 
 Tokyo (supports EPs), NY 
(no involvement), London 
(against EPs) 
 Consensus took 6 months 
 
Corp communications supported 
EPs 
 
Selling – used consultant 
 Used rise of EPs in global media 
and bank  
 
Top persons of project finance – 
credit teams  
 Approve deals “have the 
power” 
 No process for CSR people  
 Talk to deal makers 
 CSR – no veto power 
 
Energy (12) Operationalizing 
corporate human rights 
policy 
 
Adopted a policy without management 
system 
 Surprised there was legal 
approval 
 
Trigger: 
 NGO scrutiny of 
operations in sensitive 
areas  
 
Different groups involved: 
 Government relations and 
Security 
 “homeless policy” – CSR 
group took it 
 
Current state of policy: 
 Low appreciation of it 
 No competition 
 Low visibility  
 
Buy-in already – Corp security and 
government relations 
 
 
Operationalization by stealth 
 industry event in Calgary – 
training program  
 Competitor/peer company 
hammered in media – 
“catalyst”  
 Went to sensitive operating 
areas – open audience and 
had ear of country manager 
 Road show 
 Target senior executive 
 Build piece by piece the 
implementation  
 Legal and general counsel – 
sent out invitations 
 Operationalization = 
airtime for the group  
 
Enabled opportunity for next stage: 
security and human rights policy 
(momentum) 
 Found gap analysis 
 Going beyond voluntary 
stage to mandatory one 
 Operational level 
people/country 
management “get it” 
 Risk trends – became 
mandatory 
 Individual became subject 
matter expert  
 External research and 
trends 
 NGO inquiries - have 
response  
 
No comment on political 
behavior shaping outcome 
 
Outcome good for company: 
 Adopted policy 
 Human rights in 
country risk 
assessment 
 Annual sustainability 
report and updates 
 Management training  
 
Agree and Disagree: CSR is not a 
negotiated process; not negotiated 
about the policy 
 
Agree: CEO is a visible champion, 
VP visible and General Counsel 
visible 
 There are changes in new 
persons 
 New leadership 
programming, but not all 
there 
 [good] economy is 
necessary first 
 
CSR important and part of the culture, 
but lack systems 
 
The How: articulate outcome and 
what you get 
 
Push back – resources, need of 
operationalization, realistic, costs-
benefits 
 
Engage early and often 
 
Detect opportunities  
 
Seize opportunity – use other change 
agents to advance agenda 
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May have competing interest – CSR 
or security leading it  
 May lose buy-in 
 
Energy (13) Establishing a 
community development 
fund  
Opportunity and need: 
 Mine closing in the 
future framed the CSR 
issues 
 Company legacy 
 Help economic base and 
community development  
 
Sold to management as “RISK” 
 Get permits/license to 
close  
 Less dependent in 10 
years – less potential 
activism when closing 
 
Cross-functional working group: 
 Community relations  
 External advisors 
 Operations facility 
 Environment 
 Corp CE 
 Corp Tax 
 Legal 
 Operating company had 
decision making power 
 
Mechanisms: 
 VP/mining led group 
 4 year period of 
meetings 
 Mine manager, HES, 
Law, External 
consultant, PR firm 
 
Buy-in needed for a fund 
 How – mine manager 
 Convince them that fund 
will be positive 
 Sell models of success 
 Case studies of other 
places of closures – exit 
strategy 
 Had other executives 
(external) talk about 
similar experiences 
 Orchestrated what would 
be said – control 
information flow and 
communication 
 Idea learned in meetings 
and part of process  
 
Competing interests 
 Scope to narrow; wanted to 
expand it, not just “stop 
bleeding” 
 Example: Call it Economic 
Development fund – focus 
on economic development 
 
Tactics: 
 Executives, their wives, face 
to face meetings with 
leadership team members 
 Consultant close to 
leadership and was 
targeted for lobbying; 
already bought in but 
asked him not to attend 
meetings – too much of 
an advocate 
 
Reconcile: Make it broader, but focus 
language – community grant tied to 
economic opportunity  
 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 Artificial barriers 
created by managers 
 Mining – Culture was 
already decentralized 
 Separate coalitions 
 Open sensemaking – 
by managers Always 
part of higher level 
decision making 
 
Alternate experience 
CR project – leadership rejected 
it; low lobbying 
 
Fund was good for company 
and community – community 
development 
 New process to 
manage stakeholder 
expectations 
 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Why? – CSR as a topic 
 Real CSR crosscuts some 
groups – need buy-in from 
diverse/affiliated groups 
 
 
Computer (14)  Unified enterprise vision 
for CSR 
Deputy General Counsel unveiled 
new vision for CSR at international 
conference: 
 CSR was a separate 
activity in the past – now, 
new priorities and 
definitions to “get ahead of 
the curve” 
 Unified approach 
 Used external partners to 
help them decide what to 
Tactics: 
 Sell to Leaders and other 
executive members – key 
decision makers (need buy-
in) 
 Big company – “mind 
stream” 
 Country office needs to own 
it (need buy-in) 
 Spending time and 
resources 
No comment on whether 
political behavior shaped 
outcome 
 
Winners: Good for group and 
company: Put CSR group on 
map and visibility 
 CSR shop had 
greater 
responsibility  
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
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be known for (used 
partners to build case) 
 
New vision: 
 Computer skills training 
 Who to partner with 
 Target number to be 
trained in 5 years 
 Define, develop, 
prioritize 
 
CSR involved a number of different 
groups: 
 CSR group under global 
Public Affairs 
 Lead by deputy general 
counsel (reporting to 
General Counsel)  
 Public Relations, 
Government sales, 
research 
 Public Relations was a 
powerful group 
 
Education group (potential 
competing group): 
 Had different ideas 
 Thrust to be big in 
education space 
 Had own program to train 
teachers 
 Less CSR; more 
business development 
programming 
 Connection to selling 
software – bottom line 
 Different position  
  
CSR group: 
 How many students 
trained 
 Hierarchy of goals 
 Sell IP policy message 
(intellectual property 
protection) 
 Get product to market  
 Built constituency for 
IPP 
 General counsel 
supports CSR initiative 
 IPP idea aligns with 
business units and 
General counsel 
 
Leaders of company very hands-on 
– MOST IMPORTANT 
 Public relations, media, 
advertisement – very 
 Internal selling to get 
alignment 
 Too different; undefined 
priorities – opportunism  
Competing interests – 
dissatisfaction in decentralization:  
 Centralized company – 
executive focus and 
decision making 
 Deliberate effort to not tie 
software sales or business 
impact 
 Sales people out of the loop 
(some resistance) 
 Leaders did not want to link 
to business success in 
developing countries; made 
it a measurement of 
success in country offices  
 
Resistance by country office on 
implementation: 
 Not on concept, but on 
implementation  
 Needed education group 
not to object to it  
 Confusion: Business units 
created separate initiative – 
focus on developing 
countries 
 
Corp-wide: 
 Internal organizations need 
a vote 
 Importance of leaders – 
must be convinced  
 Shopping around to get 
buy-in – leaders expected it 
 Head of CSR group was 
negotiating with other 
groups – gave comfort to 
leaders 
 Logical plan/frame = low 
resistance  
 Lots of messaging – not 
about their bottom-line 
 
Good alignment prevented excessive 
political behavior: 
 Corp CSR aligned with what 
the BU are trying to do 
 Culture supported for this – 
beyond sales 
 
Philanthropy is not sustainable – must 
be aligned with other key objectives – 
keep focus 
 
To outsiders – CSR image tied to 
IP concerns only – must 
overcome this image 
 Program helped to 
overcome reputation 
to outsiders and 
insiders 
 
Country office – different 
mentality 
 Not developing 
products, but selling it 
(different than HQ) 
 
Opinion surveys 
 CSR program 
implemented it, but 
difficult to show cause 
and effect 
 
Dissatisfaction with 
decentralized approach 
 Centralized culture 
 Wanted consistent 
message and program 
 Linked with key b-
objective and fit 
structure 
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powerful  
 
Professional 
Service (15) 
a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups  
 
No clear understanding of CSR 
Who owned it was not clear 
 
Apparel company was top down – 
wanted to look ahead and tied with 
worker rights  
 
Another apparel company driver – 
branding and who company is  
 
Enterprise buy-in and integration is 
not the norm  
 
Legal – positive and negative role 
 Affects independence of  
CSR department  
 
Deal with CEO, BoD, GC, CSR 
groups 
 
CSR group gets activated when 
something bad happening; lawsuit  
 
 
 
Today: legal and reputation risk 
management 
 Tool for companies to 
promote value 
 Protect assets and mitigate 
risks 
 
Working closely sometimes – in 
house tension 
 Value and implementation  
 Trend – decision on CSR is 
made at top levels 
 
Fix issue and prevent it from 
happening again 
 Inconsistent framing  
 Today – CSR may be to 
mitigate risk 
 Some first need risk to 
establish CSR framework 
 Living wage issue in apparel 
company – cost company 
money; liability in BU – 
sweat shops 
 
Some legal department run CSR 
 Becoming more clear today 
then before – role of 
General Counsel  
 
Political agenda – yes 
 Corp culture 
 Turf – define boundaries  
 Apparel company: “knife in 
the back” by sourcing 
group; did not see CSR as 
impact 
 
Definition of issue and parameters 
 Grab CSR  
 Sell as risk 
 
Tactics:  
 CSR involves General 
counsel, CEO, Business 
development, Finance, 
Sourcing  
 Lobbying with board of 
director members; no 
surprises; communication – 
critical (lobbying) 
 Used business case/risk 
rationale 
 Seminars to talk about it 
 Write memos – risks and 
 Pushed other groups 
to focus on CSR 
 CSR meetings with 
different business 
groups 
 Lead to cross-function 
Big failures in MNCs 
 Communicate internally 
with themselves and not 
with other key 
departments  
 
Future trends – CSR cannot be 
responsibility of CSR guys; groups 
are responsible for CSR 
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facts – reflected buy-in 
 Resources needed 
 
Energy (16) Corporate Rule of Law 
Program in a focus 
country 
 
Highly visible publication on oil/gas 
project and human rights abuse – 
triggered external pressure on firm  
 
[Firm needed to address external 
pressures] and required internal 
company engagement 
 
Typical – crisis led to trigger 
 Met with author of 
publication and committed 
to several things that were 
difficult – more reactive 
 
Cross-functional working group: 
 Internal stakeholder 
groups: Global Security, 
Communications, Legal, 
senior management (for 
project); external 
consultants brought in 
Strategy: 
Assemble a group of key people 
(Global Security led); Law and Public 
Affairs included 
 
There was a duplication of efforts – 
embedded Global Security person; 
disengage Communications/Public 
Affairs; there was a lack of enthusiasm 
and maybe because they were 
disengaged (?) 
 
Many departments pulled in different 
ways; departments had separate 
relationships 
 
Competing project:  
 Regional development 
program – controlled money 
and focused on small 
business development, 
education, access to energy 
(legitimacy, strong 
position and placement); 
owned by 
Communications/External 
Affairs 
 Multilateral institution 
project on reconstruction 
and development [in focus 
country] tied to regional 
development program – 
Global Security was left out 
of the loop 
 Tactics: Program had 
“Big pot of money” [= 
influence for 
Communications/External 
Affairs] 
 
Global Security focused on rule of 
law program; [but] did not do 
enough work internally to prioritize; 
not well thought out 
 Rule of law program 
strategy was to approach 
[influence] the regional 
development program 
manager (he reported to 
communications/external 
affairs director) 
 Early stage – early flagging 
of need for rule of law 
program during strategy 
[Global Security] Decided to back 
off – quick halt 
 Regional development 
manager, communication 
and community affairs 
teams pushed back – NO 
 
Outcome:  
 It was a missed 
opportunity for the 
company; Global 
security lost out 
 
 
 
 
[rule of law issue] Too difficult and 
politically sensitive: 
 More money controlled was a 
factor 
 Global security did not 
make it a major issue 
 Did not seen HQ funding 
Lessons [learned] difficult and 
sensitive area to intervene  
 
CSR is a negotiated process:  
 Joining up Global Security 
with 
Communications/External 
Affairs  
 Sequencing issue and 
ownership issue (1-Govt 
Affairs, 2-Upstream, 3-
Communications/External 
Affairs) – Global Security 
operates separately  
 [rule of law program 
became] risk migration 
[option] with other risk 
assessments; when risk 
assessment grew, it 
became an ownership 
issue  
 
Global security should have made a 
more aggressive move to “champion” 
the rule of law program: 
 Getting a partner on board – 
[but was] difficult 
 Implementation [of program] – 
[would be] difficult  
 
Flipside: “Rule of law in the focus 
country is really bad and 
worsening” – may not be good for 
company (mixed)  
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formulation, but 
 “not interested”; [then] 
Trying to get rule of law 
program into regional 
development program was 
not successful: 
 [business case – rule of law 
issue] research stayed on 
shelf – no intervention 
 Proponents tried to be 
persuasive; tried to 
elevate the benefit of 
business case 
 Regional development 
was a “rigid strategy” 
 
Banking (17) Climate position Part of risk management, but 
tension with business line 
(bankers) 
 
Cross-functional working group: 
 Corp affairs/Corp 
sustainability – Corp 
Communications and Corp 
relations 
 Environment/social risk 
management  
 CSR are ideas between 
risk management, Corp 
sustainability  
 
Climate and carbon –  forward 
looking business strategy/case 
 Work on deal flows – 
close with bankers 
 Coal fire plant – screen 
project 
 Received negative media 
attention; flagged to 
bankers 
 Bankers, Corp 
Communications, risk 
management – holding 
statements 
 Ensuing negative press; 
and new campaign threats 
 Corp sustainability – meet 
with NGOs; new partners 
stand to distance 
themselves 
 Sr. management not 
involved; siloed within 
Corp sustainability, risk 
management, and bankers 
 Community relations got 
involved b/c of community 
activism 
Active campaign started against CEO; 
engaged and meeting with NGOs 
 
Crisis: More senior attention 
Actual strategy: 
 Climate position statement 
 Portfolio assessment 
 Joint industry statement 
 
Bankers 
 Pushing back on 
independent review 
 Other motivation – 
leverage buy-out (risk 
management has access 
to information) 
 Corp Affairs – no access to 
information  
 Senior officer had to 
negotiate settlement with 
NGOs and other bankers 
 
Tactics: 
 Bankers – two teams of 
bankers competing to 
manage deals 
 Communications – keep 
groups out intentionally 
 Get support of organization 
at senior level – did not 
work 
 Business line – do not 
disclose information or do 
not allow enough time to 
get support 
 Day of deal launch – 
communicate to Risk 
Management  
 Bring people in early – co-
opt them through a 
“drafting” 
Strategy pushed through 
 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 Bankers’ investment 
made a difference 
 
Outcome was good for 
company and board 
 Unequal benefits – 
risk management 
elevated 
 Job preservation 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Issue “value” selling 
Need to get beyond reputation risk 
(always need a reputation problem) 
 
Co-opt business line 
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 Risk management and 
Corp Sustainability 
formed an alliance 
 
Corp Sustainability deliberate intent: 
 Get buy-in from risk 
management 
 Access to Board  
 Get CEO pressure on 
business line 
 
Issue “value” selling 
 Need to get beyond 
reputation risk (always need 
a reputation problem) 
 Co-opt business line to 
draft climate change 
statement 
 Bankers to work with Corp 
Communications when 
there is negative media 
 Protocol “charter” 
 
 
Energy (18) Integration of Security 
and Human Rights policy 
Project in sensitive areas had no 
guidance to handle security and 
human rights issues 
Need to build guidance at Corp 
level 
 
Top down Corp policy making; make 
Corp aware of it 
 Issue management 
process: Each business 
line and service 
department is responsible 
for identifying issues 
 Issue – present to 
management committee 
(lobby with management 
committee first) 
 Sell case to Upstream 
(issue hits production 
access) 
 See CEO 
 
List of issues – Corp or specific 
business issue – process  
 Human rights and security 
flagged – public affairs, 
global security, Upstream 
(hey identified the issue) 
 human rights was head of 
issue manager – my “pet 
issue” 
 Field people wanted 
guidance 
Goal: 
 security and human rights 
integration into processes 
– management systems 
Human rights policy 
 VPs integration into 
processes – management 
systems 
 
Selling policy: 
 Sell work product to 
business line 
 Resistance – prove 
around company 
 Seeing another policy and 
guidance to follow 
 Some get it, some don’t 
 Law – focus on meaning 
and content 
 Concern – policy in plans; 
customer are the guys in 
the field; “scars” from the 
field – explain issue and 
need 
 
Tactics:  
 Took executives from field 
(took examples…) 
 Picked it carefully 
 Top management 
 Put team together; 
management/business line 
picked person 
Political behavior did not shape 
outcome 
 Political process – 
issue getting flagged 
(yes) 
 Tactics shaped the 
outcome for human 
rights 
 
Outcome was good for 
company – social responsibility 
was out of the picture for 
implementation  
 
Initial team to participate in 
training – deliver training 
 human rights and 
security is different 
from usual business 
issue 
 use people who can 
explain and get 
support 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Business line and service 
groups 
 
CSR is not an issue – CEO, 
department or czar 
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 Litigation going on – 
external pressures made 
it a Corp issue 
 Shareholder resolutions  
 
Identified owner of issue – global 
security and public affairs 
Issue manager: 
 put cross-functional 
team together (global 
security, Law, Upstream) 
 responsible for the 
preferred alternative 
 
 
Concerns over litigation and risk 
Know exposure and what to avoid 
Drafting took a while 
Overcame concerns 
Each team supposed to address it 
100% public affairs background – may 
not have flagged it 
 
Banking (19) Equator Principles (EPs) 
and Corporate 
Environmental Policy 
 
 
 
All the banks got beaten up – 
external pressures  
 go beyond compliance – 
not working 
 use international institution 
because well known in the 
market 
 met with IFC and drafted 
EPs 
 light consultation with 
NGOs 
 
Bank needed implementation 
NGOs attacking bank and EPs 
adopted; but… no infrastructure to 
implement it 
 
Corp affairs, Environmental affairs 
– no integration 
 Project finance head – did 
not want to give power 
 Environmental affairs 
 Corp sustainability – 
already hired people; need 
to sit within business  
 Risk management – risk 
management function  
 
Bank is large and complex and 
political 
 100 operations  
 Certain groups perceived 
as international NGO  
 
EPs already done [no mobilization 
needed] 
 
Air cover 
 CEO had a personal 
commitment 
 “proud to be at launch of 
EPs… a strong signal” 
 Where does this fit 
unresolved 
 
Internal fight!! Negotiation and 
territorial behaviors  
 Politicking outside of formal 
decision making  
 assumed it happened 
 
Chief sustainability person 
 Individual risk 
 Bankers, deals 
 
Social policy and risk management – 
create system 
 Lots of trouble and 
problems with mining 
specialist 
 engineer and did technical 
deals 
 Resistance, turf, 
predatory issue 
 
Tactics:  
 Need people to be allies on 
the ground 
 O&G, mining – getting them 
on our sides 
 Set up by change agents 
 Develop relations with 
sectors 
 Mid-level champs in regions 
 Senior credit officer – 
opposed authority for deals 
 Lobbying 
Political behavior: Negotiating 
internally can be very political 
 Middle of the road is 
tough 
 Force to accept – 
bankers 
 
Good for company 
 New group – 
embedded in credit 
and risk management 
 Lots of mileage; better 
than IFC   
CSR is a negotiated process 
 big complex organization 
 lots of convincing 
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 Core - CEO sold value 
early on (CEO message) 
 How to get 
allies…depended on 
personality 
 Global training exercise – 
inserted officer to attend 
training  
 Critical to attend meetings 
– senior credit officer 
 Send signal across 
organization 
 Bankers – “this is about 
adding value” (not rejecting 
it) 
 Training – had examples, 
cases, major issues 
 Business case selling 
 
Energy (20) Human Rights policy Peers put out human rights 
statement and position 
 Issue management group 
– look at issues when CoP 
managing in pieces 
 
Cross sectoral issue: 
 Task force team to 
develop position 
 Communications, human 
resources, Law, 
government affairs, global 
security, sustainable 
development (housed in 
HES), business units, 
Environmental 
management somewhere 
else 
 Alignment (?) 
 Inconsistent interpretation  
 
Organizational behavior of company 
 Buy-in 
 Subject knowledge 
 Internal influence 
 Hierarchal, but think 
decentralized 
Many tactics (expected): 
 Education sessions 
 Using company language 
 Snaking – did not do 
enough; merger – CoP did 
not figure out 
  
Up and down and sideways 
 Company still learning 
 “not my problem; don’t want 
to interact”; deflect their role 
 Biggest challenge 
 
Approved process – play cards 
 Chain of command; do not 
approve right now 
 Culture – position or policy 
should be asperational 
 Example: three international 
codes; code versus security 
and human rights principles 
created a disconnect 
(compromise) 
o Global security – 
we only could 
follow 
international 
code to letter of 
law 
 
Tactics: Information crafting 
 External groups 
 Reduce risk 
 Different lens 
 Felt strongly – SME leads 
 Self agenda 
 Pick words to meet internal 
concerns and address 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 
Position – more palatable; allow 
to move forward 
 Grid lock 
 
Sustainable development left 
out 
 Not strong; 
functionally lost out 
 
Outcome was good for 
company – starting place 
1. Everyone 
ok with 
“nothing” 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
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external issues 
 
Policy or position? 
 Policy – CEO did not want 
another policy 
Energy (21) Social Due Diligence in 
Sensitive Operating area 
 
Upstream team looking at Peru 
 
Reputation issues pivotal 
1 year engagement before 
commitment 
 
Context: 
 Legacy issues 
 NGO allegations  
 Commercial 
 
Social and political risk 
assessment – cross-functional 
working group: 
 CSR group 
 Law (report to legal 
executive), Upstream, 
Global Security, 
Environment, 
Communications, CSR, 
third party consultant 
 
Consultant: stakeholder map; travel 
to country to gather and analyze 
information; met with NGOs; met with 
communities  
 
CSR – had own imperfections to focus 
on 
Reconcile different ideas 
CSR versus legislation and regulation 
Environment – broaden issues; friction 
points 
Turf issues with environment 
Global security – loss turf (had 
informal conversations) 
 
Some degree of lack of understanding 
 Sudan experience 
gave people some 
idea  
 No structure or 
template  
 
Critical buy-in – EVP legal, EVP 
Upstream, CEO 
 
Agreement and decision making to 
proceed 
 
Internally – CSR group had a strong 
seat at the table – no need for 
external SMEs; already a concern 
 Country xx – changed name 
to political and social risk 
 Required – stakeholder and 
political risk assessment 
 Work with legal teams – 
took information back to 
operations committee 
 
Non-States - disputed areas, conflict 
zones, ethical considerations 
 Business teams agreed 
 Some resistance  
 Used business case and 
information 
 Legacy of corporate issues 
 
Constructive group – internal selling 
Enablers versus stop signs 
 
Post legacy issue – will CSR group still 
be relevant 
 sat down with key 
executives and had “heart 
to heart” 
 Each wanted group to be a 
strategic function and 
leverage learnings from 
Sudan as a Corp advantage 
 Executives had a “vision” – 
framed as being a 
competitive advantage for 
the company 
 CSR group had a seat at 
the table 
 Early engagement; not after 
deal was made 
 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 Senior people 
conversations 
 Politicking in a good 
sense 
 Match objectives of 
senior decision 
makers 
 
CSR group became first and 
center 
Outcome was good for 
company 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
May be different for a smaller 
company  
 
 
 
Energy (22) Human Rights guidance  
 
Strategy and policy department – 
independent because of politics 
(relations with CEO) 
 Geo-politics and strategy 
 Separate CSR team 
Talk to people across the company 
Workshop with cross-section of 
personnel – where are we and need 
to be document 
 Group convened to develop 
Political behavior shaped 
outcome 
 Consensus building 
 
Outcome was good for the 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Sometimes can be 
mandated 
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(communications and 
external relations) 
 Had a change agent 
 
 
Trigger: 
 Internally – sensitive 
operating areas ramping 
up 
 Projects attracted NGO 
groups 
 Many external trends and 
standards evolving  
 
CEO engaged on business and 
human rights 
 “surprised” may be where 
debate was and company 
not plugged in 
 
CSR was ambiguous and vague 
Goal was no clear; no end product 
 
Started to talk to particular 
stakeholders  
 CSR and Assets 
 Information gathering and 
diagnostics  
 Senior people to connect 
with – Upstream and HES 
 Required people’s time; 
some jealousy by CSR 
group of change agent 
 
 
 
document  
 End product was not clear – 
need better guidance 
 People wanted a document 
 
 Guidance – took away 
potential resistance; what 
people wanted 
 
Part of management system – 
(competing issue) 
 Strong in operations 
 Internal incident happened 
 Calculate that business and 
human rights debate is 
salient – get out sooner 
than later 
 
Conversation of Operations – should 
this be a part of management system?  
No, prevent safety issues [take away 
focus from it] 
 
Tactics: 
 Use of information – 
based on conversations 
 High level of upfront 
engagement 
 
Another change agent leading CEO 
case 
 Power – people did not like 
him 
 Tactic – upfront 
engagement  
 Another change agent had 
ear of external relations 
head 
 Non-threatening helped – 
reduced resistance  
 Hyper awareness of loss 
roles and behaviors – 
careful of not over-including  
 Power / collaboration 
outcome 
 Staff in business – shaped 
products 
Engaged with peers 
and developed 
allies 
Both groups and 
individuals 
worked on it 
 Find approval and buy-in 
from general counsel and 
chief of staff 
 Done for external audience 
and timing 
company, but not if policy 
[instead of guidance] 
 Change agent 
reputation elevated 
internally 
 May not have 
happened; no product 
at all 
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 Collaboration process – 
part of culture!!  
 Network place 
 
Air cover 
 CEO cover 
 HES, Upstream 
 Depended who was talked 
to – if new person – 
leveraged air cover 
 
Health (23) Integration of CSR Issues 
in Government Affairs 
Function 
NGOs have political networks 
Need relations with NGOs 
 Access abroad – buy-in of 
this idea 
 Still foreign to many 
people 
 Low understanding of 
global health 
 Part of international 
government affairs 
 Link to Foundation 
 Link to CSR program in 
Geneva 
 
 
 
 
Buy-in – HQ bought in on health issue 
Foundation funded 
Head of CSR reports to head of int’l 
government affairs 
Foundation – issue not a priority – 
domestic focus 
 Reorganization – CSR on 
the backburner; save 
reporting 
 Corp communications and 
int’l communications push 
back on project ideas 
 Barrier – health issue is 
not a priority 
 Head of CSR is not heard; 
not aware; no clear 
direction/directive 
 Tension with HQ – don’t 
produce antibiotics 
 Low business case 
 
Internally – very difficult 
 
Tactic – sell concepts (low tactical 
move) 
 Regional offices – not 
enough business 
connection to global project; 
low prevalence  
 doing CSR in your backyard 
 
Global office – Corp affairs director; 
don’t get it 
 CSR – one program does 
not integrate it 
 No self serving interests to 
grab onto issue 
 Low strategic value (NGO 
piece) – focus on negative 
NGOs 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome 
 Top leadership – no 
air cover (linked to 
low business case) 
 Own budget – target 
a local area only 
 Legal – practices of 
CSR; threats of 
accusation of selling 
drugs 
 Finance – utility of 
resource 
 
Not good for Government 
affairs group 
 No one was 
interested in federal 
and domestic affairs 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
 
 
Energy (24) Anti-corruption policy Hard law – focused on FCPA in US 
 Approach needed legal 
counsel 
 Direction of major 
litigations 
 
Tactics: 
Political problems 
 Indirectly – preventing 
project and agenda 
 Organizational meetings 
between people 
Political behavior shaped 
outcome  
 
Outcome was good for 
company as a whole 
 Benefit – new 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Change agent 
 Without senior influence – 
no outcome 
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Approach – soft effort (political?) 
 
Cross-functional engagement: 
 independent compliance 
+ CSR 
 Fines and Control 
 Director/ED of companies 
(endorsement needed) 
 Ethics committee 
 Audit 
 Human resources: 
Needed to get their 
support 
 Early consultation to get 
input – early engagement 
 Endorsement – help them 
implement  
 
Issue selling/crafting – tactics 
 What is their agenda? 
 Put project in their 
perspective 
 Part of something – 
support 
 
 Key person is General 
Counsel 
 Prior ethic committee – big 
role in preventing policy 
internally; raising 
awareness of people 
 Security – engage the right 
persons 
 Deliberate tactic – 
nominated by GC 
 Particular reason – 30 years 
upstream experience 
(change agent) 
 He was go-between legal 
and others 
 
Top 
 Shaping mindset 
 Building case 
Middle management 
 Challenge 
 Hamper their work 
 Overt and covert tactics 
 Fear of being unrealistic 
 Educate them – individual 
conversations 
 Crafting information to 
sell 
 Use different language – 
their own language they 
know – operational risk; 
individual risk  
 
Content – discussed a lot 
 Support by general counsel 
benefited a lot 
 Support in early position 
and support 
 Legal family – coherent 
assignment for the 
group – anti-
corruption contained 
within the group 
 Visibility – legal team 
expanded; issue has 
matured and people 
agree 
 Visible general 
counsel influence 
Marketing, PR 
(25) 
a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups  
 
CSR group – not well defined yet 
Corp communications or public affairs 
or government affairs 
 Always interfering with 
other groups 
 Educational component 
 Work with main contact – 
usually have a CSR focal 
point 
 HES 
 Foundation  
 
Inconsistency in goals and 
objectives 
 Immature level – low skills 
and competencies 
 What it means?? 
 
Resistance:  
 Overcome institutional 
knowledge and non-
confrontational approach; 
continued consensus 
building; snaking before 
meeting happens 
 CEO is agent of change 
 
Protecting territory 
 Walking out of meetings 
 Not answering emails 
 Delegating to decision-
making meetings – no 
person to decide 
 No pre-read 
 
 
Business strategy is influenced 
by politics 
 CSR – gets in their 
territory 
 
Good for company and group 
 More information 
sharing 
 Breaking down silos 
 Corp works with BUs 
 
Ambiguity is an incentive for 
political behavior  
 
Personal agendas 
Immature organizations 
Reducing a center of power 
 Money moved in 
 Status elevated 
 CEO recognition 
 
Result – in-fighting would go on 
 Become part of it or power 
shift 
 Money taken from one 
group’s budget 
 
New initiative – had to use it to have 
success 
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Crisis – ambiguity – territoriality 
happens 
 Response to the crisis 
 Ex: Finance/insurance 
 Transparency sensitivities 
 Legal, Investor relations, 
Public affairs, Government 
affairs 
 Legal had most power; 
others had less power 
 Part belief; part way of 
doing things 
 CSR – gets in their 
territory 
 
Overcoming resistance 
 Engage with groups 
 External expert – used 
politically to push agenda 
 
Sustainability: Power grab within 
some departments 
 
Based on individuals, culture, org 
structure, whether CEO champions it 
 Culture to meet desires of 
CEO 
 Groups want to own it 
 Hurt sustainability program 
– hurting CEO 
o Detrimental 
outcome – Corp 
foundation, 
NGO partner, 
stopped 
innovation 
o Slow process 
and causes 
problems – hurts 
brand [it’s hard 
to overcome?] 
o In-fighting – 
goes away when 
funding is on 
board (??) 
 
Convince them of the business case 
 Do it because it is the 
right thing to do 
 Pattern – why and how you 
do business… 
 Stealth way 
 What will finally happen – 
internal thinking… 
priorities, offense or 
defense  
 
University (26) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups  
 
Normally dealing with CSR unit 
Sustainability department 
HES 
 
More than one unit within CSR 
 Community and 
philanthropy 
 HES 
 
Inconsistency on goals and 
objectives 
 Political dynamics 
between units and c-suite 
executives 
 More consistent of political 
buy-in and consistent 
leadership of CEO and c-
suite (is the single most 
political factor) 
 Influence strategic intent 
– different frame 
 
CSR (flow up to CEO) – tactics  
 Positioning: New stories, 
external changes and 
crisis 
Ex: beverage company environment 
and labor (Human Rights) 
 Consumer based teams: 
operations, marketing, 
human resources 
 There was strong CEO 
framing – lead to consistent 
story being told and a 
process in place 
 
Competing interests – winner gets 
airtime with CEO and resources  
 Political skills and 
articulated vision and 
corporate performance  
 Show materiality  
 
CSR – risen to a strategic level 
Seriousness 
 Consistent messaging 
 Seriousness of 
management 
 Resources available 
 Positioning of team within 
company 
 
Internal tactics were necessary 
or critical to the success of the 
organization’s CSR 
 
Good for group 
 Elevated group and 
individuals 
 Ear of CEO 
 Part of external 
platforms 
 
Good for company 
 More strategic and 
consistent 
 Improve credibility –  
 Bottom-line improved 
(??) 
 
More respected – performance 
can make company better; non-
financial performance 
Political skills more important than 
“rational” arguments and behavior 
 
CSR at strategic level – political 
skill and ambition determine 
competition between groups; CEO 
becomes referee or process is 
applied  
 
Communications and competing 
interests  are political when CSR is 
put in a strategic position 
 
Tactics to position it 
 Politics and personality 
that lead CSR group and 
CEO 
 Political process is about 
embedding and incentives  
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 Find internal champs and 
platforms 
 Strategy group 
 Standing committee 
  
CEO (flow down to staff) 
 Middle management and 
employees – capacity, 
communications, 
incentives  
 More important than 
materiality of issue, 
institutional structure 
 
Political skills – framing of issues, 
positioning internally, 
communicating 
Articulate CSR is a political skill; 
relies on skill of individual; it does 
elevate profile 
 
Political players – took CSR 
 Spearheaded 1-2 material 
issues 
 External advisor used to 
ramp up 
 Astute about key influencers  
 Navigate political spectrum 
 Internal champs and 
external champs 
 Engage with strong critics – 
support strategy  
 
Beverage and energy companies – 
used external consultant as external 
agent of change 
 Important influence and 
power 
 Identify internal platform 
and events – symbolic or 
scale 
 Individual champs 
 
Software – asked consultant to make 
case and bottom line 
 Influence and shape what 
to say 
 Most influential person is 
head of EU 
 Worked with him [group] to 
get it 
 Internal champ and external 
SME (trust building) 
 Gain business level 
credibility – identify by CSR 
group  
 
Three political dynamics: 
 Identify top level BU 
respected champ to move 
forward 
 Trusted but credible 
external voice 
 Key platforms – symbolic 
or scale 
 
CSR group was politically savvy 
Politicking and dynamics are critical 
Factors: 
 Confident person 
 CEO vision  
 
Beverage company: Nothing has 
changed – political process and buy-in 
need to change, not structure 
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Change – political process and leader 
(go back to institutional structure) 
 Business system is same 
 CR is scattered 
 CR functions are 
empowered 
 Coherent message  
 
 
 
Apparel company – wake up call (crisis) 
Political skills: 
CSR folks pushed issue down to 
business unit level 
Bring in academic rigor 
Internal champs – build allies 
External champs – academia and 
platforms 
Super-focused and vision 
Pick one or two things to be 
focused on  
Advocacy committee established  
Used competitive issue – 
diffuse territoriality and 
resistance  
Legal, buyers and designers – 
incentive and make them 
champs  
Needed buy-in and design on 
board 
Used personal relationships, role 
modeling, and champs  
 
c-suite dynamics 
 effort must be worth it 
 CR group must convince 
CEO 
 Need to raise to the 
strategic level 
 Without political skills; get 
killed 
 
Energy company 
 Used external agents  
 Crisis trigger 
 Internal stories 
Consulting (27) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
Retail case 
What is CSR – labor and 
standards 
Risk management 
Small incidents – global attention 
 
How influenced and shaped: 
 Wanted a quick fix at first 
– evolved overtime 
 Law suits occurred – 
Thought do all business with Ethical 
Group – found champ 
 Go closer with commodity  
 Bring Retail chain to Africa 
 Got a call that trip was off 
o Politicization 
and 
broadening of 
CSR 
o Buy-in not 
Outcome 
 System-wide and 
systemic 
 Invite key NGOs 
 Green market 
 
Good for company – more 
global and less insular 
 
Good for some groups, not 
What pulls WM through? 
Thick culture and value system – 
unifier  
Placed by Sam Walton 
Business value argument gets push 
back – wants to know savings value 
New CEO – concerned with legacy 
(cultish) 
 Do more good [why] 
 CSR programs – beyond 
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was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups  
 
resources and time 
 Reputation issue ensued  
 Set off conversation 
among NGOs 
 Move from reactive/ad hoc 
approach to coordinated 
approach 
 
Risk management – dealt with ethical 
standards team – risk management 
unit 
 As CSR evolved and CEO 
saw legacy issue 
 Bottom line business 
incentive  
 
Sustainability team created 
(powerful) – VP level 
 Young team 
 Internal consulting group – 
embedded consultants 
 Change agents 
 Resentment against 
them 
 
Government Affairs group 
 Need leadership 
 Culture chaos – not into it 
 
Corp Affairs – wanted to “grab this” 
 Triggered creativity of 
Corp affairs – global MOU 
 
Foundation 
 Response to requests 
 New director – wants to be 
known 
 Give its own position of 
power – inconsistent 
with HQ 
 Confrontational with 
Corp – strong director 
phased in 
 Competitive behavior  
 Cannot influence CEO on 
BoD?? 
 
Internal consulting group – frame and 
get buy-in from CEO 
 Know buyers not on board 
 Compete against 
sustainability group 
 Loyal to business group 
when embedded 
 
“Ethical group can’t tolerate 
politicization”   
 
received 
o Barrier – textile 
group, global 
procurement 
group 
o Had to meet 6 
VPs who 
represented 
hard business 
groups: textile, 
food, wholesale, 
procurement… 
o Year and a half 
delay on MoU 
 
Milestone meeting 
 300 NGOs and suppliers 
and buyers 
 Selling sustainability 
(SVP) 
 Savings = business value 
 Buyers feel it is not part of 
the business 
 “hold out group” 
 Will continue to pursue 
lowest price  
 
CSR is owned by different groups 
Understand differently and 
interpreted differently 
 
Corp affairs has grown in last nine 
months – could be a problem 
 External image versus price 
 
Ethical group presentation on 
partnerships 
 Corp officer – shot down in 
meetings 
 But… privately took it 
 
Politicking and competing interests 
is not good “now” 
 Spread is good – also 
subsumed by HQ 
 CEO vision – middle 
management pulled in 
different directions 
 
Distrustful teams and territoriality  
 When went to Corp, more 
complicated and now a 
resource issue – politicized  
 Tactics: Put sustainability 
person in operations 
group 
 
 
buyers (yet); may be 
antithetical to culture and 
people’s value 
 
 
 
standards; products with a 
story  
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Consulting (28) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
CR Integration Project 
 
Cross-functional working group: 
 Public affairs, operating 
companies, other Corp 
groups, Upstream, 
Downstream, HES 
 Alignment (misalignment) 
across organizations and 
groups 
 
Espoused was Corp public affairs 
(owner of CSR) 
 Decentralized  
 Ownership of CSR 
 Tactics happen at 
business unit level – own, 
run, manage 
 Fluency, understanding, 
execution 
 
Reasons: Org readiness 
 Evaluation of initiative  
 
Evolution: 
 Moving into “globalization” 
 Transition – CSR was not 
a priority 
 Build Upstream strategic 
operations first 
 Then HES management 
system; now CSR (??) 
 
Org is ready now 
 External triggers caused 
issue to become hyper 
sensitive 
 How CSR is evolving 
outside company – 
matured, policy issue 
 Litigation has heightened 
CSR sensitivities  
 
Political behavior – decentralization 
Corp versus non Corp (extreme) 
OpCo versus business units (very 
political) 
Corp PGPA internally (project leader 
leading from political sensitivity) 
 What gets communicated or 
not 
 Willing to take risks to push 
status quo 
 Interpretation of what would 
work or not 
 Political point of view and 
project management 
 
Alternative – different (yes) 
 e.g. framework would set 
analysis with cross-
functional team, use of 
external expert, low risk 
aversion – outcome may be 
more rigorous  
 political reasons – 
maintain pace of project; 
more ‘chefs’ = slow down  
 
Negotiate with HES (environment) – 
environmental performance  
 Out of scope quickly 
(Offline conversation 
between senior 
executives) 
 CSR versus environmental 
performance  
 
Political tactics used in a way 
that diminished opportunity 
(??) 
 Get in the way of 
some innovation that 
org may have been 
ready for 
 
Good for company and group 
 Gave purpose to 
group 
 Leadership for Corp 
 Strategic activity into 
focus – efficient  
 Better morale for 
employees 
 
Some groups win; others lose; 
trying to lobby to get his people 
involved  
 
Turf! 
 Legal versus public 
affairs on human 
rights  
 Stakeholder 
engagement –tension 
between process 
owners and users 
 Technical group – feel 
they are experts; 
collateral started; 
strong point of view 
 Technical group 
less/no power to claim 
process ownership 
 Another group has 
influence with project 
leader 
 Contact and visibility 
with executives 
 Org was in crisis  
 
 
Success – big company 
 
Given – not harmful; would be part of 
org fabric 
 Politics/tactics secured 
project – we have a 
political culture 
 Better than not being 
anything 
 
Toxic at times – not collaborative; 
tension was not creative, but 
conflictive 
Government (29) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
Policy people – always 
 Rarely with functional 
people – did not care what 
policy people were doing 
 Voluntary Principles – 
security versus policy 
teams 
 
Typically dealt with Government 
Affairs, Public Policy, CSR 
 HQ versus Government 
Affairs 
 
Go to bat for companies – asked to 
say things in certain ways to 
challenge NGOs  
 
 Used government to move 
specific issues 
o Internet 
company quoted 
at meeting 
(deliberate); on 
blog – 
transparency – 
importance of 
Good for both 
 Good for individual 
and company – one 
person dedicated to 
business and human 
rights 
 
Believes there is inconsistency 
prior to seeing State 
 
Voluntary Principles – functional 
people could have had a different 
outcome 
 Internal tactic necessary 
 
Self serving behavior – Keep CSR 
centralized and maintain importance; it 
is hard for CSR… should be 
decentralized to be good for 
company 
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 Consistency in general on CSR – get 
organized before that saw the 
government 
 
Issue by issue – was not clear who 
owned CSR 
 Apparel – head of CSR, 
sustainability and CSR 
 Retail – international 
policy person – not clear if 
they owned it 
 Agri-business – 
international policy person 
– not clear they owned it 
 
Policy person (opposed to functional 
person) 
 Negotiation gets bogged 
down on administrative 
issues (policy) 
 Voluntary Principles – 
policy people did most of 
the negotiating 
issue; build 
business case; 
justify position 
 
Technology (30) Disaster Relief program 
 
CSR: Disaster response is part of job; 
includes other operating companies 
 
Cross-functional issue:  
 HQ, Foundation, and 
Communications 
 
Branch of Japanese company 
 Regional directors 
 Make decision on NGO –  
“mother will decide on 
amount given” 
 
Decentralized in North America 
 branch has no power 
 Project goals do not flow 
through branches 
 
San Jose – Americas Office (NY – 
CSR falls under him) – branch 
management 
 
Within Communications: 
 Disaster Response 
Committee 
 
 
Yes decision (executives did not want 
to send cash – Q4 2009) 
 Staff – recommendations 
formed; guide their decision 
(statistics and information); 
used third parties 
 
Tactics: 
 Face-to-face meetings 
 Persuade the right way to 
go 
 Senior authority by Card – 
precedent – pitched this 
 benchmarking with other 
Japanese companies 
 
Each company would do what they 
want to do 
 Brand push – own Haiti 
issue 
 No tracking or 
measurement 
 Group synergy and one 
family – branding 
 
The outcome was good for 
company 
 
 Communications – 
brought group 
together 
 Brand – more visibility 
 
Regional HQ is better and 
strategic – evolution 
 Non-substitution – 
regional 
autonomy/decision 
making 
 In this one drastic 
case 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Political tactics – different culture; 
politics different – aware of this going 
on 
 
 
 
Energy (31) Human rights project – 
implementation of 
guidelines 
Incident – external influence:  
 Global ratings – company 
out because of human 
rights  
 Started benchmarking 
best practice – going to 
many events 
Baseline project – what are we doing 
(internal) 
 No formal policy or practice 
 Plan for intervention in 
sustainability areas 
 
CEO – gave different division 
The outcome was good for 
sustainability department  - 
more engaged and visibility 
 
Starting point – challenge – 
reaction could have been 
negative 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Flipside: Could have prevented 
more activity in Corp 
 Afraid of their reactions – 
objective of analysis  
 
 147 
 
 Critical for companies 
 New strategic plan 
(includes sustainability 
section) – project on 
human rights 
 Issuing guidelines 
 
Cross-functional working group: 
 Human Resources, 
Sustainability, Secretary, 
HES 
 Executive committee 
(CEO) 
 Sustainability Department 
 Planning and reporting 
 Community investment  
 Working group: 
Sustainability, Community 
Investment, Upstream 
 
Very few people knew what human 
rights was – sustainability 
department had an advantage 
 
Human rights compliance 
assessment – included different 
functions (Security, human 
resources, HES) 
challenging goals 
 - objectives for my division 
(sustainability department) 
 Insert human rights into 
strategic plan (includes 
sustainability section) 
 
Human resources and legal – formed 
verification of document  
 Human rights compliance 
assessment –Involved Corp 
and division functions 
 Work to analyze procedures 
and norms against human 
rights 
 
More critical – middle manager 
 Did not find any big gaps; 
not a central issue 
 Subsidiary head: critical of 
need to implement any 
actions to improve systems 
of supplier; “his” system 
was best 
 Managers spread ideas 
about projects 
challenges… crafted 
information  
 Criticize report of third 
party 
 Organize meeting 
between third party and 
subsidiary middle 
manager – talk about 
gaps and improvements 
 
Used data about gaps; real 
situations about risk 
 
Head of division – senior officer  
 Ratings issue 
 Put together different 
evidence and case 
studies “on our side” – 
head of division and CEO 
(was the starting point) 
 Now was convinced issue 
was important – 
assessment in other 
countries; need to improve 
behaviors 
 Middle management now 
convinced  
 
Used evidence to spread “voice” on 
issues – meetings with all high level 
managers in Upstream 
 Human rights is new – habit 
 
Now – results are good – one 
assessment to ensure external 
influence  
 
Management is happy – external 
engagement 
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of making money or cost 
cutting 
 Commitment of high level 
managers needed 
 
Mining (32) Resettlement  of impact 
communities  
 
Step change in CSR – triggered by 
crisis (bad resettlement) 
 Got people’s attention – 
changed thinking  
 Bad resettlement: Media 
and NGO attention  
 
Company change – visible and 
politicized issues 
 Bad resettlement – senior 
level attention – failed to 
deliver project timelines  
 
Business unit – majority shareholder  
 Autonomous behavior; 
did not adopt group 
policy 
 Territorial behavior – no 
action 
 “outside your authority” 
 Hierarchy in field 
prevented influence by 
Corp 
 Low expertise at front 
lines; issue precipitated   
CEO mandate: CSR (business and 
government affairs) – guidance only 
BU ignored them 
 BU – CRO – Engineers  
 Newly formed group; social 
practitioners/engineers  
 
Change agent: not many layers to go 
through 
 Tried to get to CEO 
 Memos and updates 
 Issue crafting 
 Made it personal (CEO) 
 Memos and updates 
 
Mine managers (frontlines) 
Became a key desire to solve problems 
– cross business team (Corp and BU) 
 Became community of 
interest – realized issue 
needed to be resolved  
 
Corp CEO and business 
 Implement solutions that are 
possible 
 New policy and procedures 
– prevention  
 Get it done quickly 
 
CEO dictated what to implement 
 Power to dictate what to 
do 
 Need him to advocate 
 Business unit will be 
involved in the 
implementation  
 
Worked with senior leadership 
Build internal capacity at BU level 
Outcome was good for both 
 Head of a business 
group lost out 
 CSR group elevated  
 
Resettlement policy approved 
Social and economic activity and 
management system 
Guidance to most of policy 
 Policy 
 Guidance to 
implement policy 
 Management system 
– measure 
implementation  
 
CSR involvement in resettlement 
action plans; signed off by CSR 
group 
Brought in key skills and tools 
Audit team (CSR group involved) 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
Crisis helped the negotiation process 
 Highlight gap in system 
 Expertise used more 
broadly 
 
Shareholder versus societal  
CSR is not job of Corp, but 
contributing to cause 
Negotiation will continue as society 
changes 
 
Politics: 
 Hierarchy politics 
 Business unit autonomy – 
if different behavior, would 
not have delayed uptake 
 Enlightened manager at 
Business unit – easy to 
engage him/her earlier 
 
Can be very territorial 
 Structure enables some 
groups to have much 
independence; controls 
his own “CSR” 
 
Opinion: without crisis, no space for 
CSR group to embed requirements  
Senior leadership felt uncomfortable 
Got people’s attention 
 
Small group – little overlap 
Small company 
 Large energy company 
quite different – high Corp 
center 
 Flavor of the month – 
more territorial behavior 
Roles and representatives in small 
companies are very clear 
Much easier to get something done 
University (33) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
No – based on personal relations 
CSR, public affairs, strategy, image 
management 
Large IT company – many players 
CSR is distributed  
 
Internal function/process – CSR 
person does coordination 
Public affairs, procurement, legal, 
CEO 
Political behavior: “internal politics”, 
“internal stakeholders” – a challenge  
 Get third party to sell issue 
 Get buy-in or minimize 
friction  
 How to communicate is very 
political 
 
Project does not fit core business  
 CEO gets involved and they 
Raise issue = 
outcomes/tangible/good 
outcome 
 Outreach by credible 
individuals 
 Study/external 
validation  
 CEO talk about it 
 Community of interest  
 
What are the incentives for different 
groups? 
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was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
 
Inconsistency – CSR people does 
translation –  message can be 
superficial  
 Another department may 
have a different story 
 
get interested  (personal 
connection; no challenge) 
Use third party – compromised to 
say things that are not true 
 
Political structure of organization 
changed; change from research to 
the need for internal buy-in  
 
Talking more about “core business” to 
activate business unit support 
 Issue crafting  
 
Tough to get them started 
 Substantiation  
 Subject matter expertise 
 External pressure makes 
a difference  
 
Resistance to CSR – looking at 
development impact of business 
 Focus from business to 
development  
 Changes – business and 
development – resistance 
by BUs 
 
 
Consulting (34) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
Head of CSR group 
Separate group 
CEO of companies around socio-
political issues 
 
Typically do not engage other 
groups 
 
Decision making authority / purview 
not there 
 
Where is influence and power – 
search for it 
 
Who are change agents?  
 
Each group has different lens 
 Priority differs; responsibility 
for issue may have a 
different priority/views 
 Inconsistency in CSR 
understandings 
 Framing is different if they 
don’t align in advance 
 
One person may have indication to 
make it work – change agent 
 Not to much capacity for 
issue management 
 
Politics is 100% in all areas; not just 
CSR 
 Convince skeptics 
 [Shape] Agenda and 
Outcome was good for both 
Margins to center for CSR 
group 
At mercy of larger forces 
of institution  
 
Believes there is a decision maker, but 
not in a group 
 
Influenced outcome  
 may have succeeded, 
but third party provided 
higher probability of 
success 
 
Political tactics critical – failure 
without it 
 Part of change 
management 
 Must make case for 
recommendation 
 Justify cost and benefits  - 
must understand politics of 
organization 
 Bring from margins to core 
business 
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arguments  
 Energy company: explain 
in a certain way to sell to 
executives 
 Bank Group head asked 
third party to present to the 
Board; third party validation 
(independent expert) 
 Asked to use certain 
language and content to 
sell 
Consulting (35)  a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
 Communications or 
public affairs – where the 
issue ended up 
 HES function 
 Human Resources 
(moved out of their 
purview – more on 
philanthropy now) 
 Ethics office 
 CSR group 
 
Decision-making – senior person 
from Corp public affairs group 
 
 
Inconsistency [CSR goals, objectives, 
framing] 
 [CSR] Bad term – too 
confusing 
 Not a lot of shared meaning  
 
Within different business functions, 
difficult to understand what it means 
to them; different groups expressed 
it differently [to the CSR consulting 
firm] 
 
Example: XZY Company CSR report: 
 Kick off workshop – people 
had different 
understandings of what it 
was 
 [CSR] Meaning was 
equated with their 
individual functions 
 Different groups involved, 
but not clear on influence 
and power 
 
Political tactics: Example – XYZ 
Company put CSR expectation into 
human rights policy; new language 
into existing policy: 
 Prevent [internal] 
resistance from 
happening; [brought in 
CSR consulting firm to] 
develop business case to 
sell internally  
 “Trojan horse” function: 
successful – example: 
human rights was on the 
radar screen; [secure] CEO 
ownership [and as] driver; 
[elevated] law suits; 
framed to a policy – 
couched in risk to make 
business case 
 
Good for both 
 Third party expertise – 
helped drive agenda 
of group 
 Build credibility 
 
Public Affairs/CSR group 
 Seen as previously 
providing support; 
now shifted power 
dynamics – own CSR 
 
 
[Political tactics] Necessary and 
critical 
 Understanding of what 
[CSR] is and 
expectations 
engendered [internal] 
political behavior 
 Can be used to prevent 
resistance 
Service NGO (36) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
 Assistant director of CSR 
 Int’l and Government 
[Brought in NGO to] Position them 
as good corporate citizen [to 
Conference – initiated by NGO 
and Washington, DC office of 
Washington, DC office wanted to 
“do something” 
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deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups  
 
Int’l pharmaceutical 
company  wanted a 
series of conferences to 
frame their CSR position; 
[wanted to be] leaders in 
CSR arena  
 
Relations  
 multiple divisions involved  
 6 persons on plan at 
beginning 
 
 
Washington, DC policymakers]  
 
Inconsistent goals/objectives to 
reach – was not sure of goals 
 
Objectives – position company as doing 
positive work, [but] did not know how to 
get there 
 
Reasons for inconsistency: lack of 
depth in CSR (bench strength); low 
strength [of CSR group] in 
Washington, DC 
 
HQ – lack of guidance [provided to 
Washington, DC] 
 Their ideas did not match 
Washington, DC 
 Reorganization of CSR 
[concurrently happening] 
 
No clear sense of direction – [HQ 
]CSR director was needed; buy-in 
from HQ [needed]; they were in 
control 
 
Politics did influence – few months 
later [HQ] CSR director said HQ 
would refocus CSR objectives – 
aligned with drugs sold 
 Internal process vexing 
assistant CSR director 
[Washington, DC office]; 
buy-in – “fight battle with 
home office first” 
 
Internal challenges – difficult to push 
ideas 
 
Had to get HQ focused to move 
ahead, [but] HQ did not know how to 
focus 
 
HQ came to meet NGO without 
assistant CSR director [Washington, 
DC] involvement 
 
company; sought brand in the 
space of CSR 
 
[Outcome] Not good for 
Washington, DC CSR group 
 
 
HQ came to Washington, DC to 
assess CSR issue; source of 
disconnection between Washington, 
DC office and HQ 
 
Internal reorganization occurring at 
same time 
 
Association (37) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
 CSR and sustainability 
groups 
 Public affairs 
 Compliance  
 Human resources  
 Legal departments – do 
not drive agenda  
 
Typically 3 types of companies 
 CSR owned by CEO 
Human rights – little understanding – 
not coordinating – driven by issues 
 
Other CSR issues – varies by groups 
and companies 
 
Different groups deal with different 
issues 
 
Not consistent – sustain and 
CSR department lost – did not 
influence board 
 
Bank lost out – not the best CSR 
bank 
 
Territorial behaviors were 
necessary to influence  
 
 Lack of clarity, too 
ambitious  
 Compliance department  
(bank) – CSR, compliance, 
operations  
 Compliance – territorial                                         
 Operations – practical  
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was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
Dutch companies – 
human rights  
 
 department owns it – 
driving it – close to board  
 no one owns it 
 
coordination 
 
Politicking typical in Netherlands - 
informal dealings  
 Put forward objection to 
board and CSR department 
– memo written 
 
CSR not practical and expensive 
 Investigating claims of 
human rights abuse would 
be expensive  
 
A step back for the bank – CSR 
department 
 
Most were ad hoc; incentive model – 
positioning  
 
More buy-in from groups 
 
Now – conflict between groups is 
healthy  - got others to agenda 
 
Service NGO (38) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
 Public policy groups 
 More than one depending 
on issue/products 
 Human resources and law 
involved 
 
Inconsistency in framing and 
understanding 
 
Issue and tactics vary 
 
Lack of understanding and business 
case 
 
Impact on business (?); get granular 
quickly 
 
Mandate clear, but no decision making 
power – resource must be coordinated 
(legal and business units) 
 
Political behavior – yes  
 Where they are coming 
from 
 Intervening – that group 
can’t do it 
 Share information – why?  
 Sway outcomes – 
happens out of self-
interest  or personal 
agendas 
 Acquisition experience – 
business unit discussion 
 Explain why prioritize and 
de-prioritize 
 What is an important project 
(?) 
 Shape an outcome above 
others (decentralized) –  
 Business units and 
geographies – orchestrate 
communications – work 
through NGO – send 
messages back “never get 
heard” 
Winners and losers  
 Resources being 
pooled 
 
Good for company as a whole  
 bias set of 
recommendations  
 Helpful to inform 
decision making 
Politics influenced decision making 
and execution  
 
Expansion of territory = make it 
strategic 
 More touch points in firm 
 Gain momentum – 
articulate business case 
 Resources and visibility 
 
Material impact on recommendation 
and action of senior management 
 
Outcome can resolve problems 
 
Did shape outcome, but not 
necessarily for groups 
 Self interest lead to good 
outcome – raised issues 
of neglect and 
marginalization 
 CSR is a unifier – want 
to be part of it 
 Organizational behavior 
problem 
 
Better chance for CSR outcome to 
being appropriate and operationalized 
 
External – allowed to communicate 
“dirty laundry”  
 
Consulting (39) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
Traditionally CSR manager/director 
and VPs for Sustainability 
 
[however] Overtime more 
integrated in the business  
 
It is clear who is in charge, [but] 
Decision-making process is unclear 
or undetermined – Example: 
Leadership not taking on broad range 
issues (nice to have, not a must); put 
someone in role, but no budget to drive 
[Internal] Groups involved 
benefited 
 
Interest [in CSR issues] by Corp 
Communications externally – this 
is a positive outcome 
Political behavior did shape [CSR] 
outcome 
 
Good ones [political tactics]: Use good 
person or senior executive – 
“champion” [CSR] issues; raise 
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b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 
Increased interaction [between HQ 
CSR groups] with business unit [field] 
people and Procurement teams 
 
[CSR issues are becoming] more 
cross-cutting  
 
Three categories [of companies CSR 
consulting firm has observed] : 
 Some are very confused 
– under pressure to do 
something; lessen impact 
 Know what to do – good 
design – fail on execution; 
organizational issues 
come into play, right 
incentives for managers 
(needed and not there) 
 Combining design and 
execution in a reasonable 
way – how to organize? 
(need to overcome 
deficiencies with a good 
management system/org 
culture) 
 
real change/action 
 
Example: Company CSR Report – 
asked [consulting firm] to review and 
facilitate; individual content 
owners/managers raise profile of issues 
they are dealing with; bring in third 
parties to help elevate it [as most 
important]  
 
Tactics can be explicitly or implicitly 
[known] to [CSR consulting firm]: 
 
 Direct Tactics: [CSR firm gets] 
call about [a] company’s needs; 
will say “we want you to come in 
and do a workshop and offer a 
point of view to influence 
someone” 
 Indirect Tactics: [an internal 
group will] Talk about lack of 
external alignment; territorial 
behavior – subtle ways – how to 
inform/infer (influence how 
communications is 
distributed); serve internal 
political [needs] 
 
[Consulting firm asked to] Put [CSR 
issue] into business case language; 
address as “risk”, not “doing good”; 
[client’s internal groups says] “we don’t 
use this word here” 
 
[CSR firm asked to conduct competitor 
CSR research because] “people like to 
research peer companies to sell case 
internally” 
 
 awareness [through] deliberate 
actions (i.e. workshop) 
 
Competitive behavior for CSR is 
good 
 
[CSR] Promotes creation of some 
[personal] agendas – wrong 
process, low experience, or trying 
to climb latter (organization loses on 
development of CSR capacity/ skills) 
 
[Self] Interest should be to improve 
practice   
Professional 
Service (40) 
a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups?  
 Stakeholder Engagement 
– philanthropic lens 
 Legal – risk lens 
 Government Relations – 
regulatory lens 
 
XYZ oil/gas company [client]: 
 Key [internal] stakeholder 
[groups]: HQ, Security, 
Upstream, Law, Social 
Responsibility  
 Resource control = 
Upstream [influential 
stakeholder group] 
 
Solutions are different – [created] 
inconsistency 
 
Power is not equated with role – affects 
decision making 
 
Sometimes know who is in charge of 
CSR; more often they are not in 
charge – [lots of] transitions 
 
Example: [firm was asked to do the 
following by client in order to get 
support for a human rights impact 
assessment process] 
 Describe risk and gaps 
 Create argument within 
company 
 Serve as “agent of change” 
Outcome – [having human 
rights impact assessment 
process] was good for 
company 
 
 
[political] Tactics were necessary – 
brought together [disparate] 
internal groups to “see” issue 
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 Use practical studies 
(sponsoring individual had 
no personal agenda) 
 
Coached on what language to use; 
used a “risk” lens; CSR alone would 
not “sell” 
 
Educated [client’s key internal 
stakeholders] through phone calls; 
used as “agent of change” 
 
Brought in special lawyer to give 
different account and provide 
different strategy; elevate issue 
 
Government (41) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
 DC representatives: 
Government Affairs, 
lobbyists 
 HQ: CSR people 
 
Some people had CSR in title 
Outsider: person seems in charge – 
some stature, but limited usually 
 
Authority really with the lawyers 
 General Counsel had CEO 
ears – legal risk is a “real 
problem” 
 US and non-US 
companies (more with US 
companies) 
 
“singing different tune” 
GA and lawyers – more pragmatic 
 
Inconsistency!! 
 Range within government 
affairs reps 
 Challenge that needed to go 
away or behavior change 
 Government affairs “jaded” 
 Business unit had wide 
range of responses 
 
Different frame: 
 Want problem to go away 
 Not a problem 
 Used to going to Hill – get it 
solved 
 
Politics:  
 DC reps – one approach 
which is to have the 
“problem” go away 
 Policy professionals (CSR) 
understood challenges – 
speak “my” language 
 Had human rights 
background; non-business 
unit people – call and 
engage with government 
and NGOs 
 
Different story: 
 government “Spin” – cocoa 
initiative + child labor issues 
(West Africa) 
 NGO activism and 
Congressional scrutiny  
 Three main companies in 
chocolate business involved 
 Dismissive of problem and 
government responsibility – 
not “our” problem 
 Spin – not a problem – not 
feasible (no expertise) – 
Outcome shaped by political 
tactic 
 Company went on one 
direction of a group 
 
Some won and some [won 
differently] 
CSR group more visible: downturn 
of economy has reduced some 
groups 
 
VP CSR does not matter (overhead) 
 More CSR language and 
projects – but not 
considered critical position  
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host government 
responsibility 
 
Mining (42) Mozambique social 
investment project 
 
No internal structure in place  
Bid winning – why? 170M CSR plan 
over 20 years (8% of capital 
investment) 
 No planning, no risk 
assessment/management 
plan 
 Philanthropy – concern 
was “photo-op for CEO” – 
big political game 
 Tough to spend 8M per 
year 
 Planning: creates 
expectations; more 
important than CSR – 
managing expectations  
 
CSR led by communications team 
 Good SR process 
 Did consultation with 
locals 
 Equal benefits for ethnic 
groups 
 No long-term planning 
 Generating jobs 
 Risk – creates new 
poverty in local and 
surrounding areas 
 Create disparity through 
inequality  
 
Cross-functional working group 
 Communications 
 Foundation  advisors 
 Local teams 
 Local engineers 
 HES 
 Human Resources  
 International Public Affairs 
 
Int’l public affairs: political risk (social 
risk analysis) 
 Tangible and intangible 
risks 
 Needs by local politician 
 CSR project used as a 
showcase 
 Creates a firewall 
 
HIV/AIDS and Malaria: link to CSR 
function; mitigate risk 
Hurts bottom-line  
 
Local manager – supposed to get 
Competing interests: Int’l public affairs 
– data collection, baseline information, 
establish priorities 
Communications: focus on photo ops 
and ads 
 CSR falls in 
Communications group, 
which controls Foundation) 
  
Tactics:  
 Data collection – showed 
how other companies 
addressed similar issues 
 Long-term legacy issue 
 Census – data collection in 
operational area; social risk 
baseline 
 Cultural trait – allowed 
“improvising”  
 Delineate messaging to 
sell ideas – used risk lens 
 Must get buy-in of CEO!! 
 External cases of failures  
 Executive board needed 
to be convinced 
 
Alliances – create new ones 
 Destroy alliances for 
communications – 300M per 
year 
 Power and influence 
 
Communications: convening 
meetings without int’l public affairs 
 Lobby CEO his idea 
 Used country case as an 
example 
 
 
Political tactics shaped 
outcome 
 Communications 
strategy would have 
one 
 But, eventually CEO 
would question flaws 
 
Outcome was good for 
company 
 Changed culture 
 Now: negotiate with 
government; ask 
government for advice  
 
Lost relations with 
communications  
 
 
 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 Need Communications 
because of resources 
 Also – lack of intelligent 
people/knowledge on the 
team 
 High amount of hubris – 
“we are the biggest and 
the best” 
 
Same in country x: meeting with local 
managers without risk management 
team  
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alignment; not enough brain power 
on CSR risk 
 
Association (43) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
2000 revision of global CSR 
guidelines 
 Many internal CSR related 
groups – revision 
focused integration 
 No cohesive strategy  
 
Company perceptions  
 Existing structure and 
culture – large 
differences on managing 
CSR programs  
 Systems oriented versus 
decentralized - very 
difficult  
 Focus on systems  
 Big struggle to how it is 
related 
 Who should do it 
 Philanthropy damaged 
CSR (resources) 
 Never wanted to be part of 
CSR 
 Corp strategy  = set up a 
group  
 
Resistance by other groups who 
owned pieces 
 Team (task force) – CSR 
group not really finalized 
 Buy-in – none  
 
Senior leadership had inconsistent 
views 
 Middle management 
tasked to construct it – 
competing interests  
 Not clear on CSR 
ownership – earlier days 
 Who was the most 
interested 
 CSR department versus 
construct a team 
approach  
 
 
Tactics:  
 Effort to expand CSR 
organization – add staff 
 Under CEO – Corp 
communications versus 
policy being played out – 
resistance senior 
management; VP – close to 
philanthropy  
 Philanthropy put pressure to 
prevent budget 
 Constant question of the 
role of CSR and why 
resources needed 
 
IT/Computer Company: multiple 
groups working the issue 
 Inconsistent – status quo 
approach 
 Not coordinated – general 
pattern 
 Create a group and report – 
use [CSR] report to bring 
parts together 
 Group created to do 
something and add value 
 Start-up – “huge” [push] – 
get out there  
 Rationalization of what 
they were doing 
 Companies sat back after 
5 years to assess what 
they were engaged in 
 
Internal: CSR practice was not 
effective and no value 
 Oriented toward to external 
recognition  
 Loss opportunity – not 
embedded in systems 
 CR report: section of what 
division is doing and CSR 
group – need to justify 
 What it was doing; not 
integrated issue  
 
CEO getting cornered – old days 
 New person coming in 
and using recognition of 
CEO to force things 
through internally 
 change agent used 
 Resistance internally – did 
not want to get out in front 
Beverage company:  
 Group and activity got 
added to him – his 
organization grew 
and more visibility 
 Sees effectiveness  
 
Pharmaceutical: Top down policy 
 Can depend on 
personalities 
 Not based on strong 
advocates  
 Don’t grow CSR 
group – internally   
 
Politics has impact  
 Management styles 
 What management will 
take on 
 Loss opportunity – not 
embedded in systems 
 
Philanthropy damaged CSR 
(resources) 
 
Territorial: manifestation of their 
business model – Pharmaceutical 
company (missing opportunity) 
 Carried over to in other 
parts of the company 
 
Not coordinated – general pattern 
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 Number of groups 
(Government affairs) – no 
consensus of creative 
discussion  
 Consensus by groups 
Marketing, PR 
(44) 
a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
Operations/marketing/CSR/Commu
nications  
 
 
Early stages – Public affairs side 
 CSR seen more to 
manage risk; not to add 
value 
 Shifted to CSR 
department – 
stakeholders outside 
government affairs 
 Back to public affairs 
and Corp 
communications – part 
of brand 
 Still varies: preventing risk 
to something of business 
value and broad 
 Engage with consumers – 
proactive shift  
 
Kind of engagement – shift 
 Moved away from 
government affairs to 
activists  
 PR and advocacy front 
 Audience to consumer – 
differ per group and 
their stakeholders  
 
Crosscutting across entire 
enterprise  
 New for internal group and 
external advisors – 
inconsistent 
understandings 
 Example: Operations – 
budget focus 
 Some have started to 
embrace – make sense for 
business 
 Competing priorities in 
companies 
 New for CSR, not new 
for companies 
 Always had conflict with 
marketing and 
operations  
 More processes with 
social and environmental 
issues  
Not clear who was in charge 
 Ownership is shifted and 
many owners not a typical 
CSR officer 
 Everyone owns a piece of 
the budget 
 Cannot identify one 
specific group – vacuum  
 
Political behavior – economic 
challenge 
 CSR used to have a free 
rein 
 Crunch on the budget 
 Pushing and shoving on 
responsibility  
 More important and cross-
cutting  
 Posturing to be a leader 
 Make case to be important  
 
1. Opportunity for personal growth 
 Sold by individual workers 
to leadership – engineering 
company he has worked 
with  
 CSR is leaderless… put 
themselves forward\how to 
position it in marketing 
department (exclude 
important departments) 
 
2. Operational level risk management 
 Individuals will take ideas 
to sell to team; participate 
in meetings and sell to 
leadership team and not 
inclusiveness of others – 
keep others in the dark 
 People driving CSR at 
different angles to be 
visible – leads to 
differences – see threats 
and opportunities  
 
Good for company to use these 
tactics 
 CSR efforts are 
disjointed – leadership 
team sees this 
because of politicking  
 
Good for company – push 
because one believes; push 
because of politics  
 self-interested 
behavior is positive 
– spurs innovation 
and attention 
 Not good for groups 
New for CSR, not new for 
companies 
 
Political behavior does influence 
CSR behavior  
 
Tactics are necessary and critical to 
successful alignment and integration  
 
Always had conflict with marketing 
and operations  
 Align and integration 
increasingly important  
 Individuals [change 
agents] better than group 
to drive change  
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Association (45) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
15 companies: Inconsistency – some 
had different approaches  
 Strategic CSR in some 
cases, but varied  
 Many worked in different 
departments  
 Little consistency in 
types of people – broad 
differences – 
HES/Law/Security 
 
Each company had a particular 
position on CSR 
 Visible differences 
between companies 
 Some companies it was 
very clear 
 Larger companies – clear 
who was in charge in 
some (different groups 
participated in association 
work) 
 
Use association to learn how to 
overcome barriers in the field 
 Low decision making 
capacity; influence how 
CSR was operationalized  
 One company: 
management decision 
making versus advisors  
 Management structure – 
attitude of management; 
outdated perception (low 
power) 
 Downsize and CSR people 
first to go 
 
Implementation of CSR tool – based on 
personality 
 Depended on priority placed 
by company 
 Top driver needed in some 
cases 
 Mandate = more interest 
and participation 
internally 
Tool: used under banner of a 
change; not driven by CSR 
people 
 Need others to 
support 
 
How firm was structured influences 
level of tactics 
 Smaller companies – 
easier 
 
Service NGO (46) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
Government affairs – Initiatives 
have a government component  
 
Extractives: CSR started moving 
into government affairs 
 Consolidation into HQ 
 CSR relations group 
 Deal with CSR piece  
 Turf battle between CSR 
and GA (HES and 
Security) 
 
Cross-functional working group: 
In-country: Security, Community 
relations, HES 
 Figure out who transacts 
with you 
 Lead to recognition of 
group power 
 Finance and general 
counsel goes after it 
 Need c-suite; back-up 
 
Groups: want to show risk 
 Water down position 
papers – at board level 
 Risk based lens 
 Paper/idea changes 
completely 
 Risk sells – personal 
exposure  
 Too much CSR focus – 
they lose legitimacy  
Buy-in: need reputation to be hurt to 
act; need it to be attacked  
 They get embarrassed – 
gives power 
 Sell risk – increase or 
decrease 
 General counsel versus 
other rising groups 
 
Brought in agent of change to sense-
give and secure buy-in – reinforce 
through emails and other 
communications  
 
Take out ideas “strip out” and get 
operations person to put in 
“ownership” to shape outcome 
 
Win-win for company and 
group 
 Executives bought in 
 CSR unit given power 
[to work an issue] 
 
Internal tactics are necessary 
 
Bad/bad scenario 
 Diffusion: divide CSR into 
small pieces; deliberate 
strategy 
 Group no longer exists 
o Company 
cannot 
institutionaliz
e because 
fear of power 
structure – not 
good for the 
company  
o Low skills to 
manage it 
where difficult  
 
No change of hierarchal structure – 
want attention of CEO (have the 
access) 
 
Take CSR issues for themselves 
that has reaction [human rights] 
 
Without politicking and influencing 
will go with foundation model – 
follow the past; a pet idea 
 Country office can easily 
undermine project 
alternative – simple call to 
CEO “you don’t know 
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 Downside of 
sensegiving CSR 
 Does not allow company 
to learn CSR – low 
innovation internally  
 
Tactics:  
 Co-option of general 
counsel or “snaking” 
 CSR = power (given or 
diffused) 
 CSR needs desire  
 Internally need a change 
agent – put him/her in a 
position of power 
 Risk exposure of CSR 
 Temporary alliances 
around budget – alliance 
for resources  
 CSR standards: general 
counsel versus other 
groups 
 Security: Take out 
international standards 
language; take out CSR 
language  
 Embellish risk to sell 
case – issue crafting  
 Asked to make 
information sound 
“scarier” 
Panama”  
 
Marketing, PR 
(47) 
a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
1980 – 1991 period 
Japanese MNCs in US 
 
Not clear who owns CSR [because 
of Tokyo decision making] 
 
 
Need OK from Tokyo [on CSR 
decisions] 
 Inconsistency and 
sometimes dramatic 
 Frustrated US managers 
 
Talk to major Japanese companies 
 Not clear – groups 
involved (CSR/XYZ 
executives) 
 CSR: Weak; just 
facilitators [in Japanese 
companies] 
 CSR – will become more 
powerful; wanted group to 
be powerful for business 
o Persuade 
executives – 
buy-in to your 
idea 
o CSR group 
begging third 
party (give 
credit to CSR 
unit) 
o For third party – 
Use agency – good for agency 
business  
 Good for group; not 
good for companies 
 Elevate CSR group; 
trend to continue 
Japanese corporations and corporate 
citizenship 
 Not prepared 
 Not interested 
 Exposed to “all” issues, 
including impact or 
implications of decisions 
 “gate keepers” only 
 Tension between HQ and 
Field units 
 Protect career when he 
returns to HQ 
 
CSR is fashionable  
CSR group must do something 
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potential 
revenue stream 
Energy (48) CSR Strategy Review for 
Legacy Assets 
External trigger – long standing 
issue for the company 
 Tactical lead person to 
execute 
 Twice a week meetings 
 Need someone – but don’t 
know what they need 
 Provide information to 
support decision making 
 Tactical and strategic  - 
press release, community 
program 
 Decision body is cross-
functional  
o Group 1: 
VP/Law/GM-
Policy/Media/g
overnment 
affairs  
o Group 2: 
Security/Invest
or relations 
/Media/Policy/
External 
Relations 
(quality group) 
 
Consensus: fair amount of conflict 
 Low consensus 
 Media – own idea 
 
Hierarchy: 
Law 
Media – competing agenda with 
government relations 
government relations 
– competing agenda with Media 
and policy 
Policy (CSR related to issue) – 
competing agenda with 
government relations 
o Wins come 
from other 
issues, not 
CSR 
 
 
Sense-giving: work on VP on idea 
Sensegiving and alliance building: 
Law and media thought out idea 
 Buy-in stage 
 Pre-work on  lawyers 
 Consultants are used – sell 
ideas and not in company’s 
best interest  
 
Government relations: works directly 
VP – Lead Counsel (leave others out) 
Competing interests and 
different interpretation 
Inter-personal skills are bad; 
cannot admit defeat 
 
Policy: integrated opinions  
 Winning Group – access to 
full information 
 Decision making people and 
not advisors 
 Hid information from 
competitors 
 Information was 
manipulated by certain 
groups 
 
Lots of advocacy  
 Keep on radar, not 
controversial – deliberate 
strategy  
 Internal communications 
 Selective 
information/alternatives 
added to agenda 
 
Losers: no data donation; 
media activity lost (no results); 
policy lost (low support) 
 
Factors: little resistance because 
it met legal strategy  
 
Losers = community plan and 
team 
 
External issues: Good for 
government affairs 
 What is good for CSR 
group (has something 
to talk about; show 
value) 
 Environment: Not 
good for the group 
(HES), but good for 
company 
 
 
 
Most influential is Law  
 
dependent on personal relationships 
Set up for failure (CE project) 
 
External CSR issues are a negotiated 
process 
Even with a process in 
place, items are 
negotiated away 
 
Tactic of pre-work and back-room 
dealings 
5-6 times before a meeting 
Some things get 
negotiated away – 
end of decision 
making process 
General 
recommendations: 
“Find me a 
justification to talk 
to co-leaders and 
decision making 
group” 
 
Big Company 
 Single factor: b-case – 
make it happen 
 Change words – liability 
and costs 
 How you couch case 
 Horse trading happens 
 Need people who have…  
o an agenda 
o a business 
case 
 Snaking – Perspective 
from others and selling 
(dual purpose) 
Energy (49) Social Risk Management 
Process for New Projects 
 
Reaction to legacy issue and 
externalities on projects where 
company operates  
 Not proactive 
management 
 Risk management  and 
future liabilities  
 Operational policy 
Bilateral conversations outside team 
meetings 
 Influence key persons 
 Use external triggers to sell 
issue 
 
Lobbying: focused vetting seniors or 
approvers – get buy-in 
If tactics were not used, move 
company to be further 
decentralized  
 
Good for both 
 CSR elevated profile  
 Company had a risk 
management process 
CSR is a negotiated process and 
there is always politics/politicking  
 
Individual motivations vary to do 
both (good for me and good for 
company) 
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commitment  
 
Groups: cuts across functions 
 Defined to operations 
deliberate to be social 
function 
 Internal process is also 
cross-functional 
 HES/Law/PGPA 
 [felt] backroom dealings 
going on 
o Negotiate 
ownership  
o Horse trading 
taking place 
o CSR role; Law 
asserted 
themselves  
o Baseline 
information; 
right to retain 
documents 
o Environment 
participation – 
5 lawyers – 
control 
information  
o Grand 
compromise to 
get new social 
process 
approved 
 
 
CSR understood differently by 
different groups 
 Legal understanding of 
social risk – we cause 
problems  
 Cross-functional team – 
diverse group 
 governance board was 
cross-functional  
 Competing interests – 
legal supported argument of 
exposure to problems; 
disregarded because they 
see value 
 Legal was “empire 
building” 
 
Some influence over decision criteria 
by third parties 
 
Law: Use slide deck 
 Issue crafting – risk; 
scare tactic (ATCA cases) 
 Raise uncertainty  
 Be worrisome  
 
HES has a lot of power – custodian of 
management system 
 Lobbying HES to have this 
 Executive level lobbying   
 
CSR/HES 
 Protect technical turf 
 Empirical data used against 
legal challenge  
 
for new projects 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy (50) Implementing labor 
standards in supply 
chain 
 
Risk assessment: identification 
labor standards – weak 
 Another company in 
country x had a child labor 
incident 
 Criticized in Norwegian 
media 
 Trigger senior executives 
– are we prepared? 
 CSR Group – not strong, 
risks high and strengths 
low 
 Other groups – prepare 
memo with HES (big), 
Memo of recommended actions 
 Executive leadership 
wanted an operational 
review 
 wanted review of the policy  
 
Tactical consideration to elevate the 
CSR group 
 Labor issue was not 
regulated – CSR used to 
take the lead (foothold) 
 CSR is dangerous… 
engenders opportunities  
 Expected human resources 
Politics shaped outcome 
 
CSR group gained – “owned” 
policy and issue (supply chain 
agenda) 
 
“Own Policy” – CSR group 
 
Outcome was good for 
company and for CSR group 
 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Challenge to Think 
 
Most important person is CEO 
 Asked for internal 
discussion 
 Always pushing others to 
do it 
 
Some stakeholders in task force 
jockeyed for position to own issue 
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human resources, Law, 
Procurement 
 Consistency in message 
 Leave sections open; they 
fill in 
 Leveraged Business 
Unit contacts 
 
would be negative 
o Should be 
owners 
o Early on they 
had no interest 
to regulate 
 
Law had questions 
 Material issue and they are 
on board 
 VP/Law became an ally 
 Strong legal department in 
all business areas 
 Realized strong and 
important and set up 
meeting – internal 
discussions 
 
Set up task force – cross functional  
 Headed by CSR 
 Procurement/Int’l 
CSR/human resources 
(there was a practical 
decision not to front-end 
Legal) 
 
Steering Committee:  
 Communications/procure
ment/HES 
 Cross-functional teams 
was the internal buy-in for 
executive leadership 
 
Task Force: Each had specific 
motivations and objectives – difficult 
 Procurement: Define and 
set up strategy that would 
[help] his unit 
 HES: Wanted to require 
HES work 
 Internal turf: how you define 
and form policy; legal 
become helpful 
 Resistance: long 
discussions; lots of 
negotiation and direct 
quarrels 
 Side negotiations among 
task force members 
 
10 projects identified for risk 
assessment 
Public Affairs: Influence CSR’s boss 
Executive leadership consulted with 
middle managers 
 
Executive committee, steering 
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committee, and Task Force (Need 
Consensus) 
 One hour meeting with 
steering committee 
 Hierarchy – task force 
members were managers 
 CSR manage had more 
contact with executive 
leadership 
 Task force members did try 
to influence CSR manager 
thinking 
 
Strategy: rollout of labor standards – 
road show with EVP of all business 
areas 
 Lead ALL presentations 
 
Tactics: 
 EVP well-briefed before 
executive leadership 
decisions (lobbying) 
 Use minutes of meetings 
of executive leadership 
meetings – CEO 
recommends adopting 
international standards 
Management 
Consulting (51) 
CSR strategy for the firm: 
Pro bono program or a 
powerful CSR tool 
 
 
Defining CSR and what it means to 
an internal audience 
 Need to educate people 
internally 
 CSR means different 
things to different 
people 
 For community relations it 
was a big challenge 
 How they define it will be 
completely different from 
others  
o How to make 
pro bono 
service more 
strategic CSR 
o Value 
proposition: 
protection 
reputation, 
attract and 
retain talent, 
differentiate 
among peers, 
justify internal 
spend 
 
 Driven by change agent; 
not his boss 
 
Partners already doing pro bono work 
 It was unstructured and not 
strategic 
 Client focused and partners 
used it for non-paying 
clients to win new contracts; 
not a CSR tool 
 “discount” use of pro bono 
resources 
 Each partner used its 
resources as needed – 
little consistency across 
the enterprise  
 
Former CEO vision – eliminate 
“discount” use of pro bono resources  
 
Word of mouth – CEO was visionary 
(he believed in it) 
Incentive to get into annual report 
Need to centralize pro bono work 
 
Partners formed alliance to support 
issues and not support it 
 There was limited resources 
per partners and now 
strategic focus would take 
away “consultants” for paid 
projects 
 Some partners on senior LT 
Some partners lost – lost 
internal resources 
 Push back when 
money taken away – 
disconnected by 
commercial sales 
 
Outcome: No outcome or 
resolution  
 Missed opportunities 
to help NGOs on 
social issues  
 
Use of information: Did not do enough 
upfront work and promotion  
 
Need a political strategy; Team did 
try to influence  
 Industry benchmarking 
 Tap into members of 
organizations 
 External engagement of 
peers 
 
Get a different director – no framing in 
risk 
 
Community relations director – did 
not champion; strategic frame 
rejected 
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Comm relations team tasked with 
enhancing pro bono work – provide 
grants to support NGOs and NPOs 
 
 Need their buy-in and 
support 
 Need support of partner(s) – 
controlled resources 
 LT did not see strategic 
dimension – saw it as a 
program 
 
Comm relations formed alliance with 
some partners and leadership team 
members – fragmented (?) 
 There was already buy-in 
for the existing program 
 
Goals – expand pro bono work and 
make it international; make it strategic 
for the firm 
 
Buy-in for existing program: Expand 
and make it international  
 Domestic and Int’l – 
government and 
commercial – board seat 
(int’l NGO) 
 Attracting good people – 
preach it 
 Bring in human resources to 
build case 
 Did not have to fight for pro 
bono dollars 
 Get training and support 
Lack of leader 
 
Internal champ – difficult to gain 
support by senior leadership about a 
‘local boss’ 
 Program not strategic – 
performance appraisal of 
employees [option]  
 
Change agent framing – human 
resources on board (performance 
appraisal) 
Energy (52) Putting Social back into 
CSR 
 
Did not measure social risk 
 No clear narrative on 
managing social risk 
 Business unit versus HQ 
on how to manage social 
risk 
 
Who framed it? No direction 
 Remove social – it was 
deliberate 
 Talk to another level; risk 
adverse people and Silvia 
(opportunity for group) 
 Greater engagement as a 
Support and buy-in – gather data 
through meetings 
 Put result in writing and 
meet with credible 
organizations 
 
Fell to certain executives – growing 
awareness of social risk 
 No country strategy or story 
 Used relations with Law 
 Resistance to overcome 
 Used country experiences 
(Law) 
 
Political behavior influenced 
the process; not the outcome (?) 
[may have been different] 
 
Good for company 
Law lost; did not want a CSR 
policy  
 
Opportunity for CSR group 
 Gain credibility and 
standing 
 Ambiguity, 
confusion – function 
in charge of CSR 
CSR s a negotiated process: 
decentralized, risk adverse 
 
Lobbying: Empower executive 
champion 
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risk 
 law seen to own function 
– command and control 
 Limit information and 
engagement  
 
Selling idea to executives after Law got 
on board 
 No embellishment – cannot 
take risk too far; direct 
quotes were used 
 Manipulate messages – 
risk lens; only company not 
doing this 
 
CSR group: No informal alliance to 
raise the issue 
 Recognition by executive to 
have social risk – external 
trend in human rights  
 NGOs and SRIs and legal 
cases 
 Follow same process to 
sell issue 
 Used legal cases to sell 
CSR policy 
 
Tactics: CSR group focused more 
internal lobbying with Law 
 Met extensively  
 How to handle it 
 Law did not want CSR 
group to manage CSR 
 Reconcile: Went above 
them to general counsel  
 Law tried to control it 
 Managing Counsel: 
reporting information to 
general counsel was not 
accurate 
o Barrier 
 Diffusion of  power was 
deliberate  
 Wanted a piece of it – 
high profile issue 
 She was political 
 
Tried to control CSR report – go above 
her; trying to shape policy 
 
Use of external consultants – sell 
agenda – get executives to see person 
as a “normal” person 
 Orchestrated what to say 
 
Lobbying:  
 Empower executive 
champion 
 Overcome resistance on 
scope and intent 
 Vice chairman and general 
counsel most important 
 
 Result – groups try 
to interfere 
 No clear leader on 
CSR; no “DNA”; no 
goal 
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Energy (53) Environmental and social 
practices for new 
projects 
Cross-functional working group: 
 CSR team, external 
affairs, Environment 
operations  
 Integration between CSR 
team and Environment 
operations 
 Environment operations – 
serve business with advice 
on Environment topics 
 
Environment part only – annual 
general meeting resolution  
 Visible because of 
“Upstream lifeblood” 
 Access to protected areas 
 CEO – addressed 
concerns 
 Investor concerns – no 
process to access areas 
 
Environment protection for new 
projects;  “applicable” projects are 
screened 
 
What about social aspects? 
 Change agent came from 
project with human rights 
issues/experience 
 Wanted set of social 
requirements  
 Wrote social requirements 
in same format as 
Environment process – 
integrate the two 
 
Resistance from US operations 
(government affairs, public affairs, 
Environment, business units… cost 
considerations); legal issues and 
compliance with US laws 
 
Manager would like to expand her team  
 Manager behavior: 
ambitious but in good way 
 Saw obvious logic of social 
practice 
 Opportunity to grow remit 
 Expand team and visibility 
 Contingency and non-
substitution  
 
Saw value in social issues 
 Changed name of team to 
reflect social opportunity 
 Talked with colleagues – 
crafted dialogue in a certain 
way 
 Example: who is involved; 
senior people; politics 
about it; roles and 
personalities 
 
Buy-in – no opposition 
 Reasons: consulted major 
projects 
 Senior people in Upstream 
were aware of it 
 Environment and social 
assessments being done in 
integrated way 
 Completely new 
management system – 
internal roles contained – 
included social risks 
 Upfront work – 
constituency of 
practitioners  
 
Met with senior management and 
interject social component – sell issue 
 Push manager forward as 
subject matter expert 
 
 Integrated and embedded 
 Social impact assessment 
process – had official status 
and visibility 
 FT person on human rights 
 High profile projects  
 Combination of internal and 
external influence  
 
No serious opposition or resistance to 
integrate practices 
 If no plans to revise 
Environment strategy, 
difficult to develop social 
practice 
 
Political behavior shaped the 
outcome – how important was it; 
will require a look back 
 
Outcome was good for 
company as a whole 
 
Good for group – credibility 
within company 
 High profile and 
enhanced reputation 
 Source of strong piece 
of policy and rules, 
and business unit 
support 
 
Wrote social requirements in 
same format as Environment 
process – integrate the two 
 
 
CSR is a negotiated process – seen 
more of it in the past few years 
 “no matter how good your 
idea is and support you 
get; if you don’t get 
socialization and work 
politics right; you are 
going to struggle” 
 
Compromise objective??? 
 Example – tactic – who 
you know 
 Environment/Social – as 
CSR, would have gone 
nowhere 
 CSR is vague 
 SR = risk management 
 
Manager knew all people needed to 
influence 
 Craft business benefits 
document – transformed 
it from aspiration to risk 
management 
conversation 
 
Conversation will rarely use CSR – 
badly defined term and too many 
different interpretations  
 
Problem: Upstream will be 
reorganized 
 New senior people to be 
consulted – “digging heals” 
 
Community of practice – formal and 
informal 
 Issued based and 
networks 
 Influence members to 
sell message 
 
Education – be change agents 
 Official role to do so 
 People who are influential 
– senior management 
listens to them 
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Resistance 
 Internal and presented as a 
“large document” 
 “Shall” statements 
 External resistance from US  
 Upstream – will not endorse 
so many commandments  
 Manager did a lot of face to 
face meetings 
 Difficult messages were not 
being given 
 Prevent filter – made sure 
senior management heard 
messages 
 
Re-do the practice document 
Strip out non essential items 
Operational management system – too 
much shall or you should 
 Match up topics tied to 
management system 
 Get acceptance 
 
Get comparison to demonstrate 
practice  
 
Consulting (54) a) Which individual or 
group did you typically 
deal with on CSR 
issues/activities; was it 
clear who was in charge? 
 
b) Did organizational 
politics or political 
behavior shape and 
influence CSR outcomes; 
was the outcome good 
for the company or 
specific internal groups? 
Large companies – very political 
internally  
 
Clear on client 
CSR – very little consistency 
 young field – how to 
standardize practices 
 varies company to 
company 
 
Ownership is unclear – ultimate 
ownership 
Difference in level at which there is 
ownership 
 mid level often 
 does not spend much time 
on it 
 multiple responsibilities 
 sometimes CEO takes an 
interest – unusual 
 
started to work with other groups; 
work with more senior people 
 
Ex: mid-size company 
 Runs sustainability  
 May be mid-level 
 Wants us to be his 
resource – do not 
interact with anyone else 
 Senior person wants us to 
Political behavior: 
 Look for information to 
produce an outcome 
 Demonstrate cause and 
effect – open doors and 
reverse resistance 
 
Opposite 
 Company had a problem 
 Trying to let alternative 
(PR) fail to make case to 
go to CSR approach 
 
Tactics: 
Brought into process – can be good 
Felt threatened – backfired 
 person brought in beholden 
to someone who was a rival 
to person who owned CSR 
process 
 no strategy in advance 
 felt he had to go to battle for 
his guy 
 over years it resolved itself 
– power struggle CSR war 
 
Outside groups (third sector) 
 Picks off leadership of 
companies 
 Puts CSR in a particular 
position 
Political tactics are critical  
 
Good for company 
 Pull pieces together – 
disjointed in the past 
 
Self-interested behavior is good for 
CSR – plus for career path 
 
Big wins – defensive cases, solve 
problems 
 
Inside box – comply with law / 
preserve stock price 
Outside box (CSR) – always entails 
political strategy 
 
Crisis – resistance increases – 
triggering reaction by senior 
management to innovate 
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work with his team 
 
Dynamics driven by crisis – current 
or past 
 Elevate level of 
engagement in CSR 
 Without crisis senior 
management may not be 
engaged 
 
 
Goals vary – competing views and 
interests 
 
Used as a change agent to sell 
issue 
 Trying to affect change 
within company – why firm 
is contacted 
 
Always a group trying to drive an 
issue!!! 
 Butting heads everyday 
 
Bolstering group: 
 Selling information to 
internal stakeholders 
 Issue crafting – best 
sense of what will sell 
 Follow lead of client to 
frame and communicate 
 Take cues of NGOs is 
dangerous – colors internal 
politics 
 
Energy (55) Creation of Sustainable 
Development Issue 
Management Process 
CSR report: 
 All new people: corporate 
citizenship and investment 
department 
 Corp involvement 
enterprise-wide 
 Culture – low engagement  
 Corp CR report – trying to 
use more sustainable 
development content 
 
Challenge:  
 Public affairs value 
proposition to the business 
 Some subsidiaries lately 
about ‘sustainable 
development’ 
 Business case from 
Chemicals, some  Corp 
groups, and Lubricants 
 New generation of senior 
management 
 
Future tension: treatment of socio-
economic issues 
 Issue management team 
No owners yet [socio-economic issues] 
 Some VPs forced it 
 Goal – unify sub-groups 
 Charter developed 
 Issue owners assigned, 
meeting only 
 
HES feels ownership 
 Easy buy-in with functional 
VPs 
 HES felt historical 
ownership 
 Find allies – senior VPs  
 
Social/Human rights – not a culture of 
soft issues 
 Skeptical  
 Not well integrated 
 Person dependent  
 
HES powerful – but focused only on 
health and environment  
 
Social – attribute is limited 
 Demand driven by BUs 
 Who will take over? 
Development of the process is 
incomplete 
Future tension: socio-economic 
issues 
 
All new people 
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 HES, E&P, IR, PA, 
Chemicals (low 
understanding), Upstream, 
Corp 
 Inconsistent goals and 
objectives 
 
Competing interests; BU 
power 
 Social-economic task force 
 Did not think about CSR 
 maybe HES (environmental 
management system 
already developed) 
 
Mining (56) CR strategy: 
Communication 
response lines 
 
 
CSR – improve process of community 
grievance mechanism  
 Clear and transparent 
edict  
 Whistle blowing – hotline, 
ethics versus community 
response line 
 Law worked with CSR 
 
Corp and BU 
 CSR/Environment/Busines
s Units 
 Plant managers, law, 
security, Environment, and 
human resources 
 Different opinions of 
issue and response  
o Law – do it in a 
“risk free” 
manner 
o CSR – be 
transparent; 
should 
responsible to 
respond 
 
Environment – territorial 
 
Tactics: 
“ours to handle” 
“no responses” 
“not in writing” 
 
Mobilization – demonstrate to plant 
manager why important  
 Best practice at facilities; at 
other facilities it works  
 Plant manager was most 
important to influence 
 Don’t put individuals in the 
“hot plate” 
 
Gap between Corp and business unit 
 No sustainability officer to 
join Env and Social 
 
Environment still resistant – control 
process 
 
Tactics: 
 US is a litigious society, 
protectionist perspective  
 Hiding information 
 Half responses, no 
complete “pictures” of 
situation 
 
CSR: How it would help them? 
Highlight “risks” 
 Individuals – email 
responses created legal and 
reputation risk because no 
process 
 Prove risk – use problem in 
past to sell point  
 
More cooperation after implemented 
Why?  
 CSR was not a risk – doing 
good work 
 14001 requirement – 
communication line was a 
requirement  
 
Environment: territorial – still want 
control and ongoing… 
 Negotiation – 
communication and CSR 
(sign-off) is a risk; 
Environment wants input 
 
Political tactics were necessary 
(emphasis added) 
 
Outcome: good for company 
 CSR team and 
communications team 
– low resources (could 
push, but we must 
standardize) 
 Some control – good 
for company  
 value for them 
 
Good for law and Environment – 
still have not taken advantage of 
Environment  management 
system 
 
Same protocol across all sites – 
CSR and Communications 
manager at each site 
 
Negotiation and selling at 
different sites – depends on 
leadership in country 
CSR is a negotiated process 
 
Navigate system and use it – be 
tactical 
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Appendix B: Decision Process Plots 
 Activation  
 Individual cognitive articulation of CSR issue 
  
1 Current state: Philanthropy group dominated 
 Not integrated, no super-imposed CSR strategy, believed in current structure, politically "cut throat"  
 Culture: competetive, in-fighting between groups  
 Executive leader (SVP) believed in current structure  
  
2 Current state: Security cannot handle issue; CSR group asked to find a solution to problem  
 CSR manager as change agent 
 Corp directive to find a solution  
  
3 Current state: Need to sell risk, wait for something to go wrong to use or enhance tool, [social risk] miscalculated by people 
 Asset manager is the most important – relationship management  
 HES: Own impact assessment process – has CSR influence (owners of management process) 
 Get SMEs to feed into evaluation  
  
4 Current state: Ethos of company was access to information  
 No need to create group – already strong buy-in on issue 
 No resistance  
 Crisis/event-driven 
 Government request for data, conflicts with local and international norms for human rights  
  
5 Current state: Different mechanism at different sites 
 Consistent approach needed 
 External tools coming out 
 CSR manager saw this as a weakness and made a case - be change agent  
 Communications group – engage and influence   
 Grievance mechanism interpreted differently by all groups 
  
6 Current state: CSR to move to Communications  
 No consultations or warnings 
 Strong resistance within HES and management team  
 Leadership vacuum; seize opportunity 
 “social” – used to be part of HES 
 No information why it happened 
 Head of unit – orchestrated internal communications 
 Triggered minor change; new communications strategy, brought CSR into communications – personal agenda – Corp communication rep in 
the senior leadership committee 
 Driver – wish for the senior committee to control sustainability agenda 
 Get greater engagement into projects 
 172 
 
 Challenged by external pressures 
 Communications group to be more integrated into the business 
 “Will placement affect what CSR means for the company – question not answered 
 CEO wants this to happen (don’t know why…) 
 Territorial issue between merged companies - legacy issue 
 Communications and CSR versus international upstream 
  
7 Current state: Leadership briefed there was security concerns; no linkage between security and community relations (CR) 
 Security spend is high; CR spend is low 
 No Corp plan 
 Community problems in 1999 – 2002 
 No owner of CSR; there was low understanding  
 CR: emerging as a solution  
 Security cannot deal with community people 
 Resource access issue 
 Competing interests 
 CR solution – ideas being sought to get back into tough areas; Management asked for a different plan 
 Data collected and analyzed by sub-groups to came up with a different plan 
 CR short-changed  
 Security budgets approved quickly; no question 
  
  
8 Current state:  
 No role for Corp citizenship several years ago; philanthropy existed but no global role 
 Grow internationally in markets: Local relations needed for new assets 
 More understanding of CSR needed 
 External trends – UN work on business and human rights 
 Getting key allies: 
 “paint the external context” 
 “what does this mean to us?” 
 Outlined influence to strategy  
 (couched as risk) 
  
9 Current state: 
 Social responsibility framework – attached to the CSR group 
 Issue: buying assets without full analysis – need for realizing risks, reputation risks 
 Internal groups accepted existing HES process 
 Realized power was diffused 
 Separate alliance for government affairs and business intelligence/strategic planning – their own visibility  
 Strong opportunity – CSR group dealt with new assets  
  
10 Current state: 
 Buy-in – understanding there is much at stake 
 There was low resistance 
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 No territoriality or partisanship 
 Major program – Corp advantage – legacy  
 Part of business strategy  
  
 OPPOSITE: Experience in Pharmaceutical Corporation 
 Current state: 
 New CEO had a shift in perception of CSR – drag on bottom line 
 Low support – difficult to execute 
 CSR group had to justify existence 
 Staff led discussion to step up HIV/AIDS 
 CEO “We are not an HIV/AIDS company” 
 So much given away; “critical stakeholders still hate us” 
 Business model needed to change – pricing 
 But host countries set prices  
 Activist pressures: one of the largest pharmaceutical company and largest target; not just as a solution 
  
11 Current state: 
 Most important issue for the bank – project finance 
 2003 adoption by leading banks – management found a new business trend and led by senior management direction 
 Was in financial group (CSR) – then transferred to project finance division 
 Sustainable development department 
 Need to impact loan, deal teams, and project finance 
 Needed support: 
 Most important – deal team members  
 Need to orchestrate and accept 
 Head of project finance division 
  
12 Current state:  
 Adopted a policy without management system 
 Surprised there was legal approval 
 NGO scrutiny of operations in sensitive areas  
 Current state of policy: 
 Low appreciation of it 
 No competition 
 Low visibility  
 Buy-in already – Corp security and government relations 
 CSR important and part of the culture, but lack systems 
  
13 Current state: 
 Mine closing in the future framed the CSR issues 
 Company legacy 
 Help economic base and community development  
 Sold to management as “RISK” 
 Get permits/license to close  
 Less dependent in 10 years – less potential activism when closing 
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 Operating company had decision making power 
 Opporutnity and need 
  
14 Current state: 
 Deputy General Counsel unveiled new vision for CSR at international conference: 
 CSR was a separate activity in the past – now, new priorities and definitions to “get ahead of the curve” 
 Unified approach 
 Used external partners to help them decide what to be known for (used partners to build case) 
 New vision: 
 Computer skills training 
 Who to partner with 
 Target number to be trained in 5 years 
 Define, develop, prioritize 
 Public Relations was a powerful group 
 Education group (potential competing group): 
 Had different ideas 
 Thrust to be big in education space 
 Had own program to train teachers 
 Less CSR; more business development programming 
 Connection to selling software – bottom line 
 Different position  
 CSR group: 
 How many students trained 
 Hierarchy of goals 
 Sell IP policy message (intellectual property protection) 
 Get product to market  
 Built constituency for IPP 
 General counsel supports CSR initiative 
 IPP idea aligns with business units and General counsel 
 Philanthropy is not sustainable – must be aligned with other key objectives – keep focus 
 Country office – different mentality 
 Not developing products, but selling it (different than HQ) 
 Public relations, media, advertisement – very powerful  
 Leaders did not want to link to business success in developing countries; made it a measurement of success in country offices  
  
15 No clear understanding of CSR 
 Who owned it was not clear 
 Enterprise buy-in and integration is not the norm  
 Legal – positive and negative role 
 Affects independence of  CSR department  
 CSR group gets activated when something bad happening; lawsuit  
 Today: legal and reputation risk management 
 Tool for companies to promote value 
 Protect assets and mitigate risks 
 Working closely sometimes – in house tension 
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 Trend – decision on CSR is made at top levels 
 Fix issue and prevent it from happening again 
 Inconsistent framing  
 Today – CSR may be to mitigate risk 
 Some first need risk to establish CSR framework 
 Some legal department run CSR 
 Becoming more clear today then before – role of General Counsel  
 Political agenda – yes 
 Corp culture 
 Turf – define boundaries  
 Grab CSR  
 Sell as risk 
  
16 Current state: 
 Highly visible publication on oil/gas project and human rights abuse – triggered external pressure on firm  
 [Firm needed to address external pressures] and required internal company engagement 
 Typical – crisis led to trigger 
 Regional development was a “rigid strategy” 
 Competing project:  
 Regional development program – controlled money and focused on small business development, education, access to energy (legitimacy, 
strong position and placement); owned by Communications/External Affairs 
 Multilateral institution project on reconstruction and development [in focus country] tied to regional development program – Global Security 
was left out of the loop 
 Many departments pulled in different ways; departments had separate relationships 
  
17 Current State: 
 Part of risk management, but tension with business line (bankers) 
 CSR are ideas between risk management, Corp sustainability  
 Climate and carbon –  forward looking business strategy/case 
 Coal fire plant – screen project 
 Received negative media attention; flagged to bankers 
 Bankers, Corp Communications, risk management – holding statements 
 Ensuing negative press; and new campaign threats 
 Corp sustainability – meet with NGOs; new partners stand to distance themselves 
 Sr. management not involved; siloed within Corp sustainability, risk management, and bankers 
 Community relations got involved b/c of community activism 
 Active campaign started against CEO; engaged and meeting with NGOs 
 Crisis: More senior attention 
 Actual strategy: 
 Climate position statement 
 Portfolio assessment 
 Joint industry statement 
  
18 Current State:  
 Project in sensitive areas had no guidance to handle security and human rights issues 
 Need to build guidance at Corp level 
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 Field people wanted guidance 
 Litigation going on – external pressures made it a Corp issue 
 Shareholder resolutions  
 Identified owner of issue – global security and public affairs 
 Goal: 
 security and human rights integration into processes – management systems Human rights policy 
 VPs integration into processes – management systems 
 List of issues – Corp or specific business issue – process  
 Human rights and security flagged – public affairs, global security, Upstream (hey identified the issue) 
 human rights was head of issue manager – my “pet issue” 
  
19 Current State: 
 All the banks got beaten up – external pressures  
 go beyond compliance – not working 
 use international institution because well known in the market 
 met with IFC and drafted EPs 
 light consultation with NGOs 
 Bank needed implementation 
 NGOs attacking bank and EPs adopted; but… no infrastructure to implement it 
 Corp affairs, Environmental affairs – no integration 
 Project finance head – did not want to give power 
 Environmental affairs 
 Corp sustainability – already hired people; need to sit within business  
 Risk management – risk management function  
 Bank is large and complex and political 
 100 operations  
 Certain groups perceived as international NGO  
 “proud to be at launch of EPs… a strong signal” 
 Where does this fit unresolved 
 Internal fight!! Negotiation and territorial behaviors  
 Social policy and risk management – create system 
 Resistance, turf, predatory issue 
  
20 Current State: 
 Peers put out human rights statement and position 
 Issue management group – look at issues when company managing in pieces 
 Cross sectoral issue 
 Inconsistent interpretation  
 Organizational behavior of company 
 Buy-in 
 Subject knowledge 
 Internal influence 
 Hierarchal, but think decentralized 
 Policy or position? 
 Policy – CEO did not want another policy 
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21 Current state: 
 Reputation issues pivotal 
 1 year engagement before commitment 
 Context: 
 Legacy issues 
 NGO allegations  
 Commercial 
 CSR – had own imperfections to focus on 
 Reconcile different ideas 
 CSR versus legislation and regulation 
 Environment – broaden issues; friction points 
 Turf issues with environment 
 Global security – loss turf (had informal conversations) 
 Some degree of lack of understanding 
 Sensitive country experience gave people some idea  
 No structure or template  
 Critical buy-in – EVP legal, EVP Upstream, CEO 
  
22 Current state:  
 Internally – sensitive operating areas ramping up 
 Projects attracted NGO groups 
 Many external trends and standards evolving  
 CEO engaged on business and human rights 
 “surprised” may be where debate was and company not plugged in 
 CSR was ambiguous and vague 
 Goal was no clear; no end product 
 Started to talk to particular stakeholders  
 CSR and Assets 
 Information gathering and diagnostics  
  
23 Current state: 
 Need relations with NGOs 
 Access abroad – buy-in of this idea 
 Still foreign to many people 
 Low understanding of global health 
 Internally – very difficult 
 Reorganization – CSR on the backburner; save reporting 
 Barrier – health issue is not a priority 
  
24 Current state: 
 Hard law – focused on FCPA in US 
 Approach needed legal counsel 
 Direction of major litigations 
 Approach – soft effort (political?) 
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25 Current state: 
 CSR group – not well defined yet 
 Inconsistency in goals and objectives 
 Immature level – low skills and competencies 
 What it means?? 
 Crisis – ambiguity – territoriality happens 
 Response to the crisis 
 Part belief; part way of doing things 
 CSR – gets in their territory 
 Overcoming resistance 
 Engage with groups 
 External expert – used politically to push agenda 
 Sustainability: Power grab within some departments 
 Groups want to own it 
  
26 Current state: 
 Normally dealing with CSR unit 
 Sustainability department 
 HES 
 Inconsistency on goals and objectives 
 Political dynamics between units and c-suite executives 
 More consistent of political buy-in and consistent leadership of CEO and c-suite (is the single most political factor) 
 Influence strategic intent – different frame 
 CSR (flow up to CEO) – tactics  
 CEO (flow down to staff) 
 Middle management and employees – capacity, communications, incentives  
 More important than materiality of issue, institutional structure 
 CSR – risen to a strategic level 
 Seriousness of management 
 Resources available 
 Positioning of team within company 
 Engage with strong critics – support strategy  
  
 Current state: 
 Retail case 
27 What is CSR – labor and standards 
 Risk management 
 Small incidents – global attention 
 Wanted a quick fix at first – evolved overtime 
 Law suits occurred – resources and time 
 Reputation issue ensued  
 Set off conversation among NGOs 
 Move from reactive/ad hoc approach to coordinated approach 
 Risk management – dealt with ethical standards team – risk management unit 
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 As CSR evolved and CEO saw legacy issue 
 Bottom line business incentive  
 CSR is owned by different groups 
 Understand differently and interpreted differently 
  
28 Current state: 
 CR Integration Project 
 Alignment (misalignment) across organizations and groups 
 Espoused was Corp public affairs (owner of CSR) 
 Decentralized  
 Ownership of CSR 
 Tactics happen at business unit level – own, run, manage 
 Fluency, understanding, execution 
 Reasons: Org readiness 
 Evaluation of initiative  
 Moving into “globalization” 
 Transition – CSR was not a priority 
 Build Upstream strategic operations first 
 Then HES management system; now CSR (??) 
 Org is ready now 
 External triggers caused issue to become hyper sensitive 
 How CSR is evolving outside company – matured, policy issue 
 Litigation has heightened CSR sensitivities  
 Corp versus non Corp (extreme) 
 OpCo versus business units (very political) 
 Org was in crisis  
 Turf! 
  
29 Current state: 
 Policy people – always 
 Rarely with functional people – did not care what policy people were doing 
 Voluntary Principles – security versus policy teams 
 Consistency in general on CSR – get organized before that saw the government 
 Issue by issue – was not clear who owned CSR 
 Policy person (opposed to functional person) 
 Negotiation gets bogged down on administrative issues (policy) 
 Voluntary Principles – policy people did most of the negotiating 
 Believes there is inconsistency prior to seeing State 
  
30 Current state: 
 CSR: Disaster response is part of job; includes other operating companies 
 Branch of Japanese company 
 Regional directors 
 Make decision on NGO –  “mother will decide on amount given” 
 Decentralized in North America 
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 branch has no power 
 Project goals do not flow through branches 
 Yes decision (executives did not want to send cash – Q4 2009) 
 Staff – recommendations formed; guide their decision (statistics and information); used third parties 
  
31 Current state: 
 Incident – external influence:  
 Global ratings – company out because of human rights  
 Started benchmarking best practice – going to many events 
 Critical for companies 
 New strategic plan (includes sustainability section) – project on human rights 
 Issuing guidelines 
 Very few people knew what human rights was – sustainability department had an advantage 
 Human rights compliance assessment – included different functions (Security, human resources, HES) 
 Baseline project – what are we doing (internal) 
 No formal policy or practice 
 Plan for intervention in sustainability areas 
  
32 Current state: 
 Step change in CSR – triggered by crisis (bad resettlement) 
 Got people’s attention – changed thinking  
 Bad resettlement: Media and NGO attention  
 Company change – visible and politicized issues 
 Bad resettlement – senior level attention – failed to deliver project timelines  
 Business unit – majority shareholder  
 Autonomous behavior; did not adopt group policy 
 Territorial behavior – no action 
 “outside your authority” 
 Hierarchy in field prevented influence by Corp 
 Low expertise at front lines; issue precipitated   
  
33 Current state: 
 No – based on personal relations 
 CSR is distributed  
 Internal function/process – CSR person does coordination 
 Inconsistency – CSR people does translation –  message can be superficial  
 Another department may have a different story 
 Project does not fit core business  
  
34 Current state: 
 Typically do not engage other groups 
 Decision making authority / purview not there 
 Where is influence and power – search for it 
 Who are change agents?  
 Each group has different lens 
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 Priority differs; responsibility for issue may have a different priority/views 
 Inconsistency in CSR understandings 
 Framing is different if they don’t align in advance 
 One person may have indication to make it work – change agent 
 Not to much capacity for issue management 
  
35 Current state: 
 Inconsistency [CSR goals, objectives, framing] 
 [CSR] Bad term – too confusing 
 Not a lot of shared meaning  
 Within different business functions, difficult to understand what it means to them; different groups expressed it differently [to the CSR 
consulting firm] 
 Example: XZY Company CSR report: 
 Kick off workshop – people had different understandings of what it was 
 [CSR] Meaning was equated with their individual functions 
 Different groups involved, but not clear on influence and power 
  
36 Current state: 
 Int’l pharmaceutical company  wanted a series of conferences to frame their CSR position; [wanted to be] leaders in CSR arena  
 Inconsistent goals/objectives to reach – was not sure of goals 
 Objectives – position company as doing positive work, [but] did not know how to get there 
 Reasons for inconsistency: lack of depth in CSR (bench strength); low strength [of CSR group] in Washington, DC 
 HQ – lack of guidance [provided to Washington, DC] 
 Their ideas did not match Washington, DC 
 Reorganization of CSR [concurrently happening] 
 Internal challenges – difficult to push ideas 
 Had to get HQ focused to move ahead, [but] HQ did not know how to focus 
  
37 Current state: 
 Dutch companies - human rights 
 Typically 3 types of companies 
 CSR owned by CEO 
 department owns it – driving it – close to board  
 no one owns it 
 Human rights – little understanding – not coordinating – driven by issues 
 Other CSR issues – varies by groups and companies 
 Different groups deal with different issues 
 Not consistent – sustain and coordination 
 CSR not practical and expensive 
 Investigating claims of human rights abuse would be expensive  
  
38 Current state: 
 Inconsistency in framing and understanding 
 Issue and tactics vary 
 Lack of understanding and business case 
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 Impact on business (?); get granular quickly 
 Mandate clear, but no decision making power – resource must be coordinated (legal and business units) 
  
39 Current state: 
 [CSR issues are becoming] more cross-cutting  
 Three categories [of companies CSR consulting firm has observed] : 
 Some are very confused – under pressure to do something; lessen impact 
 Know what to do – good design – fail on execution; organizational issues come into play, right incentives for managers (needed and not there) 
 Combining design and execution in a reasonable way – how to organize? (need to overcome deficiencies with a good management 
system/org culture) 
 It is clear who is in charge, [but] Decision-making process is unclear or undetermined – Example: Leadership not taking on broad range issues 
(nice to have, not a must); put someone in role, but no budget to drive real change/action 
 Example: Company CSR Report – asked [consulting firm] to review and facilitate; individual content owners/managers raise profile of issues 
they are dealing with; bring in third parties to help elevate it [as most important]  
  
40 Current state: 
 Solutions are different – [created] inconsistency 
 Power is not equated with role – affects decision making 
 Sometimes know who is in charge of CSR; more often they are not in charge – [lots of] transitions 
  
41 Current state: 
 Some people had CSR in title 
 Outsider: person seems in charge – some stature, but limited usually 
 Authority really with the lawyers 
 General Counsel had CEO ears – legal risk is a “real problem” 
 US and non-US companies (more with US companies) 
 “singing different tune” 
 GA and lawyers – more pragmatic 
 Inconsistency!! 
 Range within government affairs reps 
 Challenge that needed to go away or behavior change 
 Government affairs “jaded” 
 Business unit had wide range of responses 
 Different frame: 
 Want problem to go away 
 Used to going to Hill – get it solved 
  
42 Activity: Country X social investment project 
 Current state:  
 Competing interests: Int’l public affairs – data collection, baseline information, establish priorities 
 Communications: focus on photo ops and ads 
 CSR falls in Communications group, which controls Foundation 
 No internal structure in place  
 Bid winning – why? 170M CSR plan over 20 years (8% of capital investment) 
 No planning, no risk assessment/management plan 
 Philanthropy – concern was “photo-op for CEO” – big political game 
 Tough to spend 8M per year 
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 Planning: creates expectations; more important than CSR – managing expectations  
 CSR led by communications team 
 Good SR process 
 Did consultation with locals 
 Equal benefits for ethnic groups 
 No long-term planning 
 Generating jobs 
 Risk – creates new poverty in local and surrounding areas 
 Create disparity through inequality  
 Int’l public affairs: political risk (social risk analysis) 
 Tangible and intangible risks 
 Needs by local politician 
 CSR project used as a showcase 
 Local manager – supposed to get alignment; not enough brain power on CSR risk 
  
43 Current state: 
 2000 revision of global CSR guidelines 
 Many internal CSR related groups – revision focused integration 
 No cohesive strategy  
 Existing structure and culture – large differences on managing CSR programs  
 Systems oriented versus decentralized - very difficult  
 Big struggle to how it is related 
 Who should do it 
 Philanthropy damaged CSR (resources) 
 Never wanted to be part of CSR 
 Corp strategy  = set up a group  
 Resistance by other groups who owned pieces 
 Team (task force) – CSR group not really finalized 
 Buy-in – none  
 Not clear on CSR ownership – earlier days 
 Who was the most interested 
 CSR department versus construct a team approach  
 Not coordinated – general pattern 
 Create a group and report – use [CSR] report to bring parts together 
 Start-up – “huge” [push] – get out there  
 Rationalization of what they were doing 
 Companies sat back after 5 years to assess what they were engaged in 
 Internal: CSR practice was not effective and no value 
 Oriented toward to external recognition  
 Loss opportunity – not embedded in systems 
 CR report: section of what division is doing and CSR group – need to justify 
 What it was doing; not integrated issue  
 CEO getting cornered – old days 
 New person coming in and using recognition of CEO to force things through internally 
 Resistance internally – did not want to get out in front 
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 Number of groups (Government affairs) – no consensus of creative discussion  
 Consensus by groups 
  
44 Current state: 
 Early stages – Public affairs side 
 CSR seen more to manage risk; not to add value 
 Shifted to CSR department – stakeholders outside government affairs 
 Back to public affairs and Corp communications – part of brand 
 Still varies: preventing risk to something of business value and broad 
 Engage with consumers – proactive shift  
 Kind of engagement – shift 
 Moved away from government affairs to activists  
 PR and advocacy front 
 Audience to consumer – differ per group and their stakeholders  
 Crosscutting across entire enterprise  
 New for internal group and external advisors – inconsistent understandings 
 Example: Operations – budget focus 
 Some have started to embrace – make sense for business 
 Competing priorities in companies 
 New for CSR, not new for companies 
 Always had conflict with marketing and operations  
 More processes with social and environmental issues  
 Not clear who was in charge 
 Ownership is shifted and many owners not a typical CSR officer 
 Everyone owns a piece of the budget 
 Cannot identify one specific group – vacuum  
  
45 Current state: 
 15 companies: Inconsistency – some had different approaches  
 Strategic CSR in some cases, but varied  
 Each company had a particular position on CSR 
 Visible differences between companies 
 Some companies it was very clear 
 Larger companies – clear who was in charge in some (different groups participated in association work) 
  
46 Current state: 
 Government affairs – Initiatives have a government component  
 Extractives: CSR started moving into government affairs 
 Consolidation into HQ 
 CSR relations group 
 Deal with CSR piece  
 CSR = power (given or diffused) 
 CSR needs desire  
 No change of hierarchal structure – want attention of CEO (have the access) 
 Take CSR issues for themselves that has reaction [human rights] 
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47 Current state: 
 1980 – 1991 period 
 Japanese MNCs in US 
 Not clear who owns CSR [because of Tokyo decision making] 
 Talk to major Japanese companies 
 Not clear – groups involved (CSR/XYZ executives) 
 CSR: Weak; just facilitators [in Japanese companies] 
 Not prepared 
 Not interested 
 Exposed to “all” issues, including impact or implications of decisions 
 “gate keepers” only 
 Tension between HQ and Field units 
 Protect career when he returns to HQ 
 CSR is fashionable  
 CSR group must do something 
  
48 Current state: 
 External trigger – long standing issue for the company 
 Tactical lead person to execute 
 Twice a week meetings 
 Need someone – but don’t know what they need 
 Consensus: fair amount of conflict 
 Policy (CSR related to issue) – competing agenda with government relations 
 Wins come from other issues, not CSR 
 Competing interests and different interpretation 
  
49 Current state: 
 Reaction to legacy issue and externalities on projects where company operates  
 Not proactive management 
 Risk management  and future liabilities  
 Operational policy commitment  
 CSR understood differently by different groups 
  
50 Current state: 
 Risk assessment: identification labor standards – weak 
 Another company in country x had a child labor incident 
 Criticized in Norwegian media 
 Trigger senior executives – are we prepared? 
 Memo of recommended actions 
 Executive leadership wanted an operational review 
 wanted review of the policy  
  
51 Current state: 
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 Defining CSR and what it means to an internal audience 
 Need to educate people internally 
 CSR means different things to different people 
 For community relations it was a big challenge 
 How they define it will be completely different from others  
 How to make pro bono service more strategic CSR 
 Value proposition: protection reputation, attract and retain talent, differentiate among peers, justify internal spend 
 Driven by change agent; not his boss 
 Comm relations team tasked with enhancing pro bono work – provide grants to support NGOs and NPOs 
 It was unstructured and not strategic 
 Client focused and partners used it for non-paying clients to win new contracts; not a CSR tool 
 “discount” use of pro bono resources 
 Each partner used its resources as needed – little consistency across the enterprise  
 Former CEO vision – eliminate “discount” use of pro bono resources  
 Word of mouth – CEO was visionary (he believed in it) 
 Incentive to get into annual report 
 Need to centralize pro bono work 
 There was limited resources per partners and now strategic focus would take away “consultants” for paid projects 
 Goals – expand pro bono work and make it international; make it strategic for the firm 
  
52 Current state:  
 Did not measure social risk 
 No clear narrative on managing social risk 
 Business unit versus HQ on how to manage social risk 
 Who framed it? No direction 
 Remove social – it was deliberate 
 Talk to another level; risk adverse people and Silvia (opportunity for group) 
 Greater engagement as a risk 
 law seen to own function – command and control 
 Limit information and engagement  
  
53 Current state: 
 Environment part only – annual general meeting resolution  
 Visible because of “Upstream lifeblood” 
 Access to protected areas 
 CEO – addressed concerns 
 Investor concerns – no process to access areas 
 Environment protection for new projects;  “applicable” projects are screened 
 What about social aspects? 
 Change agent came from project with human rights issues/experience 
 Wanted set of social requirements  
 Wrote social requirements in same format as Environment process – integrate the two 
 Resistance from US operations (government affairs, public affairs, Environment, business units… cost considerations); legal issues and 
compliance with US laws 
 Manager would like to expand her team  
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 Manager behavior: ambitious but in good way 
 Saw obvious logic of social practice 
 Opportunity to grow remit 
 Expand team and visibility 
 Contingency and non-substitution  
  
54 Large companies – very political internally  
 Clear on client 
 CSR – very little consistency 
 young field – how to standardize practices 
 varies company to company 
 Ownership is unclear – ultimate ownership 
 Difference in level at which there is ownership 
 mid level often 
 does not spend much time on it 
 sometimes CEO takes an interest – unusual 
 Wants us to be his resource – do not interact with anyone else 
 Senior person wants us to work with his team 
 Dynamics driven by crisis – current or past 
 Elevate level of engagement in CSR 
 Without crisis senior management may not be engaged 
 Goals vary – competing views and interests 
 Used as a change agent to sell issue 
 Trying to affect change within company – why firm is contacted 
 Always a group trying to drive an issue!!! 
 Butting heads everyday 
  
55 Current state:  
 Develop sustainable development issue management process 
 CR report: Culture – low engagement  
 All new people 
 Challenge: Public affairs value proposition to the business 
 Chemical group – lately about sustainable development 
 Corp CR report – using more sustainable development content 
 New generation of senior management 
 Future tension – socio-economic issues 
 No owners yet 
 HES feels ownership 
 HES powerful – focused only on health and environment  
 Socio-economic – attribute is limited 
 Demand driven by BUs; Who will take over? Competing interests; BU power 
  
56 Current state:  
 CSR – improve process of community grievance mechanism  
 188 
 
 Clear and transparent edict  
 Whistle blowing – hotline, ethics versus community response line 
 Law worked with CSR 
 Different opinions of issue and response  
 Law – do it in a “risk free” manner 
 CSR – be transparent; should responsible to respond 
 Environment – territorial 
 “ours to handle” 
 “no responses” 
 “not in writing” 
 Gap between Corp and business unit 
 No sustainability officer to join Env and Social 
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 Engagement 
 Collective involvement in the CSR issue 
  
1 Multiple groups involved: Philanthropy, CSR, and Int'l PA 
 Tactics: craft issues, co-opt informal groups, blocking CSR group from engaging, use risk language to sell issue 
  
2 Multiple groups involved: Security, CSR, consulting firm, Corp affairs, Sustainability, HSE, Law, Corp Governance  
 Recognize there are local problems that need a solution; resistence from local staff below GM  
 Tactics: sell expertise, sell risk, leverage base business knowledge, show similar problems solved (educate), target Operations manager 
"most important" 
  
3 Multiple actor involved: HR, HES, Law, PA, GA, Risk Assessment  
 Cross-functional working group formed  
 Tactics: Used crisis stories, use shock factor to influence thinking, case studies, peer competitor issue, use strong language or risk, show 
benefit of CSR, educate lots of people  
 Workshops – deliberate strategy, piloting workshops, use the language of the asset people to sell – risk, strategies, business process, 
get buy-in on strategies  
  
4 Multiple groups involved: Law, Law Enforcement, Policy, Communications, Int'l Groups, Senior Leasership, Software engineers  
 Cross-functional group created 
 Not aware of tactics: Business and human rights program has high visibility because of crisis 
 By cross-function and region – no decision making power; reports to general counsel and CEO 
  
5 Multiple groups involved: Law, Communications, Site Managers 
 Tactics: Internal advocacy group developed 
 Key players identified 
 Legal out 
 Must sell this – buy-in needed; “hardest part” 
 “make your lives easier”; “better performance” 
 Organizational capability – “tool to help you guys” 
 Territory: Environmental team – existing incident reporting system – incidents should be reported in their system 
 Low resistance: Gap was known, growing pains because of acquisition  
 Corporate was easy – people knew 
  
6 Multiple groups involved: CSR, HES, Upstream, Communications 
 Middle management absent 
 Tactics: Upstream has built alliance to resist – built HES ties and networks 
 Using relations to stop reorganization  
 Use external (credible) processes with HES 
 If not written down; much weaker 
 Effort to have it written – formalize it 
 Cannot take it out by Corp communications 
 HES leads processes; Corp communications does not 
 Lots of back room discussions on how to erect barriers 
 Communications – HES (conflict disrupts work) 
 Different understandings of what CSR means 
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 Corp communications – wanted to unify and manage agenda 
  
7 Multiple groups involved: CR, Security, Procurement, Law, Local Leadership 
 Tactics: Cross-functional meetings 
 Informal community of interest 
 CR and Security 
 Joint team was created – look at solution a different way 
 Procurement/CR: push on CR agenda: 
 Behind close doors discussions  
 “Change agents” – head of CR and Security 
 There were a number of agendas 
 Selling to leadership 
 document presentation on main improvements 
 Sustainable partnerships/growth of fields 
 Cash – cannot take away spend 
 Couch as change process and risk 
 Held private meetings of experts (everyone making money) 
 Held public meeting – locals – professional development; opportunity for community 
 “need a different way of selling” 
  
8 Multiple actors involved: Cross-functional Sustainability team – c-suite of company: 
 CEO 
 Chief Sustainability Officer 
 General Counsel 
 CFO 
 Manufacturing 
 Engineering 
 Business Units  
 Tactics:  
 Brought in external data to validate the issue  
 Lots of back door discussions / offline communications 
 Influence c-suite executives 
 Business risk – way to sell issue 
 Took existing policies and practices with international standards; tie to business strategy 
 Participate in more CSR public affairs 
 Educate senior leadership 
 Brought in white papers and existing practices 
 Educate us and build our understanding – give us direction 
  
9 Multiple groups involved: CSR, HES, Law, Int’l teams, Operations, business development, government affairs 
 Tactics:  
 Within groups there were peculiarities; “gentleman’s agreement – form a team and coordinate” 
 Over loading (laundry list); different interpretations of issues 
 CSR leadership committee – executive committee with members; have oversight 
 Lobbies members 
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 Focus on group interests 
 Issue crafting tailored to interests – the value for them 
 Business case driven – messages and couch problems in the business 
  
10 Multiple actors involved: E&P, Chairman, Law, GA, Business Units 
 Tactics: None 
  
11 Multiple actors involved:  
 External consultant was used (change agent) – experience in due diligence 
 Appoint FT person (internal change agent) 
 Support from each branch – project finance team has close relations with Tokyo  
 Tokyo head (most important) 
 Tokyo (supports EPs), NY (no involvement), London (against EPs) 
 Corp communications supported EPs 
 Tactics: 
 Conflict of interest – EPs should be separate from the deal 
 Resistance – credit division “already doing it”  
 Needed support at prep stage 
 Internal procedures – did not include them 
 Tactic – no response 
 Compromise – division head spoke with London 
 Loan agreement with EP report 
 Selling – used consultant 
 Used rise of EPs in global media and bank  
 Top persons of project finance – credit teams  
 Approve deals “have the power” 
 No process for CSR people; no veto power  
 Talk to deal makers 
  
12 Multiple actors involved: 
 Government relations and Security 
 “homeless policy” – CSR group took it 
 Tactics: 
 Operationalization by stealth 
 industry event in Calgary – training program  
 Competitor/peer company hammered in media – “catalyst”  
 Went to sensitive operating areas – open audience and had ear of country manager 
 Road show 
 Target senior executive 
 Build piece by piece the implementation  
 Legal and general counsel – sent out invitations 
 Operationalization = airtime for the group  
 The How: articulate outcome and what you get 
 Push back – resources, need of operationalization, realistic, costs-benefits 
 Engage early and often 
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 Detect opportunities  
 Seize opportunity – use other change agents to advance agenda 
  
13 Multiple actors involved: Cross-functional working group 
 Community relations  
 External advisors 
 Operations facility 
 Environment 
 Corp CE 
 Corp Tax 
 Legal 
 Tactics: 
 Buy-in needed for a fund 
 How – mine manager 
 Convince them that fund will be positive 
 Sell models of success 
 Case studies of other places of closures – exit strategy 
 Had other executives (external) talk about similar experiences 
 Orchestrated what would be said – control information flow and communication 
 Idea learned in meetings and part of process  
 Competing interests 
 Scope to narrow; wanted to expand it, not just “stop bleeding” 
 Example: Call it Economic Development fund – focus on economic development 
 Executives, their wives, face to face meetings with leadership team members 
 Consultant close to leadership and was targeted for lobbying; already bought in but asked him not to attend meetings – too much of an 
advocate 
 Reconcile: Make it broader, but focus language – community grant tied to economic opportunity  
  
14 Multiple actors involved:  
 CSR group under global Public Affairs 
 Lead by deputy general counsel (reporting to General Counsel)  
 Public Relations, Government sales, research 
 Tactics: 
 Sell to Leaders and other executive members – key decision makers (need buy-in) 
 Big company – “mind stream” 
 Country office needs to own it (need buy-in) 
 Spending time and resources 
 Internal selling to get alignment 
 Too different; undefined priorities – opportunism  
 Competing interests – dissatisfaction in decentralization:  
 Centralized company – executive focus and decision making 
 Deliberate effort to not tie software sales or business impact 
 Sales people out of the loop (some resistance) 
 Resistance by country office on implementation: 
 Not on concept, but on implementation  
 193 
 
 Needed education group not to object to it  
 Confusion: Business units created separate initiative – focus on developing countries 
 Corp-wide: 
 Internal organizations need a vote 
 Importance of leaders – must be convinced  
 Shopping around to get buy-in – leaders expected it 
 Head of CSR group was negotiating with other groups – gave comfort to leaders 
 Logical plan/frame = low resistance  
 Lots of messaging – not about their bottom-line 
  
15 Multiple actors involved: CEO, BoD, GC, CSR groups 
 CSR involves General counsel, CEO, Business development, Finance, Sourcing  
 Tactics:  
 Lobbying with board of director members; no surprises; communication – critical (lobbying) 
 Used business case/risk rationale 
 Seminars to talk about it 
 Write memos – risks and facts – reflected buy-in 
 Resources needed 
  
16 Multiple actors involved: 
 Internal stakeholder groups: Global Security, Communications, Legal, senior management (for project); external consultants brought in 
 Assemble a group of key people (Global Security led); Law and Public Affairs included 
  
 Tactics:  
 Program had “Big pot of money” [= influence for Communications/External Affairs] 
 Global Security focused on rule of law program; [but] did not do enough work internally to prioritize; not well thought out 
 Rule of law program strategy was to approach [influence] the regional development program manager (he reported to 
communications/external affairs director) 
 Early stage – early flagging of need for rule of law program during strategy formulation, but 
 “not interested”; [then] Trying to get rule of law program into regional development program was not successful: 
 [business case – rule of law issue] research stayed on shelf – no intervention 
 Proponents tried to be persuasive; tried to elevate the benefit of business case 
  
17 Multiple actors involved:  
 Corp affairs/Corp sustainability – Corp Communications and Corp relations 
 Environment/social risk management  
 Tactics: 
 Bankers – two teams of bankers competing to manage deals 
 Communications – keep groups out intentionally 
 Get support of organization at senior level – did not work 
 Business line – do not disclose information or do not allow enough time to get support 
 Day of deal launch – communicate to Risk Management  
 Bring people in early – co-opt them through a “drafting” 
 Risk management and Corp Sustainability formed an alliance 
 Corp Sustainability deliberate intent: 
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 Get buy-in from risk management 
 Access to Board  
 Get CEO pressure on business line 
 Issue “value” selling 
 Need to get beyond reputation risk (always need a reputation problem) 
 Co-opt business line to draft climate change statement 
 Bankers to work with Corp Communications when there is negative media 
 Protocol “charter” 
  
18 Multiple actors involved:  
 put cross-functional team together (global security, Law, Upstream) 
 responsible for the preferred alternative 
 Top down Corp policy making; make Corp aware of it 
 Issue management process: Each business line and service department is responsible for identifying issues 
 Issue – present to management committee (lobby with management committee first) 
 Sell case to Upstream (issue hits production access) 
 See CEO 
 Tactics: 
 Sell work product to business line 
 Resistance – prove around company 
 Seeing another policy and guidance to follow 
 Some get it, some don’t 
 Law – focus on meaning and content 
 Concern – policy in plans; customer are the guys in the field; “scars” from the field – explain issue and need 
 Took executives from field (took examples…) 
 Picked it carefully 
 Top management 
 Put team together; management/business line picked person 
 Concerns over litigation and risk 
 Know exposure and what to avoid 
 Drafting took a while 
 Overcame concerns 
 Each team supposed to address it 
 100% public affairs background – may not have flagged it 
  
19 Multiple actors involved: 
 EPs already done [no mobilization needed] 
 Tactics:  
 Air cover 
 CEO had a personal commitment 
 Politicking outside of formal decision making  
 Need people to be allies on the ground 
 O&G, mining – getting them on our sides 
 Set up by change agents 
 Develop relations with sectors 
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 Mid-level champs in regions 
 Senior credit officer – opposed authority for deals 
 Lobbying 
 Core - CEO sold value early on (CEO message) 
 How to get allies…depended on personality 
 Global training exercise – inserted officer to attend training  
 Critical to attend meetings – senior credit officer 
 Send signal across organization 
 Bankers – “this is about adding value” (not rejecting it) 
 Training – had examples, cases, major issues 
 Business case selling 
  
20 Multiple actors involvde: 
 Task force team to develop position 
 Communications, human resources, Law, government affairs, global security, sustainable development (housed in HES), business units, 
Environmental management somewhere else 
 Alignment (?) 
 Tactics: Information crafting 
 External groups 
 Reduce risk 
 Different lens 
 Felt strongly – SME leads 
 Self agenda 
 Pick words to meet internal concerns and address external issues 
 Approved process – play cards 
 Chain of command; do not approve right now 
 Culture – position or policy should be aspirational 
 Many tactics (expected): 
 Education sessions 
 Using company language 
 Snaking – did not do enough; merger – company did not figure out 
 Up and down and sideways 
 Company still learning 
 “not my problem; don’t want to interact”; deflect their role 
 Biggest challenge 
  
21 Multiple actors involved: 
 CSR group 
 Law (report to legal executive), Upstream, Global Security, Environment, Communications, CSR, third party consultant 
 Consultant: stakeholder map; travel to country to gather and analyze information; met with NGOs; met with communities  
 Agreement and decision making to proceed 
 Internally – CSR group had a strong seat at the table – no need for external SMEs; already a concern 
 Country xx – changed name to political and social risk 
 Required – stakeholder and political risk assessment 
 Work with legal teams – took information back to operations committee 
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 Non-States - disputed areas, conflict zones, ethical considerations 
 Business teams agreed 
 Some resistance  
 Used business case and information 
 Legacy of corporate issues 
 Constructive group – internal selling 
 Enablers versus stop signs 
 Post legacy issue – will CSR group still be relevant 
 sat down with key executives and had “heart to heart” 
 Each wanted group to be a strategic function and leverage learnings from Sudan as a Corp advantage 
 Executives had a “vision” – framed as being a competitive advantage for the company 
 CSR group had a seat at the table 
 Early engagement; not after deal was made 
 Match objectives of senior decision makers 
  
22 Multiple actors involved:  
 Strategy and policy department – independent because of politics (relations with CEO) 
 Geo-politics and strategy 
 Separate CSR team (communications and external relations) 
 Had a change agent 
 Senior people to connect with – Upstream and HES 
 Required people’s time; some jealousy by CSR group of change agent 
 Workshop with cross-section of personnel – where are we and need to be document 
 Group convened to develop document  
 End product was not clear – need better guidance 
 People wanted a document 
 Guidance – took away potential resistance; what people wanted 
 Part of management system – (competing issue) 
 Internal incident happened 
 Calculate that business and human rights debate is salient – get out sooner than later 
 Conversation of Operations – should this be a part of management system?  No, prevent safety issues [take away focus from it] 
 Tactics: 
 Use of information – based on conversations 
 High level of upfront engagement 
 Another change agent leading CEO case 
 Power – people did not like him 
 Tactic – upfront engagement  
 Another change agent had ear of external relations head 
 Non-threatening helped – reduced resistance  
 Hyper awareness of loss roles and behaviors – careful of not over-including  
 Power / collaboration outcome 
 Staff in business – shaped products 
 Engaged with peers and developed allies 
 Both groups and individuals worked on it 
 Find approval and buy-in from general counsel and chief of staff 
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 Done for external audience and timing 
 Collaboration process – part of culture!!  
 Network place 
 Air cover 
 CEO cover 
 HES, Upstream 
 Depended who was talked to  
  
23 Multiple groups involved:  
 Part of international government affairs 
 Link to Foundation 
 Link to CSR program in Geneva 
 Buy-in – HQ bought in on health issue 
 Foundation funded 
 Head of CSR reports to head of int’l government affairs 
 Foundation – issue not a priority – domestic focus 
 Corp communications and int’l communications push back on project ideas 
 Head of CSR is not heard; not aware; no clear direction/directive 
 Tension with HQ – don’t produce antibiotics 
 Low business case 
 Tactics:  
 Sell concepts (low tactical move) 
 Regional offices – not enough business connection to global project; low prevalence  
 doing CSR in your backyard 
 Global office – Corp affairs director; don’t get it 
 CSR – one program does not integrate it 
 No self serving interests to grab onto issue 
 Low strategic value (NGO piece) – focus on negative  
  
24 Multiple actors involved: 
 independent compliance + CSR 
 Fines and Control 
 Director/ED of companies (endorsement needed) 
 Ethics committee 
 Audit 
 Human resources: Needed to get their support 
 Early consultation to get input – early engagement 
 Endorsement – help them implement  
 Tactics: 
 Issue selling/crafting – tactics 
 What is their agenda? 
 Put project in their perspective 
 Part of something – support 
 Political problems 
 Indirectly – preventing project and agenda 
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 Organizational meetings between people 
 Key person is General Counsel 
 Prior ethic committee – big role in preventing policy internally; raising awareness of people 
 Security – engage the right persons 
 Deliberate tactic – nominated by GC 
 Particular reason – 30 years upstream experience (change agent) 
 He was go-between legal and others 
 Shaping mindset 
 Building case 
 Middle management 
 Challenge 
 Hamper their work 
 Overt and covert tactics 
 Fear of being unrealistic 
 Educate them – individual conversations 
 Crafting information to sell 
 Use different language – their own language they know – operational risk; individual risk  
 Content – discussed a lot 
 Support by general counsel benefited a lot 
 Support in early position and support 
 Legal family – coherent 
  
25 Multiple groups involved:  
 Corp communications or public affairs or government affairs 
 Always interfering with other groups 
 Educational component 
 Work with main contact – usually have a CSR focal point 
 HES 
 Foundation  
 Tactics: 
 Overcome institutional knowledge and non-confrontational approach; continued consensus building; snaking before meeting happens 
 CEO is agent of change 
 Protecting territory 
 Walking out of meetings 
 Not answering emails 
 Delegating to decision-making meetings – no person to decide 
 No pre-read 
 Based on individuals, culture, org structure, whether CEO champions it 
 Culture to meet desires of CEO 
 Hurt sustainability program – hurting CEO 
 Detrimental outcome – Corp foundation, NGO partner, stopped innovation 
 Slow process and causes problems – hurts brand [it’s hard to overcome?] 
 Convince them of the business case 
 Do it because it is the right thing to do 
 Pattern – why and how you do business… 
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26 Multiple actors involved: 
 More than one unit within CSR 
 Community and philanthropy 
 HES 
 Tactics: 
 Competing interests – winner gets airtime with CEO and resources  
 Political skills and articulated vision and corporate performance  
 Show materiality  
 Political skills – framing of issues, positioning internally, communicating 
 Positioning: New stories, external changes and crisis 
 Find internal champs and platforms 
 Strategy group 
 Standing committee 
 Articulate CSR is a political skill; relies on skill of individual; it does elevate profile 
 Political players – took CSR 
 Spearheaded 1-2 material issues 
 External advisor used to ramp up 
 Astute about key influencers  
 Navigate political spectrum 
 Internal champs and external champs 
 Beverage and energy companies – used external consultant as external agent of change 
 Important influence and power 
 Identify internal platform and events – symbolic or scale 
 Individual champs 
 Software – asked consultant to make case and bottom line 
 Influence and shape what to say 
 Most influential person is head of EU 
 Worked with him [group] to get it 
 Internal champ and external SME (trust building) 
 Gain business level credibility – identify by CSR group  
 Identify top level BU respected champ to move forward 
 Trusted but credible external voice 
 Key platforms – symbolic or scale 
 CSR group was politically savvy 
 Politicking and dynamics are critical 
 CEO vision  
 Change – political process and leader (go back to institutional structure) 
 Business system is same 
 CR is scattered 
 CR functions are empowered 
 Coherent message  
 Apparel company – wake up call (crisis) 
 Political skills: 
 CSR folks pushed issue down to business unit level 
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 Bring in academic rigor 
 Internal champs – build allies 
 External champs – academia and platforms 
 Super-focused and vision 
 Pick one or two things to be focused on  
 Advocacy committee established  
 Used competitive issue – diffuse territoriality and resistance  
 Legal, buyers and designers – incentive and make them champs  
 Needed buy-in and design on board 
 Used personal relationships, role modeling, and champs  
 c-suite dynamics 
 effort must be worth it 
 CR group must convince CEO 
 Need to raise to the strategic level 
 Without political skills; get killed 
 Energy company 
 Used external agents  
 Crisis trigger 
 Internal stories 
  
27 Multiple actors involved and tactics: 
 Sustainability team created (powerful) – VP level 
 Internal consulting group – embedded consultants 
 Change agents 
 Resentment against them 
 Government Affairs group 
 Need leadership 
 Culture chaos – not into it 
 Corp Affairs – wanted to “grab this” 
 Triggered creativity of Corp affairs – global MOU 
 Foundation 
 Response to requests 
 New director – wants to be known 
 Give its own position of power – inconsistent with HQ 
 Confrontational with Corp – strong director phased in 
 Competitive behavior  
 Cannot influence CEO on BoD?? 
 Internal consulting group – frame and get buy-in from CEO 
 Know buyers not on board 
 Compete against sustainability group 
 Loyal to business group when embedded 
 “Ethical group can’t tolerate politicization”   
 Ethical group presentation on partnerships 
 Corp officer – shot down in meetings 
 But… privately took it 
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 CEO vision – middle management pulled in different directions 
 Distrustful teams and territoriality  
 When went to Corp, more complicated and now a resource issue – politicized  
 Tactics: Put sustainability person in operations group 
 Barrier – textile group, global procurement group 
 Had to meet 6 VPs who represented hard business groups: textile, food, wholesale, procurement… 
 Year and a half delay on MoU 
 Selling sustainability (SVP) 
 Savings = business value 
 Buyers feel it is not part of the business 
 “hold out group” 
 Will continue to pursue lowest price  
  
28 Multiple groups involved: 
 Public affairs, operating companies, other Corp groups, Upstream, Downstream, HES 
 Tactics: 
 Corp PGPA internally (project leader leading from political sensitivity) 
 What gets communicated or not 
 Willing to take risks to push status quo 
 Interpretation of what would work or not 
 Political point of view and project management 
 Alternative – different (yes) 
 e.g. framework would set analysis with cross-functional team, use of external expert, low risk aversion – outcome may be more rigorous  
 political reasons – maintain pace of project; more ‘chefs’ = slow down  
 Negotiate with HES (environment) – environmental performance  
 Out of scope quickly (Offline conversation between senior executives) 
 CSR versus environmental performance  
 Political tactics used in a way that diminished opportunity (??) 
  
29 Multiple groups involved: 
 Typically dealt with Government Affairs, Public Policy, CSR 
 HQ versus Government Affairs 
 Apparel – head of CSR, sustainability and CSR 
 Retail – international policy person – not clear if they owned it 
 Agri-business – international policy person – not clear they owned it 
 Tactics: 
 Go to bat for companies – asked to say things in certain ways to challenge NGOs  
 Used government to move specific issues 
 Internet company quoted at meeting (deliberate); on blog – transparency – importance of issue; build business case; justify position 
  
30 Multiple groups involved: 
 HQ, Foundation, and Communications 
 Within Communications: 
 Disaster Response Committee 
 Tactics: 
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 Face-to-face meetings 
 Persuade the right way to go 
 benchmarking with other Japanese companies 
 Each company would do what they want to do 
 Brand push – own Haiti issue 
  
31 Multiple groups involved: 
 Human Resources, Sustainability, Secretary, HES 
 Executive committee (CEO) 
 Sustainability Department 
 Planning and reporting 
 Community investment  
 Working group: Sustainability, Community Investment, Upstream 
 CEO – gave different division challenging goals 
 objectives for my division (sustainability department) 
 Insert human rights into strategic plan (includes sustainability section) 
 Human resources and legal – formed verification of document  
 Human rights compliance assessment –Involved Corp and division functions 
 Work to analyze procedures and norms against human rights 
 Tactics: 
 More critical – middle manager 
 Subsidiary head: critical of need to implement any actions to improve systems of supplier; “his” system was best 
 Managers spread ideas about projects challenges… crafted information  
 Criticize report of third party 
 Organize meeting between third party and subsidiary middle manager – talk about gaps and improvements 
 Used data about gaps; real situations about risk 
 Ratings issue 
 Put together different evidence and case studies “on our side” – head of division and CEO (was the starting point) 
 Now was convinced issue was important – assessment in other countries; need to improve behaviors 
 Middle management now convinced  
 Used evidence to spread “voice” on issues – meetings with all high level managers in Upstream 
 Human rights is new – habit of making money or cost cutting 
 Commitment of high level managers needed 
  
32 Multiple groups involved: 
 CEO mandate: CSR (business and government affairs) – guidance only 
 BU ignored them 
 BU – CRO – Engineers  
 Newly formed group; social practitioners/engineers  
 Tactics: 
 Change agent: not many layers to go through 
 Tried to get to CEO 
 Memos and updates 
 Issue crafting 
 Made it personal (CEO) 
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 Memos and updates 
 Became a key desire to solve problems – cross business team (Corp and BU) 
 Became community of interest – realized issue needed to be resolved  
 CEO dictated what to implement 
 Power to dictate what to do 
 Need him to advocate 
 Business unit will be involved in the implementation  
 Worked with senior leadership 
 Build internal capacity at BU level 
  
33 Multiple groups involved: 
 CSR, public affairs, strategy, image management 
 Large IT company – many players 
 Public affairs, procurement, legal, CEO 
 Tactics: 
 Political behavior: “internal politics”, “internal stakeholders” – a challenge  
 Get third party to sell issue 
 Get buy-in or minimize friction  
 How to communicate is very political 
 CEO gets involved and they get interested  (personal connection; no challenge) 
 Use third party – compromised to say things that are not true 
 Political structure of organization changed; change from research to the need for internal buy-in  
 Talking more about “core business” to activate business unit support 
 Issue crafting  
 Tough to get them started 
 Substantiation  
 Subject matter expertise 
 External pressure makes a difference  
 Resistance to CSR – looking at development impact of business 
 Focus from business to development  
 Changes – business and development – resistance by BUs 
  
34 Multiple groups involved: 
 Head of CSR group 
 Separate group 
 CEO of companies around socio-political issues 
 Politics is 100% in all areas; not just CSR 
 Convince skeptics 
 [Shape] Agenda and arguments  
 Energy company: explain in a certain way to sell to executives 
 Bank Group head asked third party to present to the Board; third party validation (independent expert) 
 Asked to use certain language and content to sell 
  
35 Multiple groups involved: 
 Communications or public affairs – where the issue ended up 
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 HES function 
 Human Resources (moved out of their purview – more on philanthropy now) 
 Ethics office 
 CSR group 
 Decision-making – senior person from Corp public affairs group 
 Tactics: 
 Political tactics: Example – XYZ Company put CSR expectation into human rights policy; new language into existing policy: 
 Prevent [internal] resistance from happening; [brought in CSR consulting firm to] develop business case to sell internally  
 “Trojan horse” function: successful – example: human rights was on the radar screen; [secure] CEO ownership [and as] driver; [elevated] 
law suits; framed to a policy – couched in risk to make business case 
  
36 Multiple groups involved: 
 Assistant director of CSR 
 Int’l and Government Relations  
 multiple divisions involved  
 6 persons on plan at beginning 
 Tactics: 
 [Brought in NGO to] Position them as good corporate citizen [to Washington, DC policymakers]  
 No clear sense of direction – [HQ ]CSR director was needed; buy-in from HQ [needed]; they were in control 
 Politics did influence – few months later [HQ] CSR director said HQ would refocus CSR objectives – aligned with drugs sold 
 Internal process vexing assistant CSR director [Washington, DC office]; buy-in – “fight battle with home office first” 
 HQ came to meet NGO without assistant CSR director [Washington, DC] involvement 
  
37 Multiple groups involved: 
 CSR and sustainability groups 
 Public affairs 
 Compliance  
 Human resources  
 Legal departments – do not drive agenda  
 Tactics: 
 Politicking typical in Netherlands - informal dealings  
 Put forward objection to board and CSR department – memo written 
  
38 Multiple groups involved: 
 Public policy groups 
 More than one depending on issue/products 
 Human resources and law involved 
 Tactics: 
 Where they are coming from 
 Intervening – that group can’t do it 
 Share information – why?  
 Sway outcomes – happens out of self-interest  or personal agendas 
 Explain why prioritize and de-prioritize 
 What is an important project (?) 
 Shape an outcome above others (decentralized) –  
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 Business units and geographies – orchestrate communications – work through NGO – send messages back “never get heard" 
  
39 Multiple groups involved: 
 Traditionally CSR manager/director and VPs for Sustainability 
 [however] Overtime more integrated in the business  
 Increased interaction [between HQ CSR groups] with business unit [field] people and Procurement teams 
 Tactics:  
 Tactics can be explicitly or implicitly [known] to [CSR consulting firm]: 
 Direct Tactics: [CSR firm gets] call about [a] company’s needs; will say “we want you to come in and do a workshop and offer a point of 
view to influence someone” 
 Indirect Tactics: [an internal group will] Talk about lack of external alignment; territorial behavior – subtle ways – how to inform/infer 
(influence how communications is distributed); serve internal political [needs] 
 [Consulting firm asked to] Put [CSR issue] into business case language; address as “risk”, not “doing good”; [client’s internal groups 
says] “we don’t use this word here” 
 [CSR firm asked to conduct competitor CSR research because] “people like to research peer companies to sell case internally” 
  
40 Multiple groups involved: 
 Stakeholder Engagement – philanthropic lens 
 Legal – risk lens 
 Government Relations – regulatory lens 
 Key [internal] stakeholder [groups]: HQ, Security, Upstream, Law, Social Responsibility  
 Resource control = Upstream [influential stakeholder group] 
 Tactics: 
 Example: [firm was asked to do the following by client in order to get support for a human rights impact assessment process] 
 Describe risk and gaps 
 Create argument within company 
 Serve as “agent of change” 
 Use practical studies (sponsoring individual had no personal agenda) 
 Coached on what language to use; used a “risk” lens; CSR alone would not “sell” 
 Educated [client’s key internal stakeholders] through phone calls; used as “agent of change” 
 Brought in special lawyer to give different account and provide different strategy; elevate issue 
  
41 Multiple groups involved: 
 DC representatives: Government Affairs, lobbyists 
 HQ: CSR people 
 Tactics: 
 DC reps – one approach which is to have the “problem” go away 
 Policy professionals (CSR) understood challenges – speak “my” language 
 Had human rights background; non-business unit people – call and engage with government and NGOs 
 Different story: 
 government “Spin” – cocoa initiative + child labor issues (West Africa) 
 NGO activism and Congressional scrutiny  
 Three main companies in chocolate business involved 
 Dismissive of problem and government responsibility – not “our” problem 
 Spin – not a problem – not feasible (no expertise) – host government responsibility 
  
42 Multiple groups involved: 
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 Cross-functional working group 
 Communications 
 Foundation  advisors 
 Local teams 
 Local engineers 
 HES 
 Human Resources  
 International Public Affairs 
 Tactics: 
 Data collection – showed how other companies addressed similar issues 
 Long-term legacy issue 
 Delineate messaging to sell ideas – used risk lens 
 Must get buy-in of CEO!! 
 External cases of failures  
 Executive board needed to be convinced 
 Alliances – create new ones 
 Destroy alliances for communications – 300M per year 
 Power and influence 
 Communications: convening meetings without int’l public affairs 
 Lobby CEO his idea 
 Used country case as an example 
  
43 Multiple groups involved: 
 Effort to expand CSR organization – add staff 
 Under CEO – Corp communications versus policy being played out – resistance senior management; VP – close to philanthropy  
 Philanthropy put pressure to prevent budget 
 Constant question of the role of CSR and why resources needed 
 IT/Computer Company: multiple groups working the issue 
 Group created to do something and add value 
 Tactics:  
 Senior leadership had inconsistent views 
 Middle management tasked to construct it – competing interests  
 change agent used 
 Don’t grow CSR group – internally   
 Not based on strong advocates  
  
44 Multiple groups involved: 
 Operations/marketing/CSR/Communications  
 Tactics:  
 Political behavior – economic challenge 
 CSR used to have a free rein 
 Crunch on the budget 
 Pushing and shoving on responsibility  
 More important and cross-cutting  
 Posturing to be a leader 
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 Make case to be important  
 Opportunity for personal growth 
 Sold by individual workers to leadership – engineering company he has worked with  
 CSR is leaderless… put themselves forward\how to position it in marketing department (exclude important departments) 
 Operational level risk management 
 Individuals will take ideas to sell to team; participate in meetings and sell to leadership team and not inclusiveness of others – keep 
others in the dark 
 People driving CSR at different angles to be visible – leads to differences – see threats and opportunities  
  
45 Multiple groups involved: 
 Little consistency in types of people – broad differences – HES/Law/Security 
 Many worked in different departments  
 Tactics:  
 Use association to learn how to overcome barriers in the field 
 Low decision making capacity; influence how CSR was operationalized  
 One company: management decision making versus advisors  
 Mandate = more interest and participation internally 
 Top driver needed in some cases 
 Depended on priority placed by company 
 Implementation of CSR tool – based on personality 
 Tool: used under banner of a change; not driven by CSR people 
 Need others to support 
  
46 Multiple groups involved: 
 In-country: Security, Community relations, HES 
 Turf battle between CSR and GA (HES and Security) 
 General counsel versus other rising groups 
 Tactics:  
 Figure out who transacts with you 
 Lead to recognition of group power 
 Finance and general counsel goes after it 
 Need c-suite; back-up 
 Groups: want to show risk 
 Water down position papers – at board level 
 Risk based lens 
 Paper/idea changes completely 
 Risk sells – personal exposure  
 Co-option of general counsel or “snaking” 
 Internally need a change agent – put him/her in a position of power 
 Risk exposure of CSR 
 Temporary alliances around budget – alliance for resources  
 CSR standards: general counsel versus other groups 
 Security: Take out international standards language; take out CSR language  
 Embellish risk to sell case – issue crafting  
 Asked to make information sound “scarier” 
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 Brought in agent of change to sense-give and secure buy-in – reinforce through emails and other communications  
 Take out ideas “strip out” and get operations person to put in “ownership” to shape outcome 
 Buy-in: need reputation to be hurt to act; need it to be attacked  
 They get embarrassed – gives power 
 Sell risk – increase or decrease 
  
47 Multiple groups involved: 
 Need OK from Tokyo [on CSR decisions] 
 Inconsistency and sometimes dramatic 
 Frustrated US managers 
 Tactics: 
 CSR – will become more powerful; wanted group to be powerful for business 
 Persuade executives – buy-in to your idea 
 CSR group begging third party (give credit to CSR unit) 
 For third party – potential revenue stream 
  
48 Multiple groups involved: 
 Decision body is cross-functional  
 Group 1: VP/Law/GM-Policy/Media/government affairs  
 Group 2: Security/Investor relations /Media/Policy/External Relations (quality group) 
 Law 
 Media – competing agenda with government relations 
 government relations 
 competing agenda with Media and policy 
 Media – own idea 
 Tactics:  
 Provide information to support decision making 
 Tactical and strategic  - press release, community program 
 Sense-giving: work on VP on idea 
 Sensegiving and alliance building: Law and media thought out idea 
 Buy-in stage 
 Pre-work on  lawyers 
 Consultants are used – sell ideas and not in company’s best interest  
 Government relations: works directly VP – Lead Counsel (leave others out) 
 Policy: integrated opinions  
 Winning Group – access to full information 
 Decision making people and not advisors 
 Hid information from competitors 
 Information was manipulated by certain groups 
 Lots of advocacy  
 Keep on radar, not controversial – deliberate strategy  
 Internal communications 
 Selective information/alternatives added to agenda 
 Tactic of pre-work and back-room dealings 
 5-6 times before a meeting 
 209 
 
 Some things get negotiated away – end of decision making process 
 General recommendations: “Find me a justification to talk to co-leaders and decision making group” 
 Big Company 
 Single factor: b-case – make it happen 
 Change words – liability and costs 
 How you couch case 
 Horse trading happens 
 Need people who have…  
 an agenda 
 a business case 
 Snaking – Perspective from others and selling (dual purpose) 
  
49 Multiple groups involved: 
 Groups: cuts across functions 
 Defined to operations deliberate to be social function 
 Internal process is also cross-functional 
 HES/Law/PGPA 
 Legal understanding of social risk – we cause problems  
 Cross-functional team – diverse group 
 governance board was cross-functional  
 Tactics: 
 [felt] backroom dealings going on 
 Negotiate ownership  
 Horse trading taking place 
 CSR role; Law asserted themselves  
 Baseline information; right to retain documents 
 Environment participation – 5 lawyers – control information  
 Grand compromise to get new social process approved 
 Bilateral conversations outside team meetings 
 Influence key persons 
 Use external triggers to sell issue 
 Lobbying: focused vetting seniors or approvers – get buy-in 
 Competing interests – legal supported argument of exposure to problems; disregarded because they see value 
 Legal was “empire building” 
 Some influence over decision criteria by third parties 
 Law: Use slide deck 
 Issue crafting – risk; scare tactic (ATCA cases) 
 Raise uncertainty  
 Be worrisome  
 HES has a lot of power – custodian of management system 
 Lobbying HES to have this 
 Executive level lobbying   
 CSR/HES 
 Protect technical turf 
 Empirical data used against legal challenge  
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50 Multiple groups involved: 
 CSR Group – not strong, risks high and strengths low 
 Other groups – prepare memo with HES (big), human resources, Law, Procurement 
 Consistency in message 
 Leveraged Business Unit contacts 
 Set up task force – cross functional  
 Headed by CSR 
 Procurement/Int’l CSR/human resources (there was a practical decision not to front-end Legal) 
 Steering Committee:  
 Communications/procurement/HES 
 Cross-functional teams was the internal buy-in for executive leadership 
 Tactics:  
 Tactical consideration to elevate the CSR group 
 Labor issue was not regulated – CSR used to take the lead (foothold) 
 CSR is dangerous… engenders opportunities  
 Expected human resources would be negative 
 Should be owners 
 Early on they had no interest to regulate 
 Law had questions 
 Material issue and they are on board 
 VP/Law became an ally 
 Strong legal department in all business areas 
 Realized strong and important and set up meeting – internal discussions 
 Task Force: Each had specific motivations and objectives – difficult 
 Procurement: Define and set up strategy that would [help] his unit 
 HES: Wanted to require HES work 
 Internal turf: how you define and form policy; legal become helpful 
 Resistance: long discussions; lots of negotiation and direct quarrels 
 Side negotiations among task force members 
 Public Affairs: Influence CSR’s boss 
 Executive leadership consulted with middle managers 
 Executive committee, steering committee, and Task Force (Need Consensus) 
 Hierarchy – task force members were managers 
 CSR manage had more contact with executive leadership 
 Task force members did try to influence CSR manager thinking 
 Strategy: rollout of labor standards – road show with EVP of all business areas 
 Lead ALL presentations 
 EVP well-briefed before executive leadership decisions (lobbying) 
 Use minutes of meetings of executive leadership meetings – CEO recommends adopting international standards 
  
51 Multiple groups involved: 
 Partners already doing pro bono work 
 Partners formed alliance to support issues and not support it 
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 Tactics: 
 Some partners on senior LT 
 Need their buy-in and support 
 Need support of partner(s) – controlled resources 
 LT did not see strategic dimension – saw it as a program 
 Comm relations formed alliance with some partners and leadership team members – fragmented (?) 
 There was already buy-in for the existing program 
 Buy-in for existing program: Expand and make it international  
 Bring in human resources to build case 
 Did not have to fight for pro bono dollars 
 Get training and support 
 Lack of leader 
 Internal champ – difficult to gain support by senior leadership about a ‘local boss’ 
 Program not strategic – performance appraisal of employees [option]  
 Change agent framing – human resources on board (performance  
  
52 Multiple groups involved: 
 CSR, Policy, Law, LT 
 Tactics:  
 Support and buy-in – gather data through meetings 
 Put result in writing and meet with credible organizations 
 Fell to certain executives – growing awareness of social risk 
 No country strategy or story 
 Used relations with Law 
 Resistance to overcome 
 Used country experiences (Law) 
 Selling idea to executives after Law got on board 
 No embellishment – cannot take risk too far; direct quotes were used 
 Manipulate messages – risk lens; only company not doing this 
 CSR group: No informal alliance to raise the issue 
 Recognition by executive to have social risk – external trend in human rights  
 NGOs and SRIs and legal cases 
 Follow same process to sell issue 
 Used legal cases to sell CSR policy 
 CSR group focused more internal lobbying with Law 
 Met extensively  
 How to handle it 
 Law did not want CSR group to manage CSR 
 Reconcile: Went above them to general counsel  
 Law tried to control it 
 Managing Counsel: reporting information to general counsel was not accurate 
 Diffusion of  power was deliberate  
 Wanted a piece of it – high profile issue 
 She was political 
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 Tried to control CSR report – go above her; trying to shape policy 
 Use of external consultants – sell agenda – get executives to see person as a “normal” person 
 Orchestrated what to say 
 Lobbying:  
 Empower executive champion 
 Overcome resistance on scope and intent 
 Vice chairman and general counsel most important 
  
53 Multiple groups involved: 
 CSR team, external affairs, Environment operations  
 Integration between CSR team and Environment operations 
 Environment operations – serve business with advice on Environment topics 
 Tactics:  
 Changed name of team to reflect social opportunity 
 Talked with colleagues – crafted dialogue in a certain way 
 Example: who is involved; senior people; politics about it; roles and personalities 
 Buy-in – no opposition 
 Reasons: consulted major projects 
 Senior people in Upstream were aware of it 
 Environment and social assessments being done in integrated way 
 Completely new management system – internal roles contained – included social risks 
 Upfront work – constituency of practitioners  
 Met with senior management and interject social component – sell issue 
 Push manager forward as subject matter expert 
 Resistance 
 Internal and presented as a “large document” 
 “Shall” statements 
 External resistance from US  
 Upstream – will not endorse so many commandments  
 Manager did a lot of face to face meetings 
 Difficult messages were not being given 
 Prevent filter – made sure senior management heard messages 
 Re-do the practice document 
 Strip out non essential items 
 Operational management system – too much shall or you should 
 Match up topics tied to management system 
 Get acceptance 
 Get comparison to demonstrate practice  
  
54 Multiple groups involved: 
 multiple responsibilities 
 started to work with other groups; work with more senior people 
 Tactics: 
 Look for information to produce an outcome 
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 Demonstrate cause and effect – open doors and reverse resistance 
 Trying to let alternative (PR) fail to make case to go to CSR approach 
 Brought into process – can be good 
 Felt threatened – backfired 
 person brought in beholden to someone who was a rival to person who owned CSR process 
 no strategy in advance 
 felt he had to go to battle for his guy 
 over years it resolved itself – power struggle CSR war 
 Outside groups (third sector) 
 Picks off leadership of companies 
 Puts CSR in a particular position 
 Take cues of NGOs is dangerous – colors internal politics 
 Bolstering group: 
 Selling information to internal stakeholders 
 Issue crafting – best sense of what will sell 
 Follow lead of client to frame and communicate 
  
55 Multiple groups involved: 
 HES, E&P, IR, PA, Chemicals (low understanding), Upstream, Corp 
 
 Tactics: 
 Find allies – senior VPs  
 
 Champion drove it 
 
  
56 Multiple groups involved: 
 Corp and BU 
 CSR/Environment/Business Units 
 Plant managers, law, security, Environment, and human resources 
 Tactics:  
 Mobilization – demonstrate to plant manager why important  
 Best practice at facilities; at other facilities it works  
 Plant manager was most important to influence 
 Don’t put individuals in the “hot plate” 
 Environment still resistant – control process 
 US is a litigious society, protectionist perspective  
 Hiding information 
 Half responses, no complete “pictures” of situation 
 CSR: How it would help them? Highlight “risks” 
 Individuals – email responses created legal and reputation risk because no process 
 Prove risk – use problem in past to sell point  
 More cooperation after implemented 
 Why?  
 CSR was not a risk – doing good work 
 Environment: territorial – still want control and ongoing… 
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 Decision 
 Process to generate alternatives/preferred alternative 
  
1 Decision: No integration, continue event drive engagement with external NGOs  
 Outcome: Not good for company; good for Philanthropy group - in charge of CSR, resources, contingency, defined programs and 
direction  
 Evaluation: No political support for integration, political structure/tactics influenced outcome  
  
2 Decision: Developed CSR strategy  
 Outcome: Good for company; good for CSR group - more visbility and more remit  
 Evaluation: Political tactics influenced outcome 
  
3 Decision: Use social risk assessment process  
 Outcome: Good for company; good for CSR group - increased visibility, more peronnel, expanded terrority in procurement and 
downstream, more accepted internally 
 Evaluation: Without CEO leading – fallen and failed, political tactics affected the outcome 
  
4 Decision: Have a business and human rights program 
 Outcome: Good for company; good for group - lots of visibility, but has not expanded territory 
 Evaluation: Business and human rights was a new field between groups 
 Political tactics not a factor; or at least not aware of it 
  “Dramatic way – given how it was based, there was a fair amount of consensus” 
 “mach 2 – general agreement”, “Alignment”, Shielded by general counsel   
  
5 Decision: Have a consistent grievance mechanism at site locations  
 Outcome: Good for company - site support – more awareness and buy-in and can communicate wth external stakholders; good for 
group - more visibility  
 Evaluation: Political tactics was part of the negotiation  
  
6 Decision: No CSR strategy 
 Outcome: Good for company (leadership aware); good for Communications - more power and influence  
 Evaluation: Political tactics influenced the outcome 
 Change can bring opportunities 
 Conflict can be positive 
 CEO will be the referee, but will stand up for Communications  
 Person dependent – new EVP communications will challenge it  
  
7 Decision: Shift to community relations program 
 Outcome: Good for company; good for CR - power to influence outcome, more visibility and leadership, company leadership 
support 
 Evaluation: Political structure/tactics influenced the outcome 
 CR wanted to elevate its position - champion CR approach 
 Personal agendas will continue  
  
8 Decision: Corp Citizenship role more integrated into business 
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 Outcome: Good for company; good for gorup - more visibility with executives; viewed differently internally 
 Evaluation: Political tactics shaped the outcome; CSR is a negotiated process 
 Education, prioritization, negotiation 
 Negotiate for something better (trade-off) 
 Prioritize – build into internal process; secure resources and readiness  
  
9 Decision: Led to mandate to have social responsibility framework 
 Outcome: Good for company; good for CSR group, GA 
 Evaluation: Political tactics shaped outcome; CSR is a negotiated process (started as a negotiated process) 
 Influence tactics for good 
  
10 Decision: Launched education program 
 Outcome:  Good for company; good for group - CSR group profile elevated; Influenced community investment – good business role 
(group seen as value to business) 
 Evaluation: Political tactics did not influence the outcome; CSR may not have been a negotiated process in this case 
 “nature of the company” 
 “small” 
 “CEO authority is clear – no political dynamics” 
  
 Evaluation: 
 Because change of leadership 
 Willingness to kill stakeholder goals 
 In-fighting  
 Encouraged local behaviors; included and condoned 
 Another CEO change 
 HIV/AIDS background 
 Gained attention of CEO/chairman 
 “need to play in the sandbox” – external stakeholders  
  
11 Decision: Implement the Eps 
 Outcome: Good for company; good for Sustainability group - assigned to implement  
 Consultation and negotiation 
 Project finance deal 
 Evaluation: Political tactics did not shape the outcome; CSR is a negotiated process 
 Need to orchestrate and accept 
 External consultant was used  
 Need to know all project finance people; all key persons of all branches 
  
12 Decision: Adopted policy 
 Outcome: good for company 
 Human rights in country risk assessment 
 Annual sustainability report and updates 
 Management training  
 Evaluation: Agree and Disagree: CSR is not a negotiated process; not negotiated about the policy; No comment on political 
behavior shaping outcome 
 Agree: CEO is a visible champion, VP visible and General Counsel visible 
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  [good] economy is necessary first 
  
13 Decision: Established community development fund 
 Outcome: Fund was good for company and community – community development 
 New process to manage stakeholder expectations 
 Evaluation: Political tactics shaped the outcome; CSR is a negotiated process 
 Artificial barriers created by managers 
 Mining – Culture was already decentralized 
 Separate coalitions 
 Open sensemaking – by managers always part of higher level decision making 
 Real CSR crosscuts some groups – need buy-in from diverse/affiliated groups 
 Alternate experience: 
 CR project – leadership rejected it due to low lobbying 
  
14 Decision: Adopted vision 
 Outcome: Winners: Good for company and group - Put CSR group on map and visibility 
 CSR shop had greater responsibility  
 To outsiders – CSR image tied to IP concerns only – must overcome this image 
 Program helped to overcome reputation to outsiders and insiders 
 Evaluation: No comment on whether political tactics shaped outcome; CSR is a negotiated process  
 Dissatisfaction with decentralized approach 
 Centralized culture 
 Wanted consistent message and program 
 Linked with key b-objective and fit structure 
 Good alignment prevented excessive political behavior: 
 Corp CSR aligned with what the BU are trying to do 
 Culture supported for this – beyond sales 
 Leaders of company very hands-on – MOST IMPORTANT 
  
15 Outcome: 
 Pushed other groups to focus on CSR 
 CSR meetings with different business groups 
 Lead to cross-function 
 Evaluation: 
 Big failures in MNCs 
 Communicate internally with themselves and not with other key departments  
 Future trends – CSR cannot be responsibility of CSR guys; groups are responsible for CSR 
  
16 Decision: No Rule of Law Program was developed 
 Outcome: Not good for company; not good for group 
 [Global Security] Decided to back off – quick halt 
 Regional development manager, communication and community affairs teams pushed back – NO 
 It was a missed opportunity for the company; Global security lost out 
 Evaluation: CSR is a negotiated process 
 [rule of law issue] Too difficult and politically sensitive: 
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 Global security did not make it a major issue 
 Sequencing issue and ownership issue (1-Govt Affairs, 2-Upstream, 3-Communications/External Affairs) – Global Security operates 
separately  
 [rule of law program became] risk migration [option] with other risk assessments; when risk assessment grew, it became an ownership issue  
 Global security should have made a more aggressive move to “champion” the rule of law program: 
 Getting a partner on board – [but was] difficult 
 Implementation [of program] – [would be] difficult  
 Flipside: “Rule of law in the focus country is really bad and worsening” – may not be good for company (mixed)  
  
17 Decision: Strategy pushed through 
 Outcome: 
 Good for company and board 
 Unequal benefits – risk management elevated 
 Political tactics shaped the outcome 
 Bankers’ investment made a difference 
 Job preservation 
 Evaluation: CSR is a negotiated process 
 Need to get beyond reputation risk (always need a reputation problem) 
  
18 Decision: Integrated VPs 
 Outcome: Good for company; Not good for social responsibility - out of the picture for implementation  
 Evaluation: Political tactics did not shape outcome 
 Political process – issue getting flagged (yes) 
 Tactics shaped the outcome for human rights 
 use people who can explain and get support 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
  
19 Decision: Integtrated EPs into business  
 Outcome: Good for compony; New group – embedded in credit and risk management 
 Lots of mileage; better than IFC   
 Evaluation: Political tactics - Negotiating internally can be very political 
 Middle of the road is tough 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 big complex organization 
 lots of convincing 
  
20 Decision: Did not adopt policy 
 Outcome: Good for company - starting place; Everyone ok with “nothing” 
 Sustainable development left out 
 Not strong; functionally lost out 
 Evaluation: Political tactics shaped the outcome 
 Position – more palatable; allow to move forward 
 Grid lock 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
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21 Decision: Conduct social due diligence  
 Outcome: Good for company; good for CSR group - became front and center 
 Evaluation: Political tactics shaped the outcome 
 Senior people conversations 
 Politicking in a good sense 
  
22 Decision: Deployed human rights guidance  
 Outcome: Good for the company, but not if policy [instead of guidance]; Change agent reputation elevated internally 
 Evaluation:  CSR is a negotiated process 
 Political behavior shaped outcome 
 Consensus building 
 May not have happened; no product at all 
  
23 Decision:  No CSR integration 
 Outcome: Not good for Government affairs group 
 Evaluation: Political behavior shaped the outcome 
 Top leadership – no air cover (linked to low business case) 
 Own budget – target a local area only 
 Legal – practices of CSR; threats of accusation of selling drugs 
 Finance – utility of resource 
 No one was interested in federal and domestic affairs 
  
24 Decision: Adopted anti-corruption policy 
 Outcome: Good for company as a whole; good for Legal department - new assignment for the group – anti-corruption contained 
within the group 
 Visibility – legal team expanded; issue has matured and people agree 
 Evaluation: Political behavior shaped outcome  
 Visible general counsel influence 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 Change agent 
 Without senior influence – no outcome 
  
25 Outcome: 
 Good for company and group 
 More information sharing 
 Breaking down silos 
 Evaluation: 
 Business strategy is influenced by politics 
 CSR – gets in their territory 
 Ambiguity is an incentive for political behavior  
 Personal agendas 
 Immature organizations 
 Reducing a center of power 
 Money moved in 
 Status elevated 
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 CEO recognition 
 Result – in-fighting would go on 
 Become part of it or power shift 
 Money taken from one group’s budget 
 New initiative – had to use it to have success 
 Stealth way 
  
26 Outcome: 
 Beverage company: Nothing has changed – political process and buy-in need to change, not structure 
 Good for group 
 Elevated group and individuals 
 Ear of CEO 
 Part of external platforms 
 Good for company 
 More strategic and consistent 
 Improve credibility –  
 Bottom-line improved (??) 
 More respected – performance can make company better; non-financial performance 
 Evaluation:  
 Internal tactics were necessary or critical to the success of the organization’s CSR 
 Political skills more important than “rational” arguments and behavior 
 CSR at strategic level – political skill and ambition determine competition between groups; CEO becomes referee or process is applied  
 Communications and competing interests  are political when CSR is put in a strategic position 
 Tactics to position it 
 Politics and personality that lead CSR group and CEO 
 Political process is about embedding and incentives  
  
 Outcome:  
27 Good for company – more global and less insular 
 Good for some groups, not buyers (yet); may be antithetical to culture and people’s value 
 Corp affairs has grown in last nine months – could be a problem 
 External image versus price 
 Evaluation:  
 Politicization and broadening of CSR 
 Buy-in not received 
 Politicking and competing interests is not good “now” 
 Spread is good – also subsumed by HQ 
  
28 Outcome: 
 Good for company and group 
 Gave purpose to group 
 Leadership for Corp 
 Strategic activity into focus – efficient  
 Better morale for employees 
 Some groups win; others lose; 
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 trying to lobby to get his people involved  
 Legal versus public affairs on human rights  
 Stakeholder engagement –tension between process owners and users 
 Technical group – feel they are experts; collateral started; strong point of view 
 Technical group less/no power to claim process ownership 
 Another group has influence with project leader 
 Contact and visibility with executives 
 Evaluation:  
 Success – big company 
 Given – not harmful; would be part of org fabric 
 Politics/tactics secured project – we have a political culture 
 Better than not being anything 
 Toxic at times – not collaborative; tension was not creative, but conflictive 
 Get in the way of some innovation that org may have been ready for 
 Political behavior – decentralization 
  
29 Outcome: 
 Good for both 
 Good for individual and company – one person dedicated to business and human rights 
 Evaluation:  
 Voluntary Principles – functional people could have had a different outcome 
 Internal tactic necessary 
 Self serving behavior – Keep CSR centralized and maintain importance; it is hard for CSR… should be decentralized to be good for company 
  
30 Decision: Implement relief program 
 Outcome: good for company 
 Communications – brought group together 
 Brand – more visibility 
 Regional HQ is better and strategic – evolution 
 Evaluation:  
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 In this one drastic case 
 Political tactics – different culture; politics different – aware of this going on 
  
31 Decision: Issued guidlelines 
 Outcome: 
 The outcome was good for sustainability department  - more engaged and visibility 
 Evaluation: 
 Starting point – challenge – reaction could have been negative 
 Now – results are good – one assessment to ensure external influence  
 Management is happy – external engagement 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 Flipside: Could have prevented more activity in Corp 
 Afraid of their reactions – objective of analysis  
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32 Decision: 
 Resettlement policy approved 
 Social and economic activity and management system 
 Guidance to most of policy 
 Guidance to implement policy 
 Management system – measure implementation  
 Outcome: Good for both; good for CSR group - elevated  
 Head of a business group lost out 
 CSR involvement in resettlement action plans; signed off by CSR group 
 Brought in key skills and tools 
 Audit team (CSR group involved) 
 Evaluation:  
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 Crisis helped the negotiation process 
 Highlight gap in system 
 Expertise used more broadly 
 CSR is not job of Corp, but contributing to cause 
 Negotiation will continue as society changes 
 Hierarchy politics 
 Business unit autonomy – if different behavior, would not have delayed uptake 
 Enlightened manager at Business unit – easy to engage him/her earlier 
 Can be very territorial 
 Structure enables some groups to have much independence; controls his own “CSR” 
 Opinion: without crisis, no space for CSR group to embed requirements  
 Senior leadership felt uncomfortable 
 Got people’s attention 
 Small group – little overlap 
 Small company 
 Large energy company quite different – high Corp center 
 Flavor of the month – more territorial behavior 
 Roles and representatives in small companies are very clear 
 Much easier to get something done 
  
33 Outcome: 
 Raise issue = outcomes/tangible/good outcome 
 Evaluation: 
 Outreach by credible individuals 
 Study/external validation  
 CEO talk about it 
 Community of interest  
 What are the incentives for different groups? 
  
34 Outcome: Good for both 
 Evaluation: 
 Margins to center for CSR group 
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 At mercy of larger forces of institution  
 Believes there is a decision maker, but not in a group 
 Influenced outcome  
 may have succeeded, but third party provided higher probability of success 
 Political tactics critical – failure without it 
 Part of change management 
 Must make case for recommendation 
 Justify cost and benefits  - must understand politics of organization 
 Bring from margins to core business 
  
35 Outcome:  
 Good for both 
 Third party expertise – helped drive agenda of group 
 Build credibility 
 Public Affairs/CSR group 
 Seen as previously providing support; now shifted power dynamics – own CSR 
 Evaluation: 
 [Political tactics] Necessary and critical 
 Understanding of what [CSR] is and expectations engendered [internal] political behavior 
 Can be used to prevent resistance 
  
36 Outcome: 
 Conference – initiated by NGO and Washington, DC office of company; sought brand in the space of CSR 
 Not good for Washington, DC CSR group 
 Evaluation: 
 Washington, DC office wanted to “do something” 
 HQ came to Washington, DC to assess CSR issue; source of disconnection between Washington, DC office and HQ 
 Internal reorganization occurring at same time 
  
37 Outcome: 
 CSR department lost – did not influence board 
 Bank lost out – not the best CSR bank 
 Evaluation:  
 Territorial behaviors were necessary to influence  
 Lack of clarity, too ambitious  
 Compliance department  (bank) – CSR, compliance, operations  
 Compliance – territorial                                         
 Operations – practical  
 A step back for the bank – CSR department 
 Most were ad hoc; incentive model – positioning  
 More buy-in from groups 
 Now – conflict between groups is healthy  - got others to agenda 
  
38 Outcome: 
 Winners and losers  
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 Resources being pooled 
 Good for company as a whole  
 bias set of recommendations  
 Helpful to inform decision making 
 Evaluation: 
 Politics influenced decision making and execution  
 Expansion of territory = make it strategic 
 More touch points in firm 
 Gain momentum – articulate business case 
 Resources and visibility 
 Material impact on recommendation and action of senior management 
 Outcome can resolve problems 
 Did shape outcome, but not necessarily for groups 
 Self interest lead to good outcome – raised issues of neglect and marginalization 
 CSR is a unifier – want to be part of it 
 Organizational behavior problem 
 Better chance for CSR outcome to being appropriate and operationalized 
  
39 Outcome: Good for company and good for group 
 [Internal] Groups involved benefited 
 Interest [in CSR issues] by Corp Communications externally – this is a positive outcome 
 Evaluation: 
 Political behavior did shape [CSR] outcome 
 Good ones [political tactics]: Use good person or senior executive – “champion” [CSR] issues; raise awareness [through] deliberate actions 
(i.e. workshop) 
 Competitive behavior for CSR is good 
 [CSR] Promotes creation of some [personal] agendas – wrong process, low experience, or trying to climb latter (organization loses on 
development of CSR capacity/ skills) 
 [Self] Interest should be to improve practice   
  
40 Outcome:  
 Outcome – [having human rights impact assessment process] was good for company 
 Evaluation: 
 [political] Tactics were necessary – brought together [disparate] internal groups to “see” issue 
  
41 Outcome:  
 Outcome shaped by political tactic 
 Company went on one direction of a group 
 Some won and some [won differently] 
 Evaluation:  
 CSR group more visible: downturn of economy has reduced some groups 
  
42 Decision: Implemented social investment project 
 Outcome: Good for company; good for communications group 
 Changed culture 
 Now: negotiate with government; ask government for advice  
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 Lost relations with communications  
 Evaluation:  
 Political tactics shaped outcome 
 Communications strategy would have one 
 But, eventually CEO would question flaws 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 Need Communications because of resources 
 Also – lack of intelligent people/knowledge on the team 
  
43 Outcome: Good for CSR group 
 Group and activity got added to him – his organization grew and more visibility 
 Sees effectiveness  
 Can depend on personalities 
 Evaluation: 
 Politics has impact  
 What management will take on 
 Loss opportunity – not embedded in systems 
 Philanthropy damaged CSR (resources) 
 Territorial: manifestation of their business model – Pharmaceutical company (missing opportunity) 
 Carried over to in other parts of the company 
  
44 Outcome:  
 Good for company to use these tactics 
 Good for company – push because one believes; push because of politics  
 Not good for groups 
 Evaluation:  
 self-interested behavior is positive – spurs innovation and attention 
 CSR efforts are disjointed – leadership team sees this because of politicking  
 Political behavior does influence CSR behavior  
 Tactics are necessary and critical to successful alignment and integration  
 Always had conflict with marketing and operations  
 Align and integration increasingly important  
 Individuals [change agents] better than group to drive change  
  
45 Outcome:  
 NA 
 Evaluation: 
 Downsize and CSR people first to go 
 How firm was structured influences level of tactics 
 Smaller companies – easier 
  
46 Outcome:  
 Win-win for company and group 
 Executives bought in 
 CSR unit given power [to work an issue] 
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 Evaluation: 
 Too much CSR focus – they lose legitimacy  
 Downside of sensegiving CSR 
 Does not allow company to learn CSR – low innovation internally  
 Internal tactics are necessary 
 Bad/bad scenario 
 Diffusion: divide CSR into small pieces; deliberate strategy 
 Group no longer exists 
 Company cannot institutionalize because fear of power structure – not good for the company  
 Low skills to manage it where difficult  
 Without politicking and influencing will go with foundation model – follow the past; a pet idea 
 Country office can easily undermine project alternative – simple call to CEO “you don’t know Panama”  
  
47 Outcome:  
 Good for group; not good for companies 
 Elevate CSR group; trend to continue 
 Evaluation: 
 Use agency – good for agency business  
  
48 Outcome:  
 Losers: no data donation; media activity lost (no results); policy lost (low support) 
 Factors: little resistance because it met legal strategy  
 Losers = community plan and team 
 External issues: Good for government affairs 
 What is good for CSR group (has something to talk about; show value) 
 Environment: Not good for the group (HES), but good for company 
 Evaluation:  
 Most influential is Law  
 dependent on personal relationships 
 Set up for failure (CE project) 
 External CSR issues are a negotiated process 
 Even with a process in place, items are negotiated away 
  
49 Decision: Company had a risk management process for new projects 
 Outcome: Good for both; CSR elevated profile  
 Evaluation: 
 If tactics were not used, move company to be further decentralized  
 CSR is a negotiated process and there is always politics/politicking  
 Individual motivations vary to do both (good for me and good for company) 
50 Decision: Implemented labor standards 
 10 projects identified for risk assessment 
 Outcome: Good for company and for CSR group 
 Evaluation: 
 Politics shaped outcome 
 CSR group gained – “owned” policy and issue (supply chain agenda) 
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 “Own Policy” – CSR group 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 Most important person is CEO 
 Asked for internal discussion 
 Always pushing others to do it 
 Some stakeholders in task force jockeyed for position to own issue 
  
51 Decision: No strategy 
 Outcome: Not good for company or group 
 Some partners lost – lost internal resources 
 Push back when money taken away – disconnected by commercial sales 
 Missed opportunities to help NGOs on social issues  
 Evaluation:  
 Use of information: Did not do enough upfront work and promotion  
 Need a political strategy; Team did try to influence  
 Industry benchmarking 
 Tap into members of organizations 
 External engagement of peers 
 Get a different director – no framing in risk 
 Community relations director – did not champion; strategic frame rejected 
  
52 Decision: Executive decision to focus on social issues (human rights policy) 
 Outcome: Good for company; good for CSR group - opportunity and visibility 
 Political behavior influenced the process; not the outcome (?) [may have been different] 
 Law lost; did not want a CSR policy  
 Evaluation:  
 Gain credibility and standing 
 Ambiguity, confusion – function in charge of CSR 
 Result – groups try to interfere 
 No clear leader on CSR; no “DNA”; no goal 
 CSR s a negotiated process: decentralized, risk adverse 
  
53 Decision: Social impact assessment process – had official status and visibility 
 Outcome:  Good for company and group - credibility within company 
 High profile and enhanced reputation 
 Source of strong piece of policy and rules, and business unit support 
 Wrote social requirements in same format as Environment process – integrate the two 
 Integrated and embedded 
 FT person on human rights 
 High profile projects  
 Combination of internal and external influence  
 Evaluation:  
 Political behavior shaped the outcome – how important was it; will require a look back 
 No serious opposition or resistance to integrate practices 
 If no plans to revise Environment strategy, difficult to develop social practice 
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54 Outcome: Good for company 
 Evaluation: 
 Political tactics are critical  
 Pull pieces together – disjointed in the past 
 Self-interested behavior is good for CSR – plus for career path 
 Big wins – defensive cases, solve problems 
 Inside box – comply with law / preserve stock price 
 Outside box (CSR) – always entails political strategy 
 Crisis – resistance increases – triggering reaction by senior management to innovate 
  
55 Decision: Incomplete process 
 Outcome: Incomplete process 
 Evaluation:  
 Future tension: Socio-economic issues  
 All new people 
  
56 Decision: Implemented response lines in business units 
 Outcome:  Good for company; good for law and Environment – still have not taken advantage of Environment management system 
 Same protocol across all sites – CSR and Communications manager at each site 
 CSR team and communications team – low resources (could push, but we must standardize) 
 Some control – good for company  
 value for them 
 Negotiation – communication and CSR (sign-off) is a risk; Environment wants input 
 Evaluation: 
 Political tactics were necessary (emphasis added) 
 Negotiation and selling at different sites – depends on leadership in country 
 CSR is a negotiated process 
 Navigate system and use it – be tactical 
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